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SUMMARY 
A model is presented which simulates the criminal justice 
system over a 25 year horizon. The simulation is run over discrete 
one month periods incorporating the court, corrections and law 
enforcement systems. The model is used to determine the effect of 
various sentencing strategies involving the certainty and severity 
of punishment. Those sentence policies which correspond to the 
greatest estimated crime control effect are identified as optimal 
solutions. Extensions of the analysis are developed to specify the 
incapacitative and deterrent effects embodied in prevailing and 
optimal solutions. In addition, results of the model are presented 
for data bases originating in different geographical areas and a 
detailed comparison is performed. Finally, methods for the validation 




The alarming rise in the level of crime experienced by our 
society in the past decade indicates a definite need for re-examining 
the criminal justice system. From 1965 to 1976, the crime rate in the 
United States rose by over 140%. Although the theories explaining this 
increase are varied, most experts will agree that growth of the absolute 
level of deviance in society stems mainly from a breakdown in the 
committment to conformity on an individual level. The impressive 
magnitude of this breakdown has led many researchers to believe that 
the individual's decision to engage in illegal activities is a function 
of his perception of the economic costs and rewards for doing so in 
combination with the criminal's idiosyncratic utility structure. 
In the earliest years of the rapidly growing crime rate, the 
popular strategy for dealing with the problem was to try and modify the 
behaviors and character of the individual during incarceration. This 
trend led to a large increase in expenditures for experimental programs 
such as training and work therapy centers within correctional 
institutions. Perhaps, due to its outwardly rehabilitative appearance, 
this approach for dealing with offenders held great popular appeal for 
many until about 1974. Around that time, a significant body of 
literature appeared which presented evidence showing the failure of 
rehabilitation. Most such studies showed recidivism rates for 
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correctional institutions to be roughly the same whether or not 
rehabilitative programs were present. As a result, the emphasis, at 
least in the research area of criminal justice, changed to more 
objective resource management problems within the system. 
Much of the analytical research from 1975 to the present, in the 
area of resource constrained crime rate modeling, has addressed the 
question of allocation for a fixed resource rather than the absolute 
level of that allocation. In addition, concentration has switched from 
attacking the problem on an individual level to viewing the system in 
the aggregate. Here, judicial policy is seen as the controllable 
variables as opposed to "in-house" corrections policy. Specifically, 
attention has been directed toward determining what judicial policy 
within a stated expenditure level is associated with the lowest 
possible crime rate. A judicial policy consists of some trade-off 
combination of the certainty of imprisonment and the length of 
imprisonment meted out to convicted criminals. 
Most of the research addressing this question up until now has 
been unable to distinguish between the effects of these two variables 
in quantitative terms. This has made it a difficult task to clarify 
the nature of "optimal" solutions. In addition, recent modeling has 
been static in nature and unable to account for changes in either 
indogenous and exogenous variables including time. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
The objective of this research is to extend the approach taken 
in previous research to circumvent some of the shortcomings mentioned 
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in the previous section. In particular, a dynamic model of the criminal 
justice system, integrating the courts, corrections and law enforcement 
bodies, is constructed. The formulation of the model addresses the 
questions of increasing crime rates, limits on corrections expenditures 
and judicial policy simultaneously, in order to account for the global 
impact of manipulating judicial policy. Also, the model maintains the 
flexibility to deal with trends in any variable present in the system 
over time. By this, we are able to forecast the effects of these 
changes into the future, as well as pinpoint optimal policies at any 
given time during the analysis under a given set of hypothetical 
conditions. 
1.2 Overview of the Research 
The literature survey of the previously mentioned research and 
findings is presented in Chapter II. The model by Blumstein and Nagin 
[1976] was of particular interest since its formulation was a 
fundamental building block for explicitly modeling judicial policies. 
The univariate time series modeling of crime rates by Deutsch [1976] 
also received greater attention because it deals with modeling crime 
rates independent of controllable factors. This approach to crime rate 
modeling eventually serves as the driving mechanism of the model through 
time. Finally, the research of Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin [1975] is 
presented in some detail since their approach to the modeling of the 
behavior of criminal populations also appears in the final model. 
Chapter III primarily discusses the formulation of the analytical 
model. This chapter illustrates how the past research is integrated to 
4 
arrive at the analytical form and discusses the necessary assumptions 
for interpreting the results of the model. Finally, the third chapter 
presents some closed form analysis possible when using the model, and 
outlines the extensions beyond previous research which are present in 
the model. 
Chapter IV outlines a range of relevant experimentation 
pertaining to the model. In addition, procedures for developing input 
data to the model are discussed, and the technique for resolving the 
model to delineate quantities of theoretical and practical interest are 
presented. Chapter IV provides an item by item description of the input 
and output of the computerized model. Sources for the development of 
data and input parameters are discussed, and output of the computer 
program is outlined and described. In addition, the sequence and flow 
of logic within the computerized model is detailed. 
Chapter V embodies the experimentation and simulation mentioned 
in the proceeding three chapters. In this section, quantitative results 
are presented and analyzed for the state of Georgia in considerable 
detail. As well as providing detailed computational experience for the 
basic model in Georgia, Chapter V presents results for the major 
extensions of the model which are developed, and lays the groundwork 
for conclusions stemming from the analysis. Finally, Chapter V 
illustrates results from the model for the states of Missouri and Texas 
and prepares a detailed comparison. 
Chapter VI is a summary of the conclusions and recommendations 
following from the previous five chapters. It also provides direction 
for extensions of the research and offers a retrospective critique of 




The approach taken in the following literature survey is to 
develop the notion of what is meant by the crime rate, what is involved 
in its measurement, and how it can be characterized. This first section 
reflects the views of contemporary students in criminal justice, and 
some traditional ideas. This section is intended to develop the 
motivation for modeling, and illustrate current thinking in the area. 
The next two sections develop the concepts of deterrence and 
incapacitation, respectively. Since these concepts are highly relevant 
to the goals of our research in modeling, understanding of their nature 
is essential. 
The fourth section of the literature survey addresses some works 
in contemporary criminal justice modeling. Each sub-section covers a 
different approach appearing at one time or another in the literature 
on modeling static systems. The final sub-section is of particular 
importance, since it deals with very recent, "state of the art," 
techniques. Overall, the fifth and final section is material of a more 
recent vintage, which develops the need and methodology of dynamic 
modeling. Some very recent and extremely innovative research is 
presented, which is among the most recent literature dealing with 
stochastic modeling. 
The intent of structuring the literature in the above format was 
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to prepare the reader for considering the plausibility of dynamic 
modeling with deterrent and incapacitative effects present. This would 
be the next logically coherent trend in the field, and is consistent 
with the stated goals of our research. 
2.1 Crime in Society 
Durkheim [1964] has proposed the interesting and provocative 
notion that some degree of crime is characteristic to a normal, healthy 
society. Durkheim states that the presence of crime in society is 
natural and emanates from those processes which preserve internal social 
stability. Erickson [1972] explains that the phenomenon of crime 
originates as the cultural integrity of a sub-culture is specified and 
reinforced. In addition, he contends that social reaction to crime 
also contributes to internal cohesion and serves the useful purpose of 
strengthening the essential and defining norms of society. 
These ideas have given rise to the increasingly popular notion 
of some normal or "optimum" level of the crime rate. While the actual 
levels across various social subgroups may vary, Durkheim suggests 
that the approximate level within a specific group will rarely experience 
extreme fluctuation from its normal level. While these ideas may appeal 
to an observer as logically consistent or even plausible, a question 
arises concerning the bounds on our classification of deviant behavior. 
Specifically, a distinction must be made between that categorization of 
acts which include all deviant behaviors, or only those which are reacted 
to by society. 
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2.1.1 Measurement of the Crime Rate 
The fact that the criminal justice system does not react (i.e., 
record, punish, arrest, etc.) to all violation of legal statute, 
enormously complicates the measurement of levels of crime. Clearly, 
the absolute crime rate does not lend itself to rigorous quantification 
and can only be approached through estimation of aggregate costs to 
society as a whole. Further, gross inconsistencies in the recording 
and classification of crimes by authorities and victims confuses the 
notion of a stable crime rate to an even greater extent. This suggests 
that apparent empirical evidence for dynamic stability (Blumstein and 
Cohen, 1973) within the crime rate is actually an indication of chronic 
stability in the level of societies reaction to crime. Consequently, 
stability in the level of punishment delivered by society over the 
latter part of the century, as observed by Durkheim and others, appears 
to bear no direct or obvious implication for the level of deviance 
existing during that period. Rather, the implication is continuous 
reformation and flexibility in the norms of society, which define the 
bounds on acceptable behavior. 
2.1.2 Notion of a Behavior Distribution 
A great deal of the recent literature relating to explanation 
and modeling of the crime rate posits a statistical distribution of 
crime related behavior (Cavan, Wilkins). Structurally, the general 
approach is to use a normal distribution to characterize the diversity 
of behavior in a society. The extremities of this scale include 
behavior that is severely deviant to that which is, "compulsively 
moralistic," (Blumstein, 1973). Although an obvious oversimplification, 
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the behavior distribution has proven to be a useful tool for modelers 
and appears repeatedly in the current literature. Somewhere near the 
criminal tail of the scale, analysts denote a limiting value which 
defines the threshold on behavior deemed as socially acceptable. 
Moreover, the behavior distribution is specified in some general form 
g (x), while the level of punishment delivered by society, a , can be 
described using the general integral form: 
a = s°° f (x) c(x) g (x)dx. 
3 o B 
Where, c(x), is the probability of arrest and conviction of an 
individual who has engaged in behavior x, (Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin, 
1975). 
During social stability, a , remains relatively stable reflecting 
a homeostatic punishment process. Perturbation of the threshold 
parameter, (30)> through less permissive redefinition of social norms 
and subsequent punitive operations to a "lenient" society, might 
generate a short run increase of a . This would be followed by 
adjustment in the behavior distribution (left shifting) due to 
deterrence. This could be demonstrated, for example, by an increase 
in a societies certainty and in some cases, severity of enforcement. 
2.2 Deterrence 
While the purpose of isolating of criminal offenders strictly to 
confine their harm to society is obvious, the purpose of punishment is 
slightly more complex. Punishment of criminal offenders has the dual 
purpose of retribution for a wrongful act, and deterrence for would-be 
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offenders. Many social scientists today argue that not only does our 
correctional system fail to reform, but also fails to deter. Over the 
past few years, several efforts have been made to assess the deterrent 
effects of sentencing. These are mainly non-experimental studies based 
on often inaccurate police reports and diverse comparison of sentencing 
behavior among states, which do not show what happens when one 
deliberately changes sentencing patterns (other things equal). Despite 
this, most studies have produced consistent conclusions and the 
statistical techniques used make results due to chance unlikely. The 
thrust of these studies is revealing. 
Analysis and Summary of most such studies through 1972 is 
provided by Hunt and Antunes, who conclude that "certainty" of 
punishment has a significant deterrent effect on crime rates, while 
"severity" of punishment has a deterrent effect only on murder. 
Certainty is measured by dividing the number of persons sent to prison 
in each state for a given year by the number of reported crimes in the 
preceeding years. The larger the ratio, the greater the certainty of 
punishment. Severity is simply the median sentence length in a given 
year for a given crime. Capital punishment was not considered. This 
would imply that a low conviction rate may lead to a higher crime rate 
and vice versa. An alternate explanation of these results may be that 
high crime rates lead to low conviction rates due to court overcrowding 
or corrections capacity constraints. 
In short, the evidence is suggestive, (though not conclusive) 
that some penalties deter some crimes. Many researchers in criminal 
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justice, often overly concerned about the causes of crime, have 
convinced themselves that the average criminal is radically different 
from an ordinary person. That he or she is a compulsive and totally 
irrational individual, indifferent or (incognizant) of the risks 
involved in committing crimes. Apart from a small sub-class of extreme 
deviants, there is little evidence to support this conclusion in regards 
to the average or would-be criminal. While it may be true that the 
average criminal's utility for risk may differ from that of the average 
middle class citizen, it would not be surprising to find the marginal 
criminal engaging in less crime if the costs were to sharply increase 
relative to the benefits. 
Tullock, Becker, and Erlich have attempted to explain the 
behavior of the crime rate through the use of economic theory. Within 
his model, Becker holds that any violation can be conceived as yielding 
an increase in the offenders pecuinary wealth and/or psychic well being. 
Simultaneously, in violating the law one also risks a decrease in 
wealth and well being, for conviction entails paying a penalty, aquiring 
a record, and other disadvantages. As an alternative one can engage in 
a legal wealth or consumption generating activity. From this, a simple 
economic model of choice between legal and illegal activity is 
formulated. Erlich [1972] states, "the existence of a deterrent effect 
can be inferred from empirical estimates of the absolute and relative 
values of the elasticity of crime rates with respect to the average 
offenders subjective probability of punishment and expected time served.' 
This of course, is extremely difficult to measure because variables that 
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affect deterrence are the same as those that affect incapacitation. 
Wilson has illustrated the notion that the effective application 
of penalties, even modest ones, will deter certain forms of behavior. 
He cites the example, "Everyone who travels to Los Angeles from the 
east coast observes with awe, the extent to which traffic laws are 
obeyed." His explanation is that these laws have been enforced with 
enough vigor to make individuals feel that the risks of breaking them 
are sufficiently great and the costs of obeying them worthwhile. Other 
similar examples include studies where drunken driving in some European 
countries, and passing of bad checks in some states were found to be 
highly correlated to the intensity of enforcement efforts. Although 
these results are interesting, most serious students of crime would be 
reluctant to extend the inference to more extreme forms of crime, since 
these are generally associated with a different class of citizens. 
Differences in social class not withstanding, it is still not 
unreasonable to expect changes in the magnitude of risk to produce some 
affect on the crime rate, even though the studies do not address the 
importance of severe penalties. It is not clear, however, that these 
cases are of direct consequence when one considers that; in any rational 
system of criminal justice some very severe penalties will be necessary 
even if they have no general deterrent effect. This is because the 
extreme deviance of certain offenses precludes societies tolerance of 
small penalties, and there must always be a penalty to impose upon 
those already serving the maximum sentence. For example, the life 
sentence convict who may have "nothing to lose" by murdering another 
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inmate. Finally, the threat of severe penalties can be used as a 
resource for investigators seeking to obtain criminal informers. 
Moderating factors interacting with these arguments include the 
obviously diminishing returns of severity and the relationship between 
the severity of a penalty and its likelihood of imposition. 
2.3 Incapacitation 
As a function of imprisonment, camparitively little is known 
about the effects of incapacitation. While recent research has started 
to produce at least some sound empirical knowledge about deterrent 
effects, quantitative intelligence of the size of incapacitative effects 
is not readily available. For some time, we have understood that 
physical segregation of prisoners preclude their participation in 
criminal activity, however, questions on the quantitative implication 
of this effect have gone unanswered. 
Greenberg [1975] has presented some quantitative estimates of 
the incapacitative effect of imprisonment on the rate at which seven 
F.B.I, index offenses are committed. In developing these estimates, 
Greenberg has provided a new interpretation of parole recidivism data. 
Subject to data base limitations and a number of assumptions employed, 
his model calculations provide order of magnitude estimates of the 
collective incapacitative effect of imprisonment, clear of any deterrent 
effect. These results will be summarized shortly. 
To understand the meaning of incapacitation, it is useful to make 
a distinction between "selective" and "collective" incapacitation. By 
collective incapacitation is meant, crime reduction accomplished through 
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physical restraint regardless of the objective of the confinement. 
Whether the goals of confinement happen to be incapacitative, 
rehabilitative, deterrent or so on, decisions concerning who is to be 
imprisoned need not necessarily relate to predictions as to future 
conduct. For example, the continued incarceration of non-recidivists 
can, in many cases, be termed "collective incapacitation." Collective 
incapacitation is the most apparent dimension of overall incapacitation 
and is referred to by Von Hirsh as, "the visible tip of the iceberg." 
In contrast, selective incapacitation is defined to be, " the prevention 
of crime through the physical restraint of persons selected for 
confinement on the basis of a prediction that they, and not others, will 
engage in forbidden behavior in the absence of confinement," (Goldfarb 
and Singer, 1973). Therefore, selective incapacitation concerns those 
offenders who pose a threat of serious danger to the public. 
Theoretically, the optimum operating policy of our imprisonment system 
would call for incarceration of only this category of deviant. As a 
matter of fact, in October of 1973, the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency made the recommendation, "For all non-dangerous prisoners, 
who constitute the great majority of offenders, the sentence of choice 
should be one or another of a wide variety on non-institutional 
dispositions," (Board of Directors, 1973). 
Of course, the suggestion for determining which offenders are 
to be institionalized on the basis of their violent or dangerous 
propensities could be arrived at only through prediction of an 
individuals behavior upon release. This issue is addressed in our 
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discussion concerning recent studies in recidivism and the art of its 
prediction, the feasibility of which is still a controversal subject. 
Greenberg 1s findings relating to incapacitative estimates found 
that the amount of index crime prevented by incarceration of the present 
prison population amounted to less than eight percent of the total. 
Further, his estimates suggest that an increase of one year in the 
average length of time served (sentencing) could be expected to raise 
this figure to only 12 percent. In addition, Greenberg concludes that 
the unpredictability of prisoner behavior upon release precludes 
selective incapacitation as an effective direction for improving the 
incapacitative effectiveness of incarceration. While the rate of return 
to prison is high, most returns were not found to be the result of new 
convictions. This implies somewhat of a dilemma, since no method is 
presently known to reduce repeated crime through effective rehabilitation. 
2.4 Basic Methods in Crime Rate Modeling for Static Systems 
In considering the mathematical modeling of the crime rate, the 
analyst must bear in mind that it is not easy to specify an objective 
statement or the permissible means for optimization. Essentially, we 
want to minimize the total social costs of crime. Unfortunately, most 
of the components of this cost cannot be viewed in economic terms, and 
scientific methods don't necessarily guarantee the best balance between 
them. Inherent in any such balance is a weighting policy which is 
dependent upon subjective value judgement. In most cases, the application 
of operations research to criminal justice is not intended to produce 
optimal decisions, but rather to elucidate the implications of various 
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alternatives. Consequently, precise optimization of a deterministic 
objective function is not highly meaningful. 
been deterministic in nature and must be considered as rough 
approximation at best. In addition, a number of assumptions must always 
be made, some of which do not have substantial direct support by data. 
Consider the simple example of calculating the probability that a person 
living in some area will be affected by crime in a given year. First 
suppose that N crimes were committed during a given year in a small area 
with population K. If we impose the assumptions that all members of the 
population are equally likely to become victims and that a single victim 
and criminal are associated with any given crime, then the probability 
of a given person not being affected is: 
Up until the present time, most modeling in criminal justice has 
For very large populations, it is generally assumed that N * aK, 
where a is the average local crime rate. Consequently; 
* e -a (Avi-Itzhak, 1973) 
as K The probability of being affected over a lifetime can 
then be determined from, 
1 - -not e 
where n is the assumed average longevity within the population. 
2.4.1 Offender Behavior Modeling 
Much recent work in criminal justice modeling is oriented to 
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describing the behavior of the individual offender. In his work, 
where F(S) is the distribution function of S^. 
2.4.2 Conviction Probability Modeling 
Another technique,proposed by Avi-Itzhak and others, is criminal 
justice directed toward formulating the probability of an offender 
never being convicted. If we define the number of convictions during a 
complete criminal career to be D (a random variable), the probability 
of a criminal never being convicted can be given by: 
9. =  ; ;°° e S dF c (s) (Shinnar, 1974) 
0 o . i 
oo X N 
P q = P ( D=0) = Z ( r ^ ) X ( l - q o ) X 
x=0 o A +N o 
N (Avi-Itzak, 1973) N+A q 
o o 
Shinnar [1974] assumes that at the outset of his career the new criminal 
commits offenses at a Poisson rate A q . The probability that the 
offender is prosecuted and convicted subsequent to the commission of a 
crime is denoted by q Q. If we assume to be the length of his first 
sentence, we can associate a probability, (9)^, to be associated with 
his return to criminal activity after serving S^. Similarly, S^, 9^, 
A ^ , q^, can be defined following the offender's surviving his or her 
th 
i conviction and sentence. With the additional assumptions that all 
are statistically independent for i = (1,2,3,...), and that the 
length of the criminal career is exponentially distributed, the return 
probabilities can be stated as: 
where N is the inverse of the expected length of the criminal career. 
The probability that a criminal is not convicted, again having survived 
t h 
the i conviction and sentence, is similarly defined as: 
p . - * ^zf- d - q , ) x N i _ N+A. H i ' A.+N x=0 1 1 
N (Avi-Itzhak, 1973) N+A.q. i i 
We can further specify the distribution D in relation to P and G as 
follows: 
P(D > 0) = 1 - P 
o 
p ( d > i(>o)) = n e.(i-p.) p ( d > o) 
j-i 3 J 
= (l-P ) 1 8 . (1-P.) 
3=1 J 
To find the expected value of D (expected number of conviction during 
a career): 
oo n 
e ( d ) = z (i-p ) n e (i-p ) 
n o . t n n n=0 j=l 
Similarly, the expected number of convictions can be stated as: 
\ °° n 
$ = E(D|D > 1) = f ^ r - = E n e (1-P ) (Avi-Itzhak, 1973) — l-r . n n o n=0 j=l 
Under static or "steady state" conditions, where we assume that the 
criminal population is constant, $ can be estimated from the proportion 
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of convictions where the offender has no prior record (virgin). If we 
let Y denote the number of convictions recorded, then: 
P ( Y = 1 ) " Pvirgin " j (Shinnar, 1974) 
In addition, Shinnar has shown that 
P(D _> y|D >_ 1.) P(D ^ y|D ^ 1) 
P ( Y = y ) = E (D 1D > 1) - — * 
P(D >_ l|D >_ 1) 
P(Y=1) = = j-
Still other approaches to estimating cf> can be found in the literature. 
For example, Avi-Itzhak (1973) has estimated cf> through repeat 
probabilities. Letting denote the probability that an offender with 
i convictions will at least once more be convicted, we can write: 
r . = (l-P.)e. i = 1,2,3... 
i i i 
by substituting into the equation, we have: 
oo n 
(j) = l + £ n r . . 
n=l 1=1 1 
If we could assume that prior record had no effect on an offender's 
behavior (e.g., r ^ = r ^ = r ^ = • • • = r ) , 
^ n 1 
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or R = (Belkin, Blumstein, Glass, 1973) 
2.4.3 Aggregate Offense Modeling 
Yet another approach found in the literature toward effective 
modeling is aimed at predicting the number of total offenses which are 
expected to be committed by an individual during his or her criminal 
career. The expected value of this quantity and the size of the 
criminal population are the determinants of the level of crime in a 
society. If we let E(x) determine this expected value, and define a 
set of random variables, y^,y^,y^*•••» where y^ represents the number 
of violations committed by an offender between convictions j and (j+1), 
we can write: 
oo n 
E(x) = E E( E y.|D=n) P(D=n). 
n=0 i=0 1 
Shinnar has shown that 
A.(l-q.) X.(l-q.) 
P(y. = x|D = n > i) = ( - ^ - ^ ( l - - ^ i - ) x - 1,2,3, 
and 
n+a. 
E(u.|D = n > i) = E(u,|D > i) = T T ~~ i i n + a ^ 
substitution to the above in terms of our original variables will yeild: 
E(X) = E E(y |D > n) P(D > n) + E E(y |D=n) P(D=n) 
ri-0 n n=0 n 
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where: ( n-1 
U V ° n n .n-Cl-P.) 6. X (1-q ) 
E(PJD = n) P ( D ^ ) fTTT 
n o 
consequently, 
CO \ 00 
E ( x ) = I P(D > °) = J p ( p > °) 
n n+X q 1-P A q n=0 n n n n=0 n 
x n 
where -^j^ can be shown to be the expectation of the number of 
n n q n 
t i l 
offenses committed between the offenders n release and his or her 
next conviction (or termination of the criminal career). 
If it were assumed that the conviction probabilities were equal 
for each time an individual were to commit an offense (i.e., = = 
q^ = ... = q ) , we could rewrite : 
oo 
E(X) = - £ P(D > n) = 
q n=0 q 
which is not an unreasonable result. Using the result, E(D) = (1-P)' 
and 0 <_ P <_ 1, (by the definition of probability), we can make the 
claim that : 
1-P 
( 2 - ) < 0 < * . 
q Y - q 
Imposing the additional assumption that 1-P- < 1-P. for i > 1, we can 
o - l — 
make the additional claim that : 
1-P (j) > (j) - 1 o — 
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thus, bounding the value of E(X) between: 
4-1 
q - - q 
Studies by Sellin, Wolfgang and others have provided evidence that the 
repeat probability (1-P^) tends to increase with the severity of prior 
record of the offender, serving to make our additional assumption 
reasonable. 
2.4.4 N t h Time Out Models 
Some contemporaries in criminal justice modeling used still 
another approach oriented toward a hypothetical, "N*"*1 time out" system. 
In such a system, an offender will experience his first N-l convictions 
th 
without being sentenced to prison. If a criminal is convicted an N 
time, he is assumed to serve a prison sentence infinite in length. If 
we again allow the number of convictions to equal: 
N-l n 
, N = 1 + E E (1-P.) 
n=l i=l 
maintaining the assumption that all q_̂  are equal, we can write the 
expected number of offenses committed during a criminal's lifetime as; 
1-P 
E ( X ) N = - - ^ * N = E(X). 
2.4.5 Current Work in Crime Rate Modeling 
Blumstein and Nagin [1976] develop a model that estimates total 
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crime rate as a function of imprisonment policies, incorporating 
estimated incapacitative and deterrent effects. Formulation is within 
an optimization framework minimizing crime rate and is utilized to 
investigate the implications of alternative incarceration policies. 
Within their model, the historically observed stability of the 
imprisonment rate is incorporated as a constraint in the long term. 
Consequently, they pose an allocation of limited resource problem to 
achieve maximum crime reduction through deterrent and incapacitative 
effects. 
As direct policy variables, Blumstein and Nagin employ the 
probability of imprisonment given conviction (or certainty = Q ) , and 
the average time served by imprisoned offenders (or severity = S). 
Other variables appearing in their model include the probability of 
conviction given a crime (q), total crime rate (C), the rate at which 
free criminals commit crimes (X), the maximum per capita imprisonment 
rate (u), the proportion of time a criminal is free (N), and upperbounds 
on Q and S(Q , S ). The formulation of the crime rate then follows the m m 
logic of multiplying the number of criminals by their rate of crimes 
committed by years free, and dividing this quantity by the total 
population multiplied by the total number of crimes. In terms of our 
variables : 
C = (X N)(P) 
where P represents the criminal portion of the population. Thus, the 
constrained optimization model can be stated as: 
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Min: C = X N(Q,S) P(Q,S) 
Subject to: I = qQSC = qQSXN(Q,S) P(Q,S) 
0 < Q < Q < 1 — — m — 
0 < S < S — m 
Here, P(Q,S) can be viewed as the decision to engage in criminal 
activities and is assumed in the model to be of the mathematical form: 
y(Q,S) 
P(Q,S) = 
1 + ey(Q,s) • 
The behavior of this function is specified by the determination of 
y(Q,S) of the form: 
y (Q,S) = y 0 + y± Q + Y 2 QS n. 
This represents the expected utility for incapacitation (negative), 
E[D(S)], where: 
E[D(S)] = aqQ + dqS n 
- Y XQ + Y 2 S n 
In addition, YQ is included to allow for adjustment in the size 
of the criminal population. 
With the functional form of the criminal population specified, 
Nagin and Blumstein next characterize the proportion of time that 
criminals are free. Because XqQ is the expected imprisonment rate, it 
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follows that the inverse can be viewed as the expected time between 
commitments. Since S is the time served upon imprisonment, then the 
total time a criminal exists is: 
U q Q ) " 1 + S 
and the proportion of time free becomes: 
(AqQ) 1 (AqQ) 1 + S 
-1 
1 + AqQS (Shinnar, 1973) 
The mathematical form of the Nagin, Blumstein optimization model can 
now be restated as: 
M l n : C ^ S > • T T T q Q S • 1 + a„(Q.S) 
Subject to: I(Q,S) - + £ y 
0 < Q < Q < 1 — — m — 
0 < S < S 
— m 
2.5 Basic Methods for Non-Stationary Systems 
The overwhelming evidence of growth in the crime rate over the 
past decade is indicative of the need for dynamic modeling of the crime 
rate. The major difficulty is to quantitatively identify the parameter 
changes contributing to the sudden upswing in recorded crime rates. 
The evidence suggests that the main factors are the increasing size of 
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the criminal population, sentencing, parole policy, and the behavior 
characteristics of criminals. In particular, the dominating factor has 
been cited to be the increasing size of the criminal population and 
specifically, the input rate of new offenders versus the attrition rate 
of old offenders. This can complicate the formulation of crime rate 
models, particularly since the criminal career, in most studies, is 
assumed to start with the first arrest or conviction. In actuality, 
the criminal career starts with the first offense, and it is possible 
that many offenders are never convicted, confusing the notion of the 
size of the criminal population to an even greater extent. 
One technique, based on the belief that non-stationarity in the 
crime rate has resulted from the increasing rate of new offenders, has 
been proposed by Shinnar [1973]. By assuming criminal career lengths 
constant (equaling T ) , uniform intensity of all offenders over time, 
and every criminal career starting at age 18-t, the proportion of the 
general population engaging in criminal acts was identified. If the 
number embarking on a criminal career at some point in time were A , and 
it had been increasing at an average rate, "a," until that time, then 
the number of offenders at that time should number: 
T-l 
„ . , A A , A . a 
0 = ~a 2 ~ T = T " * , , . 1 - 1 
a a (a-l)a 
and the number of offenders under 18 would be: 
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from this, the proportion of offenders below 18 years of age at that time 
can be given by: 
T-t a'" 1 
P = a - T i r • 
a 
If we define, b, as the average rate at which the number embarking on a 
criminal career is increasing, following the year in question, we can 
write the offender population size as: 
F n - (̂ fer F n xfZ-i) A- (shinnar> 1974) 
\ (l-a)a / 
If we were able to assume the number of crimes committed by each 
offender k, we can give: 
E(D) = KTq 
and 
= E(D) = KTq 
* = ^ 0 = 1 - (l-q) K T ' 
Consequently, the expected number of convictions for the base year is 
given by: 
The probability that a criminal will experience his first conviction 
after j years is given by: 
= ( l - q ) K j K ( l - (l-q) K) j = 1,2,...T 
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The expected number of virgin convictions n years following the base 
year can be given by: 
n T-n-1 A3 +1+1 
Z = E A b U ; 3 .... + E — ~ . n . n n-i+1 . _ 1 i=0 i=l a 
Consequently, the probability of a given conviction involving no prior 
record in that (base +n) year can be stated as: 
Z 
P = . virgin G n 
Despite its versatility, models of this type are still deterministic, 
and cannot be utilized in describing changes in the parameters through 
time. 
2.5.1 Stochastic Empirical Models 
More recently, empirical-stochastic models have been advanced by 
Deutsch [1976] and others. In one recent study, Deutsch has 
characterized the arrivals or "occurrences," of crimes as a stochastic 
process, where eight index crimes are viewed in ten major U.S. cities. 
In this article, a three stage procedure in model construction is 
proposed, involving identification of a model form appropriate to the 
particular data base, numerical assignment of tentative model parameters, 
and statistical testing to update model form, for re-identification (as 
well as adequate fit). By utilizing the Box-Jenkins multiplicative 
autoregressive-moving average models, Deutsch has succeeded in developing 
time dependent point forecasts of crime rates, which transmit seasonal 
trend and fluctuation as well as linear trend and non-seasonal 
2 9 
fluctuation. In that study, rape and homicide were fit to lead-time 
dependent forecasts of the form: 
Z (£) = Z t(£-1) = Z t - e^a (Deutsch, 1976) 
Where Z f c is the estimated level of reported crime at time t, i is the 
2 
lead time. 0 is a seasonal moving average, and a f c is an NID(0,a ) 
error term. For six other Index crimes studied, a similar but slightly 
more complicated forecast of the form: 
Z t ( £ ) = Z t ( £ - 1 ) + Z t ( £ - 1 2 ) - Z t ( £ - 1 3 ) £ >̂  1 5 (Deutsch, 1 9 7 6 ) 
was developed. These stemmed from functions describing the reported 
level of crime at time t, developed directly from the Box-Jenkins 
model: 
Z t = Z + a - x (Deutsch, 1976) 
for rape and homicide, and 
Z = Z - + Z 1 0 - Z - „ + a - e_a _ - Q^a t t-1 t-12 t-13 t 1 t-1 1 2 t-12 
+ 6 1 2 e i a t - 1 2 (Deutsch, 1976) 
for the other six index crimes studied. Deutsch's forecasting results 
were found to be highly efficient, and behaved in an intuitively 
reasonable manner for estimates far into the future. Overall, each 
step-ahead forecast reflected the previous forecast updated for error 
and trend, and as such, characterized a simple Markov Chain process. 
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In addition, Deutsch's algorithm for model generation precludes "apriori 
bias" of the analyst by structuring the model in direct consequence to 
the individual data base. 
2.5.2 Dynamic Modeling of the Criminal Population 
Of substantial interest to our research objectives, Blumstein, 
Cohen and Nagin [1975] have proposed three way partitioning of the 
total population. Specifically, Blumstein (et. al.) considers the 
prison, free criminal and law abiding populations, and has made an 
attempt to characterize the flow rates between individual segments. 
Such an approach offers strong promise when one considers the 
potential of associating flow rates with their respective heuristic 
interpretations. The approximate form of the model is as follows: 
Prison Population = P(t), 
e ^ C t ) (l-6)K 1(t) 
Free Criminals = C(t) Law-abiding Population = L(t) 
K 5(t) 
(Blumstein, et al., 1975) 
Of particular interest is the flow between the law abiding and 
free criminal populations. Within these flows operates the social 
processes of redefinition in criminal behavior, the central theme of 
the homeostatic notion. In other words, the model is constructed such 
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that any purturbation in a flow will be followed by adjustment back 
toward an equilibrium state, in agreement with the observed stability 
in the level of punishment delivered by society. This, of course, is 
an oversimplification of the process. 
The formal description of the model can be expressed as the 
time rate of change (or first derivative) of the respective populations. 
P(t) = K 1(t)P(t) + K 2(t)C(t) 
C(t) = 9K 1(t)P(t) - K 2(t)C(t) - K 4(t)C(t) + K 3(t)L(t) 
L(t) = (l-6)K 1(t) P(t) + K 4(t)C(t) - K 3(t)L(t) + K 5(t)L(t) 
where 
K^(t) = release from prison 
K 2(t) = imprisonment rate of criminals 
K^(t) = rate of which law abiders become criminals 
K.(t) = rate at which criminals become law abiders 
K^(t) = birth rate 
9 = rate at which released prisoners return to criminal 
activity. (Blumstein, et.al., 1975) 
The dynamic character of the model was then explored under the 
assumption that all K_^(t) flow terms are constant. Under this 
assumption, a differential equation governing the behavior of P(t) 
was developed and compared with the dynamics of the actual time series 
for imprisonment rates. It is worthwhile noting at this point that the 
only known values of the system are K.., using the results of Gottfredson 
32 
[1959] and a number of other follow-up studies on released prisoners. 
Other flow parameters were calculated in the following approximate 
manner: 
K 2 = Prison receptions (known) * C(t) 
= 1 v (average length of the criminal career) 
(guestimated value) 
- 9 K 1 P ( t ) + (K 2+K 4) C(t) 
K 3 T(t) - P(t) - C(t) f 
Statistical testing of results with the actual data have proven to be 
encouraging, and some interpretation of flow rates was provided. 
According to Blumstein, the and flow parameter of the 
model represent the two aspects of severity and certainty of punishment. 
Since increasing severity of punishments (average sentence length) would 
decrease the release rate, k is seen as an inverse measure of severity. 
Alternatively, the more criminals imprisoned, (K^), the greater the 
certainty of punishment in a society will become. Since and 
represent flows between criminals and law abiders, they characterize 
what Durkheim refers to as the "level of conformity" in a society. In 
particular, the magnitude of flow from law abiders to criminals, (K^), 
measures the "commitment to conformity." This is a complex interaction 
between general deterrence, internalization of social norms and other 
elusive factors contributing to the motivations of individual members 
of society. Analogously, the flow from criminals to law abiders, (K^), 
represents what Blumstein has called, the "endurance of the criminal 
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role." This flow consists of a combination of the individual's 
disincentives to remain an offender, and opportunities associated with 
engaging in legitimate behavior. 
2.5.3 Fluctuations in Criminal Population as a Markov Process 
Blumstein's characterization has been extended into a three 
stage Markov process, where flow rates serve as transition probabilities 
and population segments are states of the system. Again, imposing the 
restriction that all K^(t) are constant over time, Blumstein has 
proposed the following transition matrix for his model: 
P(t) 








1-K 2-K 4 
K, 
L(t+1) 
( 1 - 8 ) ^ 
K 4 
1-K. 
Examination of the matrix will reveal its positive recurrent nature, 
and the subsequent existence of a stationary distribution. This enables 
the analyst to observe system behavior in terms of a steady-state or 
"equilibrium" condition. In fact, this analysis was used to investigate 
the effects of each parameter (see Blumstein, et.al., 1975) in the model, 
The major findings were that relatively little could be done to reduce 
the proportion of criminals, but to the extent that opportunities to 
engage in legitimate activities and deterrence were operating, "more 
reasonable attempts could be made to reduce criminality." 
Although Blumstein's model appears to provide satisfactory 
accounting of observed imprisonment rates, it is severely limited by 
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the assumption of constant flow rates. This precludes the integration 
of adaptive behavior into the model. In addition, the model fails to 
explicitly characterize deterrent effects, and is thus restricted in 
its generality. 
2.6 Summary 
Like many social science applications of operations research, 
criminal justice modeling is plagued by uncertainty in the estimation 
of model parameters and ambiguity in interpretation of results. 
Evidence from the most recent research, however, has tended to 
de-emphasize the importance of the relationship between judicial 
behavior and public safety, in light of the relative magnitude of the 
criminal population and society's capacity for incarceration. Similar 
results have been obtained in the area of feasible limits on law 
enforcement policy. Apparently, the results so far indicate that there 
is little that can be done in the way of implementable policy to control 
crime. Apart from accepting this grim conclusion, we fully recognize 
the limitations and lack of generality characteristic to current 
research in the field, and can only seek to enrich the substance of 




In this chapter the basic model for relating judicial sanctions 
to levels of crime is developed and summarized. The first section 
presents the components and form of the basic equation. The following 
three sections develop the major building blocks appearing in the 
formulation. The approach taken in these sections is to represent 
results from the literature and illustrate the modification procedures 
necessary for integration of these results into our model. The first 
of these sections develops the underlying driving mechanism behind 
the model. This stems from an application of Box-Jenkins models to 
crime rates first presented by Deutsch [1976]. The second of these 
sections develops the adaption of the three-way model of society 
(first presented by Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin, 1975) to our model. 
The last of the three sections describes the optimization process 
within the model borrowing heavily from the work of Nagin [1976]. The 
final section summarizes the model and provides an in-depth comparison 
of the model to its predecessors. 
3.1 Form of the Model 
In retrospect we have found that state of the art analysis has 
focused primarily on the three basic elements of the criminal justice 
system. These elements are; law enforcement, the corrections system 
and the courts. In addition, it has been shown that leading research 
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for each of these elements is embodied in the models of Deutsch, 
Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin, respectively. 
The overall objective stated for our research was to develop 
a model characterizing the relationship between these basic elements. 
Figure 1 represents an abstraction of the criminal justice system where 
arrows between boxes represent linkages between the various bodies 




^ Courts Corrections 
Figure 1. The Criminal Justice System 
The specific means by which each of the elements is modeled has 
been presented in the previous chapter. To summarize, it was shown 
that law enforcement is modeled frequently in terms of its response 
variable, i.e., the crime rate. Modeling of corrections has primarily 
focused on the flow of individuals through the system which for most 
purposes stem from activities within the courts. From this framework, 
we would like to develop a model which will tie activities from within 
the courts to the crime rate. That is, we want to assess the activities 
in the courts in terms of their impact on the rate of crime. Such an 
analysis should invariably involve the corrections system in a way that 
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will account for the moderating constraints and impacts embodied in 
this element, which are inherent to the system as a whole. That is, 
we cannot facilitate a change in any one element which will not have 
ramifications for the remaining components of the system. 
In addition to the general conditions stated for the models, we 
also need to impart to the formulation characteristics which enhance 
its usefulness. Specifically, the analysis should provide insights for 
improving controllable policies and extrapolating for results into the 
future. This would be done to predict the future behavior of the pre­
vailing system and evaluate the potential results of policy improvements 
which may be suggested. Finally, since the situation suggests an 
integrative model of its predecessors, it should combine their virtues 
and extend their capabilities. In the following section, a formulation 
representative of the criminal justice process is proposed. The model 
features representations of each of the elements embodied in a basic 
equation defining their interrelationship. Although this formulation 
represents only one of numerous possible approaches, state of the art 
research is such that satisfactory means are available for adequately 
modeling each of the individual components. 
Figure 2 represents the logical relationships used to model 
crime and links each to its respective element of the system. This 
representation was developed first by Blumstein and Nagin [1976], who 
employed this logic for static modeling of the criminal justice system. 
With appropriate notation we can rewrite the entries from Figure 2 
using this equation: 
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where, 
= crime rate at time t 
X = average rate at which offenders commit crimes 
D = proportion of the population engaging in crime during t 
proportion of time a criminal is free 
Crimes in 
Period t , 
_ /Offenses Per\ /Proportion of \ /Proportion of the 
I Offender in I / Offenders Free ] [ Population Choosing] 
\ Period t / I to Commit Crime/ 1 to Engage in Crime 
^ y v \in Period t / \During Period t 
Law 
Enforcement Courts 
Figure 2. Summary of the Logical Relationship 
This equation is heretofore referred to as the basic equation of 
the model. In using the basic equation, we will attempt to determine 
the optimal Q and S policy embodied in the component of equation #1, 
optimal in the sense that the specified policy will result in the 
lowest possible level of expected crimes. To recall from the previous 
chapter, Q was the probability of imprisonment given conviction for a 
crime prevailing in the court system of interest, while S was the 
average sentence length meted out in that court system. These, of 
course, are the controllable variables within the system, subject to 
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certain feasibility requirements. 
The procedure for using the model will be to characterize the 
prevailing levels of crime using the formulation of Deutsch [1976]. 
Corrections activities for the same periods of interest will be modeled 
simultaneously using a modified version of the dynamic markovian model 
of Blumstein, Nagin and Cohen [1975]. Integration of these two models 
will enable us to specify three of the four components of the basic 
equation modeled for prevailing conditions in the past, present and 
future. The remaining unknown component, D t , is then solved for and 
analyzed in terms of the model of Nagin, Blumstein [1976], incorporating 
controllable variables, Q and S. Finally, analysis is employed to 
determine optimal values of Q and S in terms of minimizing and the 
significance of this change in policy is evaluated. Figure 3 is a 
summary of the components of the model in terms of the three building 
blocks. 
Nagin [1976] 
Figure 3. Summary of Model Components in Relation 
to the Three Building Blocks 
The following sections of this chapter develop the specifics of 
each component of the basic equation, outlining the necessary 
modifications for their implementation and developing the mechanics 
for executing the model. 
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3.2 Specification of t 
W t " \ - Z t - 1 " Z t - 1 2 + Z t - 1 3 
The idea of characterizing crime rates with Box-Jenkins models 
was advanced by Deutsch during 1976. In this section, part of this 
work is represented in a form useful for our modeling purposes. For a 
more in-depth treatment of the subject, (see [11]). 
In our model, the random variable, Z^, represents the occurrence 
of reported index crimes in period t. For the dual purpose of precision 
(in using time series) and meaningful transient analysis, a period 
duration of one month has been chosen. Since monthly data for 
occurrences of index crimes becomes less available with each level of 
aggregation, annual figures for individual states have been transformed 
using monthly index crime occurrences in metropolitan areas. The 
actual data goes form 1966 to 1975, and represents the total number of 
reported offenses for each month. This data was obtained from the 
"Uniform Crime Reports," an annual publication of the FBI. 
Following the work of Deutsch [1976], a multiplicative 
autoregressive moving-average model, originally proposed by Box-Jenkins, 
was utilized to characterize the level of crime. The model is initially 
loaded using the first twelve monthly estimates,and subsequent forecasts 
are developed using the form: 
Z t " Z t - 1 + Z t - 1 2 " Z t - 1 3 + a t " V t - l " 6 1 2 a t - 1 2 + 6 1 2 e i a t - 1 3 
for t > 12, where a is calculated from W using the relation. ^ 
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for t > 12. Finally, 
a t " V l 2 + 9 l a t - l + e i 2 a t - 1 2 + e i 6 1 2 a t - 1 3 
where the values of for t < 12, were defined to be zero, and the 
remainder solved for recursively. 0^ and 0 a r e parmeter estimates 
for the fitted model. The actual past data and forecasted levels of 
crime reveal an alarming growth in the rate of crime experienced by 
society over the past decade. Despite a recent slowdown in the rate 
of growth (possibly related to increasing prison populations and 
corrections activity), the most recent data still exhibit an increase 
in the level of reported offenses. Although some have argued that the 
increases in crime of recent years is partly attributable to 
inconsistencies in reporting practices and increasing willingness of 
the general public to report crimes, these factors alone are not 
sufficient to discount real expansion in the criminalistic faction of 
our society. 
Assuming our time series approach adequately models occurrences 
of crime on a monthly basis, we can forecast to obtain estimates of the 
random variable far into the future. Previous research with this 
procedure suggests that is indeed an adequate representation of past 
data and has proven it highly efficient for short and long range 
forecasting purposes (see [11]). We are now in a position to specify 
values of Z f c in (equation #1). The following section develops our 
adaptation of the Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin model for specification 
of K. 
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3.3 Specification of K 
For a very long duration, it is not extremely difficult to 
estimate the proportion of time that a criminal is free. This is 
because viewing this proportion over a very long period is equivalent 
to assuming it is constant. Such an approach does not account for 
changes in the magnitude and mix of the criminal population and is 
insensitive to whatever prevailing trend may exist in corrections 
activity at a given time. In order to preclude these difficulties, 
we would like to arrive at an estimate of the proportion of time an 
offender is free, based on information that is current. Current in 
the sense that our estimate reflects both the immediate inmate 
population and the prevalence of the criminal role at any instant. 
Through this procedure, we can formulate a dynamic mechanism to 
generate unique estimates for each period of interest. 
If we think of the proportion of time that an offender is free 
as the proportion of offenders that are free over time, we can 
approximate this quantity by the following ratio: 
C / c + P K = t/ t t 
where C^ = the criminal population at time t, 
P = the inmate population at time t. 
With a very few exceptions, this ratio characterizes the 
proportion of potential deviants who have the capacity to violate the 
law outside of prison. 
43 
At the very heart of the model lies the dynamic process by 
which estimates of and P are produced uniquely for every one month 
time period. In the remainder of this section, we illustrate our 
motivation and procedure for employing the model of Blumstein, Nagin 
and Cohen [1975] in developing monthly estimates of the C and P 
random variables. In doing so, we develop the second of the four 
components in the basic equation. 
P 
3.3.1 Motivation for Using Time Series Modeling of t 
Recent findings in criminal reform suggest that only a small 
fraction of the criminal population is responsible for the majority of 
crimes committed and, therefore, the most effective approach to the 
control of crime is incarceration of this small fraction of extreme 
deviants. This belief has carried over in contemporary judicial 
behavior. 
The results have been severe overcrowding in prison facilities 
and unprecedented pressure on the constraints of the economic resource 
that society is prepared to allocate for corrections. The incidence of 
violent crimes, however, has leveled off somewhat during this time. 
This leveling off is attributable partly to the isolation of highly 
active criminals and partly to the deterrent effect associated with 
increasing prison disposition of criminal cases. The model being 
presented has been designed to provide estimates of this deterrent 
effect. 
For the purpose of modeling the growth of the prison and 
criminal populations, we can postulate a descriptive model anchored by 
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the time series description of the actual growth in the imprisonment 
rate. To do this, an approach to modeling P analogous to that for 
modeling is employed, and provides us with a time series description 
of monthly prison populations for the past, present and future. In 
their model, Blumstein, Nagin and Cohen have shown that such a process 
can be generated by following a first order linear differential equation, 
possibly with time varying coefficients. To illustrate this connection, 
Blumstein, Nagin and Cohen (see [5]) describe the derivative of P by 
its corresponding difference equation using the form: 
The general first order differential equation with constant coefficients 
is: 
P + dP = F t t 
and approximating with the difference equation, we have: 
P t + dP t = <P t - P ^ ) + d P t = F 
Putting this in the form of our original equation, the following 
second order autoregressive function was derived by Blumstein (see [5]): 
Thus, the differential equation #2 is the mathematical characterization 
of a dynamic process that would generate the time series that were 
observed. As it now stands, a process has been developed which could 
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represent any of numerous physical mechanisms. We would like to develop 
a model which will allow the adaptation of this flow process to 
contemporary corrections activity. Development of such a model will 
allow us to estimate the size of the prison or criminal population 
during any time period using the Blumstein model. 
3.3.2 Application of the Blumstein, Nagin and Cohen Model 
In their research, Blumstein, Nagin and Cohen show that for such 
a dynamic description of the imprisonment rate to be useful, a model of 
the social mechanism generating imprisonment rates must be formulated. 
This model must also generate flows which are consistent with the trend 
observed in the actual time series, and be plausible from an intuitive 
standpoint. The basis of their model is the partitioning of the total 
population into subgroups, one of which will be the prison population. 
The rate of exchange between groups is then explored with each group 
defined in terms of its own time rate of change. 
3.3.3 Blumsteins Three-Way Partitioning 
Assuming that each member of society can be classified as either 
a legitimate citizen, criminal or prison inmate, Blumstein postulates 
the description of society presented in Figure 4. 
C represents those individuals whose behavior in total is 
defined by society to be criminally deviant and eligible for 
imprisonment. Conversly, L t represents those individuals whose 
behavior is considered to be socially acceptable, and P are members 
of society at time t who are confined in penal institutions, isolated 
from the remainder of society. The arrows between nodes characterize 
Figure 4. Blumstein's Descriptive Model of Society 
the exchange rate between groups. They are defined by Blumstein to be 
f - The rate at which inmates are released from 
prison in period t. 
f - The rate at which criminal cases are disposed 
of through prison sentences during period t. 
fg - The rate at which juveniles become delinquent, 
and formerly legitimate citizens enter into 
criminal activity. 
. f, - The rate at which criminals cease their 4t 
illegitimate activities and re-enter normal 
society during period t. 
f^ t - The rate of growth in the total population 
during period t. 
y - rate of prisoner recidivism (to be distinguished 
from rehabilitation). 
If we think of the behavior of P as governed by an equation of 
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the form: 
p(t) = - f l t p(t) + f 2 t C(t) 
and for C •* t 
C(t) = Y f 1 P(t) - f 2C(t) - f 4 C(t) + f 3 L(t). 
Blumstein has shown that we can observe the behavior of the 
model under the assumption of constant f^. Specifically, we are 
interested in the accuracy with which the model predicts the behavior 
of P , since our earlier analysis has provided us with apriori 
information regarding this phenomenon. In short, P is considered the 
only known value output by the model and available for diagnosing the 
results predicted by the model. Clearly, the effectiveness of this 
formulation is tied directly to the estimation of flow parameters. 
3.3.4 Blumstein 1s Three-Way Model as a Markov Process 
According to Blumstein, if we consider each of the nodes in 
Figure 4 to be a state of the system, we can represent the figure with 
the following transition matrix. 








(Blumstein, et. al.) 
Note the positive recurrent nature of this matrix and the subsequent 
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existence of a stationary distribution. This feature of the M matrix 
permits the use of simulation techniques to examine the transient and 
stationary distribution for different values of f^ and y. Systematic 
adjustment of the f^ can be used to investigate the effect of each 
individual parameter on the equilibrium condition. Parameters which 
are unknowns are then manipulated in order to obtain agreement with 
the mechanism governing the imprisonment rate time series. 
3.3.5 Discussion of Flow Variables in the Markov Process 
At this point, the importance of policy variables should be 
introduced. Within the D formulation of the general model (for the 
total crime rate, not previously discussed), two controllable 
variables appear. They are defined as, Q and S, the certainty and 
severity of punishment, respectively. Certainty of punishment refers 
to the likelihood of a prison sentence, given conviction for a crime. 
Severity is a measure of the average length of sentences meted out. 
Both quantities relate directly to judicial procedure constrained by 
the limits of legal statute. For example, certain offenses are 
subject to minimum and/or maximum sentence lengths within which, 
presiding officials have relatively complete autonomy. The variables 
Q and S relate directly to two of the four flow variables appearing 
in the transition matrix for the process. 
Since S involves the amount of time that individuals remain 
incarcerated, it can be viewed as an inverse measure of the rate at 
which they are released. This is precisely the f^ flow parameter 
appearing in the model. The relationship between f 1 and S can be 
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viewed as follows: 
f 1* 
Consequently, the value of f could theoretically be related to a 
given value of S. It is worth noting, however, that other alternatives 
exist for calculating f independent of S, such as the time rate of 
change in prison populations over a one year period. Similarly, Q is 
a variable regulating the number of convicted criminals entering 
prison. The relationship between a n c ^ Q c a n D e summarized, 
theoretically, by a relationship of the approximate form: 
where c is the proportion of reported crimes punishable by imprisonment, 
and Z is the level of reported offenses. 
process are f^ and f^. These are the flows between the legitimate 
citizen and criminal populations. This probably represents a complex 
product of a number of different contributing factors, among them, 
the level of heterogeneity of society, the degree of internalization 
of social norms, and the deterrent effects associated with penalties. 
These factors all operate on different dimensions of an individual's 
motivation and utility structure. Rather than attempting to 
guesstimate these values outright, we can postulate reasonable bounds 
on their exact values, and simulate to solve for values which force 
agreement with the prison population time series. For example, if we 
CZ t(Q) 
t 
The only remaining parameters to be discussed for the Markov 
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consider f^, the rate at which offenders desist with criminal 
activities, as inversely related to the length of the average 
criminal career, one way to characterize the relationship is as 
follows: 
where T represents the average duration of the criminal career at 
time t. In summary, when using Blumstein's Markovian model, we see 
that the relation between the flow variables is maintained in logical 
order through interrelationships defined by the Markov chain. Table 1 
is a summary of plausible bounds for each of the flow parameters 
presented by Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin (see [5]). 
3.3.6 Closed Form Transient Results 
Once adequate solutions for each of the four flow variables in 
Blumstein's model has been found, we would like to be able to specify 
transient behavior of the system at any instant in time. Closed form, 
transient results would enhance the model's predictive powers not 
restricted to discrete time periods, and facilitate clean analytical 
results of flow variable changes, without taking successive powers of 
the M matrix. These results can be obtained using a simple application 
of geometric transform analysis. 
It is possible to obtain the generating function of matrices 
and vectors by taking the generating function of each entry in a 
given matrix or vector. Consider the general relationship: 
n(n+l) = H(n) M 
51 
Table 1. Plausible Bounds on Flow Parameters 
(Blumstein, Nagin and Cohen, 1975) 
- Release rate from prison -• .>.2 < f < 1.0. 
f^t - Imprisonment rate = ^ . 0 1 < f^ < .1. 
These bounds encompass the minimum proportion of 
the total population in prison and the maximum 
feasible capacity of the prison system. 
f^ t - Rate of law abiders entering crime >.001 < f^ t < .01. 
These limits similarly reflect the observed minimum 
proportion of the population in prison and maximum 
corrections capacity given the existing values of Q 
and S. 
f.^_ - Rate at which criminals reform = ^ . 2 < f. < 1.0. 4t 4t 
This interval accounts for the upper bound of f^ t and 
the extreme case of total rehabilitation. 
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where n(n) is a vector of state probabilities. By taking the 
generating function of this equation, we obtain: 
Z" 1 [G(Z) - IT(0)] = G(Z) M. 
Rearranging terms yields: 
G(Z) - Z G(Z) M = 11(0) 
G(Z) (I - ZM) = n(0) 
G(Z) = II(0) (I - Z M ) " 1 (equation #3) 
where G(Z) is the generating function of II (n), and I is the identity 
matrix. Equation #3 suggests that the transform of the state 
probability vector is equivalent to the apriori state probability 
vector post-multiplied by (I - ZM) \ where (I - ZM) 1 exists. In 
order to obtain a solution to a transient problem, we can weight the 
rows of (I - ZM) 1 by the initial state probabilities, sum, and then 
take the inverse transform of each element in the result. 
To illustrate this application for our purpose, consider a 
hypothetical two-population flow process described by: 
M = 
where P is the prison population at time t, and G is the general 
population at time t for these parameters, 












Using partial fraction expansion on an element by element basis, 
we obtain: 
( I - ZM) 
-1 
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Upon taking the inverse of the generating function, we obtain: 
T(n) = 
4 5 







The usefulness of this approach becomes clear if we consider the 
inverse of the generating function in equation #3, yielding: 
n(n) = 11(0) T(n) 
which becomes the exact analytical description of transient behavior. 
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Specifically, the (ij) element of T(n) represents the distribution 
of the population in group j at time n, given that i was the resulting 
equilibrium condition of a previous policy. 
3.4 Specification of X 
X represents the average rate at which offenders commit crimes 
and implies a fixed "level of arrivals" for offenses in any given 
monthly period. One approach to determining a value of A, would be 
to speculate about the number of criminal acts committed by the 
average offender in any given month. Such a procedure would 
inevitably involve some assessment of the motivations behind the 
decision to commit a serious violation of legal statute. Up until 
recently, a large body of criminal justice research for decision 
making has entangled itself in the causes of crime. Given the 
overwhelming evidence for the failure of offender rehabilitation and 
the urgent need for policy reform, contemporary criminal justice 
modeling has focused more objectively on the behavior in aggregate 
measures of social well being. Recent findings suggest that prisons 
with intensive rehabilitation and training programs have (with a few 
exceptions) roughly equivalent recidivism rates as those where idle 
incapacitation of inmates is practiced. Consequently, more energy is 
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now being directed toward improving the mechanism of controlling 
offenders and less to modifying the deviant behaviors of individuals. 
Rather than attempting to estimate the number of offenses 
committed by the average criminal in each month, we can approximate 
this quantity by the appropriate ratios. To do this, the difference 
between the criminal population and deterrent effect must be fully 
understood. The deterrent effect embodies all those individuals who 
in some way, engage in illegal activities during a given period. This 
includes career criminals, marginal criminals, and any person somehow 
connected with violation of legal statute in the period of interest. 
The criminal population consists only of those offenders who remain 
active criminals six months or longer. Typically, this career criminal 
would tend to see his illegal activities as his livelihood and hence, 
have the tendency to view crime in the same light as the typical worker 
would view his occupation. As a result of this, we would not expect 
the average career criminal to commit crime in a seasonal fashion. 
Rather, we would expect there to be a consistent pattern in monthly 
per offender crimes as opposed to the overall crime rate which is 
seasonal in nature. Seasonality, as in the overall level of crime, 
also appears in the deterrent effect, since we believe the proportion 
of the population engaging in criminal acts to be a seasonal 
phenomenon (i.e., more people who are not career criminals shoplift 
during the Christmas shopping season). 
Using this argument, we can approximate X for any period using 
a seasonally corrected rate of crime. That is, X , is equal to the 
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ratio of seasonally corrected offenses in period t, the average 
criminal population prevailing in period t. Symbolically; 
t 
In order to de-seasonalize the crime rate, we employ a conversion 
of the (0,1,1)(011) 1 2 form to (0,1,1). This is done as follows: 
(l-B)(l-B 1 2)Z t = (l-9B)(l-9B 1 2)a t 
or 
n _ 12.Z 
(1-B) U * = (l-eBU 
(l-B)Z' = (l-6B)a t. 
In other words, Z^ reduces to the MA(1) model of the form: 
z t = a t + e a t - r 
In the denominator of the A^ formulation, represents the 12 month 
running average of the criminal population. The motivation for using 
a 12 month running average figure relates to the potential error in 
estimating C^. The error in estimating C over any 12 month period 
will tend to represent errors over and under for individual months 
as the optimization process compensates toward minimizing the deviation 
from the actual prison time series. As a result, any individual 
estimate may represent a larger error in one direction than the 12 month 
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running average of the estimates. In addition, Deutsch [1976] has 
shown the forecasts to be highly efficient, suggesting the error 
embodied within an individual estimate of to be of acceptable 
magnitude. 
3.5 Specification of D 
In this section, the analysis for the D component of the basic 
equation is developed and described. We proceed by viewing D in the 
same perspective as Nagin and Blumstein, and employ their methods of 
analysis. Recall from previous sections that all the remaining 
building blocks from the basic equation were estimated in some way, 
except D. In our analysis, we will solve for a numerical value of D 
in each period using the results described. We then perform analysis 
of D using the model of Nagin and Blumstein to determine the precise 
problem for finding optimal values of Q and S, which would minimize 
the total value of D (and subsequently reduce the level of offenses). 
The remainder of this section outlines the specifics for implementing 
Nagin's formulation within our model. 
In the basic equation, D represents the proportion of the 
general population choosing to engage in illegitimate activities. 
This component is meant to capture the extent to which individuals 
respond to the costs associated with the penalty structure. As such, 
this can be viewed as a general deterrence effect, varying over time 
with the disincentives for remaining a criminal. In the context of 
our model, D is explicitly a function of the certainty and severity 
of punishment, used to explore the implications of alternative 
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incarceration policies. Essentially, the problem becomes one of 
allocating the limited resource of man-years of imprisonment. 
3.5.1 The Deterrent Formulation 
Our model follows directly from the successful work of Warner 
[1962] and more recently Mundell [1976], in modeling individual choice 
behavior in the areas of transportation mode and college choice. Here 
we assume that the choice to engage in criminal activities, similarly, 
follows a logistic function. Under this assumption, D, as a function 
of Q and S, takes the following form adopted from the model of Blumstein 
and Nagin [1976]: 
where g(Q,S) is the disutility function associated with a prison 
sentence. The specification of the function g(Q,S) determines the 
behavior of the logistic function. Nagin has shown the form of 
g(Q,S) to be the following: 
Here the assumption that both Q and S deter criminal activities 
constrains the values of b and c to be negative. This is because 
values of b and c which are non-negative would require that 
D(Q,S) = 
0g(Q,S) e 
1 + e' g(Q,S) 





a logical contradiction. Also, by constraining the value of, a, to 
be strictly negative, we can accommodate the idea that prison sentences 
are inherently undesirable independent of their duration. The curvature 
of the g(Q,S) function reflects the nature of the individual's distaste 
for incarceration. We can summarize the form of D by the following: 
exp[a + bQ + cQS] 
1 + exp[a + bQ + cQS] 
With the values of D, Q and S known, we can experiment with the 
functional form of D, in order to obtain estimates of, a, b and c. 
Consequently, experimentation with the model could provide insight 
into the aggregate nature of the disutility associated with various 
incarceration policies. 
3.5.2 Description of the Policy Space 
Within the model, we must recognize feasible limits on 
implementable policy. Since is monotonically decreasing with Q 
and S (an intuitively reasonable result), the best possible sanction 
would make Q and S large without bound. This, of course, is not 
possible given the restrictions on the economic resource that society 
is prepared to allocate toward the prevention of crime. We must, 
therefore, impose upper and lower bounds on the values for Q and S. 
The bounds on S are of the form: 0 < S < S , where S is the 
— max max 
maximum average sentence length allowable, given the level of 
permissiveness in our society. Since Q is a probability, its bounds 
are subject to the same restraints that confine the maximum value of 
S, as well as the definitional requirements of a probability. The 
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constraints of Q are of the form: 0 <_ Q <_ 1. Finally, we must impose 
the constraint 
Q*S* <_ QS 
where Q* and S* represent the optimal values of Q and S, respectively. 
This constraint reflects the fixed nature of short run corrections 
expenditure. Since the purpose of this analysis is to address the 
question of allocation for a fixed resource, and not the absolute 
level of that resource, the above form of the prison capacity constraint 
(adapted from Blumstein, Nagin, 1976) was regarded as appropriate. 
3.6 Summary of the Primary Model and Optimization 
We have now developed the comprehensive model for describing 
the overall level of crime, and are prepared to summarize its form as 
follows : 
Z = A • K • D 
t 
substituting, we obtain: 
Z t - 1 + V l 2 " Z t - 1 3 + a t ' e i a t - l " 9 1 2 a t - 1 2 + 9 1 2 S l a t - 1 3 = X • P • ° 
where 
D = 12 C. t + t 
[a + bQ + cQS] 
1 + e [a + bQ + cQS] 
Note that every value of Z f c, C^, P^ and D are unique for each monthly 
estimate of the process. This is due to the empirical stochastic 
mechanism of Z f c, and the underlying dynamic process for generating 
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6 C. C t + P t 
Once the simulation has produced satisfactory experimental 
estimates of, a, b and c, we can proceed with the constrained 
optimization of Q and S over the decision-theoretic logistic function. 
The optimization will take the following form: 
exp[a + bQ + cQS] 
1 + exp[a + bQ + cQS] 
i=l " 
s. t. Q*S* <_ QS 
0 < Q < 1 
0 < s < s 
— max 
Constraining S to be strictly greater than zero, precludes the logical 
contradiction of a policy where Q is at its maximum value, while 
sentence lengths are held to zero. This function can be optimized for 
the two variables using line search or any number of non-linear 
optimization methods. 
3.6.1 Comparison of Models 
Table 2 compares the formulation developed in this chapter with 
three other closely related models from which this work stems. A number 
of relevant characteristics in the areas of effeciency and 
comprehensiveness are considered. With the possible exception of a 
need for computational experimentation, the model integrates several of 
the important virtues of its predecessors, and hopefully will avert 
some of their shortcomings. The comparison offered in Table 2 reflects 
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Table 2. Partial List of Comparative Attributes 
Dynamic Model - Model 4 is 
time dependent in nature 
and provides analysis for 
changing conditions over 
discrete periods. 
Estimation of Deterrent 
Effects - Model 4 isolates 
the policy variables of 
the model within the de­
terrent formulation. Con­
sequently, the responses 
from perturbing policy 
variables can be analyzed 
in terms of their deter­
rent effects. 
Accounts for Population 
Dynamics - By utilizing 
the descriptive formula­
tion of Model 1 to char­
acterize the fluctuations 
within subgroups of the 
overall population, Model 
4 can relate the flows to 
the overall rate of crime. 
Forecasting Ability -
Following from the 
approach of Model 3, our 
model uses an efficient 
forecasting approach in­
dependent of the right-
hand side formulation. 
These forecasts constrain 
the logistic formulation 
of the crime rate in 
order to obtain fore­














Table 2 (cont'd) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Accordance with Observed History - The 
behavior of Model 4 is moderated by both the 
historical notion of a stable imprisonment 
rate and contemporary explosion in the 
growth rate of reported crimes. These ideas 
are incorporated as mathematical constraints 
or are inherent in the formulation of the 
descriptive model. 
/ / 
Provides Insight for Decision-Making -
Model 4 combines the forecasting approach of 
Model 3 with the relative functional struc­
tures in Models 1 and 2, used in sensitivity 
studies. Specifically, the Model 4 can 
forecast overall levels of crime for gross 
resource type planning or illuminate func­
tional relationships useful in resource 
allocation planning. 
/ / / 
Estimation of Incapacitative Effects -
By relating sentence lengths and imprison­
ment flows within a crime rate formulation, 
Model 4 could be used to study this rela­
tionship quantitatively. 
/ 
Provides Transient Analysis - Since Model 
4 describes a markovian process analogous 
to Model 1, discrete transform analysis 
can be employed to obtain closed form 
expressions describing time lag associated 
with a given policy change. This approach 
will also aid in determining the time 
necessary to reach the equilibrium condi­
tion. 
/ / 
Optimization - Analogous to the constrained 
optimization framework for static conditions 
found in Model 2, the structure of Model 4 
will permit static optimization for policy 
variables, as well as an iterative solution 
for an optimal policy in the dynamic case. 
/ / 
Estimation of Criminal Population - By 
associating a unique estimate of the size 
of the criminal population with each short 
run measurement of crime levels, Model 4 
will offer a functional relation between 
crime and number of criminals over time. i 
/ 
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Table 2 (cont'd) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Makes Extensive Use of Previous Research -
Model 4 is an extension from Models 1, 2 and 
3, with a few minor innovations and re­
arrangement of form. 
/ / / / 
Useful in Short Run Analysis - Similar to 
Model 3, Model 4 is based on month by month 
analysis over a period of several years. 
/ / 
Ability to Adapt Analysis to Smaller Scale -
With each parameter meaningful and available 
on a state or local basis, Model 4 can be 
utilized for analysis of a less aggregate 
nature. 
/ / / 
Mathematical Tractability - As an integrated 
combination of several mathematically trac­
table models, Model 4 will most likely prove 
analytically feasible, although cumbersome. 
/ / / / 
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the integrative nature of our model. In fact, our model contains only 
two totally new approaches. These are, the method for determining A, 
Q 
and the use of the t/C + P ratio, to characterize the amount of 
t t 
time offenders are free to commit crimes. As such, the models 
greatest virtue is that it combines the best research in each of the 
three basic elements of the criminal justice system, and brings 
together a description of the whole, in which every basic element is 
accounted for. 
3.7 Summary 
In formulating our model of the criminal justice system, a 
large body of literature is integrated in an effort to extract the 
advantages of each approach and minimize the shortcomings of the model 
as a whole. In addition, new approaches are taken toward estimating 
parameters, such as Â _ and f^, in order to further enhance the model's 
capability. Perhaps the most significant innovation is the model's 
ability to simulate the system over time and predict behavior far into 
the future. By combining the forecasting efficiency of time series 
analysis and the logical interrelationships of earlier developments, 
our formulation has imparted a dynamic character to formulations which 
previously could be analyzed under static conditions only. Results 
stemming from the model should provide insights into prevailing judicial 




The purpose of this chapter is to aquaint the reader with the 
necessary logic for integrating the three major components of the 
model. Namely, the Z^, K, and D formulations. The approach taken in 
this chapter is to illustrate how each of the individual components 
is constructed from the data and to develop the role of each component 
in relation to each of the remaining components. This is done to 
clarify the procedures necessary for simulating the model. The first 
and second section treat the procedure for offenses and prison data, 
respectively. The third section illustrates the procedure for deter­
mining an optimal policy in terms of Q and S, following Nagin"s 
functional characterization of deterrence. The final section is a 
brief summary followed by a concise outline of experimentation 
conducted in the following chapter. 
As seen in Chapter III, the form of the basic model is embodied 
in the basic equation, 
Z = X K D t t t t 
In this chapter, we will discuss how to go about utilizing this form. 
Figure 5 is a macro flow diagram summarizing the procedure for 
executing the basic equation. In this chapter, a step by step 




























Figure 5. The Macro Flow Diagram 
68 
extensions discussed in the final section. 
4.1 Utilizing the Offenses Modeling Technique of Deutsch 
In representing the overall level of crime, a statistic referred 
to as "the total number of reported offenses" is employed. This con-1 
stitutes the component of the basic equation. A discrete period 
duration of one month is appropriate for employing the modeling 
procedure of Deutsch [1976]. Total reported offenses by month have 
been compiled by Deutsch for ten major metropolitan areas. If we were 
to assume that the monthly trends in the occurrence of crime for the 
metropolitan areas were similar to those for the entire state of 
interest, we could transform the mean of the metro data to the state 
total. To do this, the proportion of each monthly figure to the annual 
total, would be calculated. Since annual totals are available for all 
the states in recent years, the proportion of that figure attributable 
to any one given month in the year would be calculated using the 
monthly proportion of the total (in the metropolitan data). In 
analysis provided by Deutsch (see [11]), modeling of total reported 
offenses in metropolitan areas suggested a seasonal component, as well 
as a trend in most such series. This indicated a (011)^ x ( 0 1 1 ) ^ fit. 
The appropriate values of 0 ^ and § ^ a r e calculated using the ESTM 
iterative parameter estimation routine. 
For the purposes of simulating the model, our procedure is to 
take transformed monthly offenses figures for each state from January 
1974 until December 1976. Using these 36 observations, an additional 
265 observations are forecasted and collected in the vector of Z^ 
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realizations for each period of analysis. From these values, the 
deseasonalized values are generated and stored providing one sub­
component of right-hand side values in the basic equation. The next 
section details the procedure for determining the vector of [C^/C^ + P^ ] 
ratios enabling us to solve for the values of D in each monthly period. 
4.2 Executing Blumstein's Criminal Population Model 
In estimating the flow variables of the Markov process governing 
the size of the criminal population, the most severe shortage of data 
exists. To overcome the limited availibility of data in this area, we 
can employ a numerical approach toward generating estimates of the 
size of the criminal population in the short run. To do this, each of 
the unknown flow variables of the transition matrix will be allowed to 
vary within their plausible bounds. Simultaneous variation of ^2t* 
f^ t, and f^ t will be conducted systematically, until the combination 
which is most consistent with the observed behavior in the prison 
population time series is found. This procedure is repeated for every 
six month interval, until the entire series for the prison population 
is described. For future forecasting, transition patterns are calcu­
lated using the same procedure with forecasted levels of the prison 
population, provided by the time series description of the imprisonment 
process. 
4.2.1 Recidivism in Blumstein's Populations Model 
The value of y represents the recidivism rate of released 
prisoners. A reasonable estimate of y is one-third [Blumstein, 1975]. 
Our definition of the criminal population implies that y includes all 
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those releases who commit at least one crime within twelve months of 
their release. In a 1971 study by Robinson and Smith, it was found 
that 51% of released prisoners returned to prison during the three 
years immediately following their release. In another study by 
Gottfredson [1959] it was reported that during a two-year follow-up 
period, 38% of released prisoners returned to prison. Since recidi­
vism rates decline each additional year following release, and not all 
releases who return to criminal activity are apprehended, Blumstein 
claims that a reasonable value of y f ° r this model is one-third 
(see [5]). In addition, Blumstein has provided computational 
experience showing the relative insensitivity of the Markov Chain to 
variations in y (see [5]). To see clearly how y appears in the formu­
lation, Figure 6 represents the transition matrix underlying the 
prisons and criminal populations model of Blumstein. 
C P L t t t 




Where the states are as follows: 
C^ = criminal population at time t 
P = prison population at time t 
L = law abiding population at time t 
Figure 6. Transition Matrix Underlying the Markov Chain 
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In adapting Blumstein's Markov Model to our analysis, we are applying 
his estimate of y, on a national level, to analysis of individual 
states. Since there is no evidence that recidivism is highly variable 
between states (see [3]), this is a reasonable simplification. Further­
more, the relative insensitivity of y (see [5]), discounts the potential 
for error in this procedure. The sections immediately following 
describe the steps involved in simulating Blumstein's Markov formulation. 
4.2.2 Simulation of the Markov Chain Underlying Blumstein's Model 
In this section, the computational procedure for utilizing 
Blumstein's Populations Model is outlined. Essentially, there are two 
basic phenomena which are integrated in order to drive the Markov Chain. 
These are, the time series description of the prisons population and 
the transition matrix description of the social process, presented in 
the previous section. Figure 7 is an illustration of the general 
procedure. 
t 
P t L t 
Time Series 




Figure 7. Procedure for Executing the Markov Process 
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Computational experience with flow variable values, offered by 
Blumstein, revealed the process to reach a steady state on the average 
in six trasitions. Since the matrix is positive recurrent, we know 
it will always attain a steady state, and in this case, the average 
duration of transient behavior is six transitions. A steady state 
within Blumstein's Process, however, is highly counter intuitive. 
Our procedure for executing the process precludes this difficulty by 
analyzing the system in six period intervals. That is, we evaluate 
the output of the transition matrix for each six period interval, 
using the corresponding six elements of the P time series. After 
this, the procedure is performed again with the next six transitions 
and next six elements of the P time series, and so on. This approach 
is based on the idea that a Markovian description of the flow of 
individuals through the corrections system and society is more appro­
priate for capturing the randomness component of the phenomenon, as 
opposed to a period by period determination of flow variables (see 
Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin, 1975). For this reason, the six month 
procedure is utilized when executing the model. 
4.2.2.1 The Iterative Procedure for Executing the Markov Chain. 
Specific steps involved in the procedure for executing the Markov 
process are vector-matrix arithmetic over six periods, adjustment of 
pattern search for flow variables, and re-evaluation of the current 
solution. Each of these steps is now described. The vector matrix 
operation involves multiplying the initial 3x1 distribution; 
[C^, P , L ], by the underlying transition matrix. Each multiplication 
produces an additional 3x1 vector of the above form. The resulting 
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vector provides our estimate of the components of the [C^/C^+ P ] ratio 
(present in the basic equation) stemming from this intermediate solu­
tion for the f-j_ values. 
Adjustment of the pattern search for flow variables involves 
the point search aspect of the discrete version Hooke and Jeeves 
algorithm. For executing the model, an IBM-16 Double Precision Code 
was adapted to produce and evaluate flow variable solutions. Figure 8 
is a figurative summary, integrating adjustment of pattern search for 
flow variables to the other two steps involved in the execution of 
Blumstein's three-way Markov model. 
Input parameters to generate Markov Chain 
a. Perform transitions; generate 
population estimates 
b. Evaluate sum of squares error 
Input sum of squares error 
a. Pattern search to find improving 
directions 
b. Determine new base point combina­
tion of flow variables 
Figure 8. Figurative Summary of the Search Process 
The re-evaluation of the solution step involves the channeling of data 
to an objective value evaluation subroutine. This final step is the 
direct link between the Markov Process and time series description of 
actual prison populations. That is, the objective subroutine compares 
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the current periods P value from the 3x1 vector solution with the time 
series value of a states prison inmate population, corrected for per 
capita. The per capita correction is performed using estimates of 
total population statistics for the state of analysis (see [28]). At 
that point, the difference is taken and squared. The squared differ­
ence is then accumulated in the summation of the prevailing six periods 
series of squared differences. The optimal solution for flow variables 
corresponds to the square difference summation which is a minimum, thus 
evaluating solutions on the basis of least squares. 
K 
4.2.2.2 Computation of t. Once an optimal flow variable 
solution is found, the values of C and P f c are available for six 
periods. Consequently, the K component of the basic equation is 
obtained for six periods, where; 
C 
K - P + C t t 
We thus have obtained estimates of the proportion of time a 
criminal is expected to be free on a monthly basis, in a given six 
months for which the integrative model is simulated. 
This process is in turn repeated until the analysis runs through 
all six month periods contained in the prison data. The routine is 
then extended for the length of the simulation, substituting forecasted 
values of monthly prison populations. In the following section, the 
procedure for obtaining the D values of the basic equation; 
Z = A • K • D t t t t 
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is outlined, and the necessary extensions for relating policy variables, 
Q and S to D t > are developed. 
4.3 Utilization of Nagin's Deterrence Formulation 
In this section, the procedure for obtaining the value of the 
only component of the basic equation, D^_, for which a value has not 
been derived, is outlined. In addition, this section illustrates the 
procedure for obtaining an optimal Q, S policy, stemming from our 
analysis of D^.. Our discussion of D̂ _ proceeds through each of the 
boxes pictured in the flow diagram. 
Solve for 
in period t 




Solve for Y . coefficients 
1 
in constrained optimization 
Determine optimal Q and S 
values, minimizing D and 
consequently, minimizing Z 
Figure 9. Flow Diagram Summary of D Analysis 
4.3.1 Solution for °t 
Since a procedure to specify each of the components of the 
basic equation has been developed, we can proceed to solve for D from 
the basic equation. Recall, the basic equation was written originally 
as; 
Z = X T • K • D t 
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Rearranging terms, we can specify as follows; 
% -
State prison population in month t 
State prison admissions in month t 
where S t represents the prevailing average sentence length, and; 
State prison admissions in month t 
Average monthly convictions in month t 
where Q represents the prevailing probability of imprisonment given 
conviction. Using estimates of this form, the values of Q and S are 
available in each period. 
4.3.3 The Optimization Procedure 
Once the values of D , Q , and S are obtained, we can proceed 
t x t t * 
to employ Nagin fs characterization of deterrence. This is done by 
equating our value of D to the functional form of deterrence; 
D
t • z t [ x t • V " 1 
for any period t. Using this procedure in every period, we can obtain 
a vector containing the values of monthly deterrent effects for each 
month that the model is simulated. 
4.3.2 Solution for Prevailing Q and S 
To perfrom analysis appropriate for each D^, we must have avail­
able the prevailing Q and S for the state of interest. If we recall 
the values of Q and S^, for each period they were estimated using the 
relations of Nagin [1976], they were; 
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rQ S ! g[ t t] 
C 1 + e ^ 
where the form of g [Q,S] is rewritten as; 
g [Q S ] = y „ + Y-iQ + Y „ Q S B L y t t J r 0 r l v t r 2 y t t 
where the y_^ a r e negative constants reflecting the disutility of a 
prison sentence. To summarize, we obtain a numerical value of d for 
each monthly period and equate it to deterrence as a function of policy 
variables Q and S , giving; 
Co + Y A + Y 2 V t ] 
D = 6 
t . . CO + Y l Q t + Y 2 Q t S t ] 1 + e 
where y. < 0 , for all i. l 
4.3.3.1 Solution for 0 Values. In solving for the y , we have 
the immediate problem of trying to estimate three parameters, Y Q , y , 
Y2> with only one known value. To overcome this, we must estimate y ^ 
by speculating what the value of d would be in the absence of sanctions 
(i.e., Q = S = 0 ) . This can be done by extrapolating from g(Q,S) to 
g ( 0 , 0 ) , assuming an appropriate value of g ( 0 , 0 ) , [Nagin, 1976]. In our 
analysis, we will define a sensitivity parameter, 3, to characterize 
the g ( 0 , 0 ) state (see Chapter V ) . Given that a value of g ( 0 , 0 ) is 
attainable, we can immediately solve for y ^ , since we are left with; 
(1+6 )D 
1 + e 
d. = 
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giving one equation in one unknown. In simulating the model, this 
[ Y0 + Y l Q t + Y 2 Q t S t ] 
D = e 
1 + e 
where the values of d and Y q a ^ e now known, as well as the values of 
Q and S. The problem reduces to solving for Y ^ a n < * Y 2> w ^ e r e the-
value of the expression; 
[ Y l Q t + W t ] 
is known. Clearly, there are an infinite number of possible combina­
tions of Y-j_ a n d Y 2» which could satisfy such a relation. 
In his analysis, Nagin claims that the Y-j^t P o r t-*- o n °^ the. 
above expression represents the stigmatization component of the 
disutility associated with a prison sentence, and tY 2Q tS ] represents 
the disutility of actual time served (see 22). In our analysis, we 
will assume that a proportion, e , of the disutility is attributed to 
Y^Q t»and a proportion, (1-e), is a sensitivity variable (see Chapter V ) . 
Specifying a value of e will enable us to determine specific values of 
procedure is repeated in each monthly period providing the vector of 
Y q values utilized in a later stage of the analysis. 
Y Y 
4.3.3.2 Solution for 1 and 2 Values. When determining the 
values of a n < * Y 2> a n analogous problem exists to that posed in 
determining the value of YQ» That is, we are left with the problem 
of determining two unknowns from only one known value. Up to this 
point, we have developed the relation; 
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y ± and Y 2-
minimize D as follows; 
Min; D = 6 
f 0 + Y 1 Q + Y 2 Q S ] 
fc ^ [̂ 0 + ^ 1 Q + Y 2 Q S ] 1 + e 
where Q and S are the variables. Since YQ> and Y 2 are all negative 
constants the problem is equivalent to; 
Min; [Y Q + y± + Y 2 Q S ] . 
This is also the equivalent to solving the problem; 
Co + T 1 Q + T 2 Q S ] 
Min; Z = \ • K. • — T r-. 
t 1 ' . [ 0 + 1 + Y 2 Q S ] 1 + e 
in terms of the optimal Q, S solution. Thus, by finding the values of 
As a result of the preceeding procedures, we can specify the 
values of Y q » y-^' a n c * y 2 > prevailing in each monthly period of the 
simulation. In the following section, it is seen how these values of 
Y ^ are utilized in formulating the problem to determine the values of 
Q* and S*, which minimize D^, and consequently, will minimize Z^, the 
expected number of total offenses. 
4.3.4 Formulating the Optimization to Determine Q* and S* 
Once this phase of the analysis of D^ is reached, the policy 
variables, and Ŝ _, are now treated as unknown quantities. Up to 
this point, we have specified the values of Y q > a n c * y 2 « We can, 
therefore, state the problem of obtaining the values of Q and S to 
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Q and S to minimize [YQ + Y-^ + Y 2 Q S ] , we have also found the Q, S 
values to minimize Z^. 
In the previous chapter, the following three conditions on 
Q and S were required to maintain feasibility: 
0 < S* < S 
max 
0 < Q* < 1 
Q*S* < Q S 
* — X t 
As a result, the minimization problem can now be restated in its final 
form as; 
Minimize: YQ + Y-̂ Q + Y 2 Q ^ 
Subject to: 0 < S*•< S 
— max 
0 < Q* < 1 
Q * S * <̂  ^t St 
For performing the above nonlinear optimization, the same package 
utilized in executing Blumstein's markovian model is accessed from a 
different subroutine in the coded model. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the basic steps for executing our model, 
integrating the work of Deutsch, Blumstein and Nagin, have been out­
lined. Essentially, it was shown how to go about computing optimal 
values of Q and S, which will result in a minimum number of expected 
offenses. 
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In the next chapter, applications of the model are documented in 
cases where the actual data is employed from three states. Comparative 
and sensitivity studies are provided, contrasting the three data bases 
of the different states, and comparing behavior within our model to 
predecessor models. In addition, extensions of the analysis, presented 




This chapter embodies the procedures and considerations 
necessary to simulate the model and provides a detailed example for 
illustration. The first section presents the solution procedure and 
assumptions necessary to obtain the desired output. The second section 
demonstrates the uses of the model through a detailed example using the 
Georgia Data Base. The third section considers the possibilities for 
modeling the input policy parameters and its subsequent implications 
for use of the model. The fourth section is a presentation of sensiti­
vity studies in the Q, S policy space, attacking the problem via a 
series of approaches. The fifth section demonstrates the analysis 
necessary to de-confound the effects of incapacitation and deterrence, 
and provides supporting computational experience. Finally, the sixth 
and last section involves a comparison of judicial policies between 
Georgia, Missouri and Texas, with results of the model for these 
states. 
5.1 Using the Model 
Citing the developments of Chapter Three, the basic equation 
which underlies the model is given below. 
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In simulating this relationship over discrete time intervals of one 
month duration, the main driving mechanism within the model is the 
Z t forecasting mechanism. This controls the behavior of the left-hand 
side throughout the analysis. Imbedded within the right-hand side is 
an independent forecasting model characterizing the behavior of prison 
populations over time. The ^t/^t + Pt r a t i o is derived indirectly from 
these prison population forecasts using a three way Markov process as 
discussed in Chapter Three. The parameter, A F C, is both a function of 
the left-hand side and right-hand side forecasting submodels. If we 
recall from Chapter Three, A is the ratio of seasonally adjusted 
monthly offenses (indirectly a function of Z..), to the six month 
running average of the criminal population (indirectly a function of 
the prison population). 
As the preceeding paragraph would imply, d(Q,S), remains the 
only unknown quantity within the basic equation. As a result of this, 
d(Q,S) is solved for in each period using the relation given below. 
Consequently, each building block of the basic equation can be quanti­
fied and examined separately. The remainder of this section develops 
the important extensions of the basic solution procedure. 
5.1.1 The Structure of d(Q,S) 
The structure of the deterrent formulation was developed and 
presented in Chapter Three. In that section, the deterrent impact of 
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sanctions explicitly incorporated Q and S, the conrollable judicial 
policy variables, into the functional form given below. 
expf^o + ^ + Y 2 Q S ] 
d(Q,S) = 
1 + exp[ Y0 + Y 1 Q + Y 2 Q S ] 
Since it is possible to solve for d(Q,S) numerically, the left-hand 
side of the above relation can be treated as a known quantity. If the 
prevailing judicial policies regarding average sentence length and 
probability of imprisonment given conviction are known, the only 
remaining unknowns are the intercept and coefficients within the expo­
nential. These, of course, are YQ» Y-̂  a n d Y 2« 
Y 
5.1.2 Motivation for the Necessary Assumptions to Solve i 
It is known by definition of the above choice behavior function 
that the Y^ a r ^ a l l negative constants. Unfortunately, only knowing 
the values of Q and S on the right-hand side leaves us in a position 
of trying to estimate three unknowns, YQ» Y-̂ > Y 2» with only two known 
values, (Q,S). As a result of this, some assumptions will be neces­
sary in order to determine the value of the Y^ parameters. These are 
in addition to the more basic assumption that the effect of sanctions 
is to reduce crime. The latter, of course, is supported by the 
argument that by confining offenders, they are unable to inflict 
offenses upon society, thereby reducing crime, at least to the extent 
of the individual's capacity. 
Y 
5.1.3 Determination of 0 
To approach the problem, consider a situation where no sanctions 
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are present, i.e., Q = S = 0. By imposing the assumption that this 
will result in some increase in the proportion of crimes committed 
over the current level, we can estimate YQ« If we call this proportion 
3, where 3 > 0, we can proceed with the following development. 
Under prevailing policy: d(Q,S) = d(Q,S) 
Under zero sanctions: d(0,0) = (1+3) d(Q,S) 
Consequently, we have: 
ex P[ yo + Y l ( 0 ) + Y 2 ( 0 ) ] 
(1+3) d(Q,S) = 
(1+3) d(Q,S) = 
1 + e x p ^ O + Y l ( 0 ) + Y 2 ( 0 ) ] 
exp[Yo] 
1 + exp[ YQ] 
Y Q = log [(1+B) d(Q,S)/(l - (1+3) d(Q,S))] 
where 3 > 0. 
y y 
5.1.4 Determination of '1 and 2 
Finally, to estimate Y-j_ a n d w e m u s t impose an assumption 
regarding the proportion of the disutility associated with imprisonment 
that is attributable to the actual severity of a sentence, and that 
which is attributable to the stigmatization associated with a prison 
sentence. If we let e be that proportion of disutility which is 
associated with the stigmatization of a prison sentence, we can 
proceed to estimate y and y^ through the following developments. 
Taking the log of the deterrent effect, we have: 
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log e[d(Q,S)/(l - d(Q,S))] 
Using a previous result for YQ» we c a n write: 
y±Q + Y 2QS = log e[d(Q,S)/(l - d(Q,S))] - y 0 
thus, 
Y n Q + Y 9QS = log [d(Q,S)/(l - d(Q,S))] 1 L e 
log [(l+ft) d(Q,S)/(l - (1+3) d(Q,S))]. e 
Consequently, 
£(log [d(Q,S)/(l - d(Q,S))] -e 
Yi = 
log e[(l+3) d(Q,S)/(l - (1+3) d(Q,S))] 
and 
Y 2 = 
(l-e)(log [d(Q,S)/(l - d(Q,S))] -
e , 
QS 
log e[(l+3) d(Q,S)/(l - (1+3) d(Q,S))] 
QS 
where, 3 > 0 and 0 < £ < 1. 
It is worth noting that the values of YQ» Y^ A N ( * Y 2 A R E 
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determined uniquely for each one month period. 
5.1.5 Solution for the Optimal Policy 
Once values for the a r e obtained for each period, the model 
proceeds to solve for those values, Q* and S*, which will result in 
the greatest deterrent impact. This is done by finding a policy which 
is feasible in terms of the corrections capacity constraint and mini­
mizes the proportion of the population which engage in illegal 
activities during period t. Since the corrections capacity constraint 
can be stated for any period t, as: 
Q * S * < Q S H t t - x t t 
the optimization problem can then be stated as: 
Minimize: Y n + Y-, Q + Y 9 QS 
t t t 
subject to: Q * S * < Q S J t t — t t 
and: 0 < Q <_ 1 
and: 0 < S f c <. S 
max 
5.1.6 Limiting Cases of Q and S 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the theoretical 
behavior of the model for limiting cases of Q and S. Namely, the 
zero and infinite sanction level cases. Computationally, this could 
be done by adding a constraint of the form: Q = S = 0, for the zero 
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sanction case or relaxing the S and product constraint to allow 
max 
zt - At ( c + p - 1 d ( Q > s ) 
If we assume the zero sanction situation, the deterrent effect will 
increase by some proportion 0. Consequently, we can rewrite the basic 
equation as: 
C 
zt = At 1 c + P I ( 1 + 3 ) d ( Q ' s ) 
z t - A t ( c - r r ) d ( Q ' s ) 
Thus, Z^ = (1+3)Zfc and, therefore, we could expect the total number of 
offenses to increase by an amount 3Z t under the zero sanction condi­
tion. 
5.1.6.2 The Case of Infinite Sanctions. The effect of the 
infinite sanction case can be seen if we consider the implications 
infinite values of S in the infinite sanction level case. Effectively, 
this would remove convicted felons permanently from the system and 
deter all others. 
5.1.6.1 The Case of Zero Sanctions. As we can see from the 
basic equation, the zero sanction level will inevitably perturb the 
entire system. In fact, it can be shown that to allow the zero 
sanction situation in our model would shift the expected number of 
total offenses in period t, from Z^ to (1+3)Z^. 
To see this, consider the basic equation: 
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of infinite sanction for the deterrent effect and subsequent ramifica­
tions in the basic driving equation of the model. Consider first, the 
limit given by the expression below. 
lim 
Q S >. oo [ Y q + + Y 2 Q S ] = - o o 
Since the are by definition negative constants, if we define a 
variable x, where: 
x = - [ Y 0 + Y-LQ + Y 2 Q S ] 
we can rewrite d(Q,S) in the following form: 
-x 
d(Q,S) = — e 
1 _ i _ ~ x 
1 + e 
Taking the limit of x: 
lim -x rt 
X — , . _ J § £= o, 
1 + e _ X 1 
Substituting into the basic equation at taking limits, we have: 
lim / C 
QS • » [ZJ = A 1 n I p [0] = 0. C + P 
t t 
Thus, we see that the functional form of the model necessarily 
predicts zero reported offenses for the case of infinite sanctions. 
The thrust of this section has been to explore the behavior of the 
model for the limiting cases of judicial policy variables Q and S. 
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Here it was seen that the behavior of the model for the zero sanction 
level reflects our assumption regarding social behavior in the absence 
of sanctions. Similarly, the results illustrated for the case of 
infinite sanctions embody the more general assumption that the presence 
of sanctions tends to decrease crime. 
5.1.7 Sensitivity of the Model to the Necessary Assumptions 
In this section, the potential impact on the results of the 
two basic assumptions necessary to solve for optimal values of Q and 
S is investigated. In a preceeding section, it was shown that state­
ments regarding the zero sanction state and the utility distribution 
between stigmatization and the actual incarceration experience 
(inherent in the perception of a prison sentence) must be made in 
order to develop the parameters. In effect, these statements 
impose the necessary constraints facilitating the solution of YQ> 
and Y 2* 
5.1.8 The Implications of the 3 Assumption 
We first focus on the solution procedure for YQ> since it is 
performed independently of the procedure for Y-^ a n ^ Y 2 * Recall that 
it was necessary to determine a value of 3, representing the increase 
in criminal activity in the absence of sanctions. Clearly, the final 
(Q,S) solution of the optimization problem will not be affected by 
the choice of 3. This can be seen if we consider the effect of 
increasing the expected level of crime anticipated in the absence of 
sanctions above some current level of crime, Ẑ _, by an amount, 3. 
This leads to the following development. 
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increasing Z f c by an amount 3, gives: 
(l +3)Z t = A t (ĉ h;) (1+6) etY° + + Y2QS1 Y± < °V 
3 > 0 
Knowing for this condition that: Q = S = 0 
we have: 
e [ V = (1+3) e [ Y 0 + ^ + ^ S ] ' Y i < ° V 
3 > 0 
At this point, the functional relationship between 3 and YQ becomes 
apparent if we consider the limit: 
B ^ . ( 1 + 6 ) e I v 0 + yjQ + r 2QS] . „ 
as a result, we can express the limit 
1 ± m [y 1 
8 y « e L T 0 J = « . 
Consequently, we can see the effect of increasing 3 is to increase 
YQ, as a result, the objective value of the optimization problem: 
Min: Y 0 + Y^Q + Y 2QS 
s.t. Q * S * < Q S 
x t t — x t t 
• and: 0 < Q < 1 
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and: 0 < S < S t — t max 
will also increase with 3. It then follows that the value of the 
deterrent formulation under optimal condtions: 
e t Y 0 + Y XQ* + Y 2 Q * S * ] / 1 + e t Y 0 + Y XQ* + Y 2Q*S*] 
will appear larger, the larger that we assume the increase in reported 
crimes, 3, will be (if sanctions are eliminated). Moreover, the 
optimal values of the sanction variables (Q*,S*) will not be affected 
by changing the value of 3, since the effect of increasing (or decreas­
ing) the value of the entire expression: 
(1+3)K = Y ( ) + Y 2 Q + Y 2QS 
will not affect the ratio Y ^ / Y 2 » This in turn, will result in an 
optimization procedure for the same linear combination at Q and S, 
regardless of the value of 3. 
The results of the preceding analysis has been to prove that 
our assumption regarding the zero sanction state necessary to solve 
for the value of YQ will not affect the optimal solution for Q and S. 
It will, however, affect what the model predicts the savings in 
reported offenses stemming from optimization will be. In fact, it 
was shown that the effect of assuming too large a value of 3, would 
be to overestimate the effectiveness of (Q,S) sanctions and subsequent­
ly overstate the impact of optimization. Analogously, to assume too 
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small a value of 3, would have the effect of understating the impor­
tance of optimizing judicial sanction variables. In any case, it is 
the significance of optimization, rather than the correctness, which 
is affected by the choice of ^ 
5.1.9 The Implications of the e Assumption 
In addition to deciding on the appropriate value of 3, an 
assumption regarding the disutility associated with a prison sentence 
must be imposed. Essentially, there are two aspects of this disutility. 
One involves the actual time incarcerated in the prison environment, 
which is presumed to be in itself an onerous experience. The other 
aspect of the disutility associated with a sentence is related to the 
stigmatization perceived by an offender, that is, the disutility of 
aquiring a prison record and its associated consequences. 
Since the latter is unrelated to the actual sentence imposed, 
it relates exclusively to the sanction variable Q. On the other hand, 
the disutility of the actual prison sentence relates directly to both 
Q and S. In terms of the deterrent formulation, this implies that 
relates to the stigmatization component and Y 2 t o t n e sentence compo­
nent. Hence, the relation: 
Y 0 + y±Q + Y 2QS. 
As explained earlier in this section, the approach taken in allocating 
the total disutility to each of the components is to define a parameter, 
e , representing that proportion of the disutility attributable to 
stigmatization. As a result, we define the disutility, ds, as: 
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ds = YjQ + Y 2 Q S 
and that component attributable to stigmatization as: 
eds = YiQ 0 < e < 1 
and that component attributable to the actual sentence as: 
(l-e)ds = Y 2 Q S 0 < e < 1. 
We can see from the above that the effect of overstating e, 
would be to inflate the absolute value of y^ (a negative constant) 
and consequently, favor Q in the optimization process. Alternatively, 
to underestimate e, would discount the importance of Q in the optimiza­
tion process, consequently, favoring the value of S. 
In addition to altering the optimal values of Q and S, the 
choice of e, will also influence the value of the objective function 
within the optimization subproblem. This in turn, will influence the 
results for the importance of the optimization process. To see this, 
consider the deterrent formulation as a function of e. 
d(Q,S) = e 0 [y n + eds + (l-e)ds] 
where eds = Y-iQ 
and (l-£)ds = Y 2 Q S . 
Clearly, the behavior of the optimization process is dependent on 
whether the value of the S exceeds unity and the ratio Y - I / Y o * 
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Specifically, if we have the condition: 
\ 
S > — 
Y 2 
the optimization process will favor the value of S. Alternatively, 
Q will be favored if the opposite is true. In addition, if the value 
of y^ exceeds y^ and S* < y^^2' o v e r s t a t i - n 8 t n e value of z will 
inflate the value of d(Q,S) and overestimate the impact of sanction 
variables, Q and S. It is, therefore, necessary to know the value of 
the individual y^ and y^ parameters in order to assess the affect of 
the e assumption. This question is addressed in sensitivity studies 
later in the chapter. 
5.2 Analysis Using Georgia Data 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the application of 
the model to a data base from the state of Georgia. In order to 
clarify the use of this example, we impose direct assumptions regard­
ing the values of 3 and e. Specifically, we will assume that the 
crime rate experienced by society in the absence of sanctions will be 
20% greater than otherwise for each period, (i.e., 3 = 0.20). Further­
more, we will assume that 75% of the disutility of a prison sentence 
will, on the average, be attributable to the actual sentence and 25% 
of the disutility will be attributable to stigmatization, (i.e., e = 
.25). Moreover, the choice of these values of 3 and e, will facili­
tate a meaningful comparison of our own results with another model by 
Blumstein and Nagin [1976], who provide limited computational experi­
ence for the same assumptions. 
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5.2.1 Input Policy Variables for Georgia 
Other information which is pertinent to interpreting the 
results contained in this section is that an average sentence length 
of 1.67 years and a probability of imprisonment of .30606 is used 
throughout the analysis in this section. These were found to be the 
mean values for average sentence length and imprisonment probability 
in Georgia courts during the period from January 1974 until December 
1976. We, therefore, will assume that these values will remain 
constant for the duration of the simulation, so as not to obscure the 
behavior of other important parameters in presenting the Georgia 
example. A closer look at the development and ramifications of this 
data is taken in a later section. It must be remembered, however, 
that the values, S = 1 . 6 7 and Q = .30606 represent prevailing policy 
in Georgia, assumed to be unchanged over the 25 year simulation. This 
somewhat unrealistic condition is imposed only to facilitate the 
clear illustration of an exmaple run, and is relaxed somewhat in a 
subsequent section. 
5.2.2 Total Reported Offenses in Georgia 
In order to interpret the behavior of the model over a 25 year 
simulation, an appropriate point of departure is to examine the 
behavior of the Z f c forecasting mechanism, which is the driving force 
behind the model. When the model was simulated from the present to 
the year 1994, a rapid growth in the level of reported offenses was 
predicted. This was due to the nature of the original Z^ time, series 
for the months from January 1976 until December 1976. The data is 
presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Total Reported Offenses for Georgia 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 15837 15456 16991 
Feb. 14484 15517 17237 
Mar. 14641 15822 17028 
Apr. 14817 15566 17342 
May 15033 16073 17150 
June 15243 16171 17563 
July 15439 16332 17421 
Aug. 15491 16291 17397 
Sept. 15597 16516 17411 
Oct. 15493 16981 18091 
Nov. 15512 16452 17960 
Dec. 15482 16470 18114 
The Georgia total reported offenses data was identified as a 
non-stationary series, appropriately modeled by the (011)(011)^ B ° x ~ 
Jenkins formulation. Iterative estimation of the parameters suggested 
a value of 8 = .2695. As a result, the forecasts were characterized 
by a steady growth over the 25 year simulation. To illustrate, 
Table 4 shows the Z^ values predicted for seven sample periods 
covering the analysis. 
From examining the values in Table 4, we see that the value 
for the left-hand side of the basic equation is increasing with time. 
A 
Just as the value of Z^ increases, the value of Z^, the seasonally 
corrected offense rate, will also increase temporally. As a result, 
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March 1975 15823 
September 1979 21721 
January 1983 25905 
May 1987 32652 
July 1990 36216 
November 1994 41228 
December 1997 45098 
we would now expect at least one component on both sides of the basic 
equation to be increasing over time. In order to clarify the effect 
of the increasing on the other parameters of the basic equation, a 
control run, where Z^ is held constant, was also performed. The result 
of this run is referred to continually in the following analysis. 
5.2.3 Prison Populations in Georgia 
Another forecasting submodel appearing in the basic equation is 
the forecasting mechanism for predicting prison populations in the 
state of Georgia over the next 25 years. Like the total reported 
offenses data, the behavior of the state institution inmate population 
totals predicted for Georgia during the simulation, will be related to 
the input data. Table 5 shows the state institution inmate population 
totals in Georgia for the months from January 1974 until December 1976. 
Statistical analysis of this series again suggested the (Oil)(011)^ 
Box-Jenkins forecasting model as appropriate. This time, however, the 
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Table 5. Georgia State Institution Inmate Population Totals 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan, 9832 10891 11421 
Feb. 9904 11072 11613 
Mar. 10171 11323 11453 
Apr. 10392 11172 11548 
May 16262 11341 11481 
June 10780 11360 11587 
July 10955 11459 11537 
Aug. 11050 11305 11521 
Sept. 11128 11326 11469 
Oct. 11045 11513 11756 
Nov. 11061 11422 11423 
Dec. 10985 11389 11350 
parameters were estimated to be: 0 ^ = .6279 and = «2028. 
Unlike the total reported offenses series, the growth predicted 
for the state institution inmate population totals was gradual. 
Table 6 illustrates the behavior of the forecasts for seven periods 
of interest covered in the analysis. This was also true of the 
simulation run for the deterministic Z^ situation, since the two 
submodels are developed independently of each other. 
5.2.4 Criminal Population Movement in Georgia 
The contradictory growth rates of the total reported offenses 
and the prison populations submodels explain a number of key relation­
ships between parameters of the model. For example, the ratio: 
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was found to remain fairly constant over the 25 year simulation for 
both the non-stationary case and the deterministic Ẑ _. In fact, 
the results for this parameter were identical for both cases, since 
the above ratio relates only to the prison populations forecasting 
submodel and the three way markovian search pattern for C^. A sample 
of the results for seven periods of interest, along with their 
corresponding general deterrent effect, is presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Illustration of the Growth in 
Georgia State Prison Populations 
Prison Population X d c Perio d t t t 
March 1975 11321 0.29 1 .32% 1. 15% 
September 1979 11660 0.37 1 38% 1. 16% 
January 1983 11756 0.43 1 42% 1. 16% 
May 1987 12180 0.53 1 43% 1. 17% 
July 1990 12416 0.59 1 39% 1. 19% 
November 1994 12643 0.67 1 41% 1. 18% 
December 1997 12903 0.73 1 .38% 1. 18% 
The data appearing in Table 7, clearly suggests that state 
institutions house between 16% and 17% of the offender population at 
any one time. Although these results are somewhat high in comparison 
to analogous results presented in the Blumstein, Nagin, Cohen [1975] 
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Table 7. Criminal and Prison Population Percentages 
Month C t 
P 
t 
C /C +P t t t d t(Q,S) 
March 1975 1.15% 0.2305% 83.3% 1.32% 
September 1979 1.16% 0.2312% 83.4% 1.38% 
January 1983 1.16% 0.2311% 83.4% 1.42% 
May 1987 1.17% 0.2331% 83.4% 1.43% 
July 1990 1.19% 0.2314% 83.8% 1.39% 
November 1994 1.18% 0.2337% 83.5% 1.41% 
December 1997 1.18% 0.2313% 83.7% 1.38% 
model, they are within a reasonable order of magnitude. Their results 
suggest that this percentage averages between 12% and 13% on a national 
level. 
5.2.5 Behavior of ^t in Georgia 
Also apparent from Table 7 is the fact that the absolute magni­
tude of the criminal population in the state of Georgia is predicted 
to rise only slowly over the next 24 years. If we consider the non-
stationary situation, we see that the parameter on the right-hand 
side of the basic equation, which adjusts for the large increases in 
Ẑ . (the left-hand side), is A^, the average number of offenses 
committed by the average criminal in period t. To illustrate, C t 
(criminal population), d t (deterrent effect) and Afc are presented 
in Table 8. Here, the units of A are crimes per offender per month. 
The figures from the table suggest that the average number of crimes 
committed by an individual career criminal will grow from about 3.5 
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Table 8. Sample Results for Seven Periods 






March 1975 15823 0.29 1.32% 1.15% 
September 1979 21721 0.37 1.38% 1.16% 
January 1983 25905 0.43 1.42% 1.16% 
May 1987 32652 0.53 1.43% 1.17% 
July 1990 36216 0.59 1.39% 1.19% 
November 1994 41228 0.67 1.41% 1.18% 
December 1997 45098 0.73 1.38% 1.18% 
in 1975 to about 8.8 in 1997. This result did not hold for the case 
of deterministic Z^9 where A fluctuated only very narrowly with 
changes in Ĉ .. 
5.2.6 General Deterrent Effects in Georgia 
One other interesting result,which can be observed from Table 8, 
is the relative stability of the general deterrent effect, d(Q,S), over 
the 25 year simulation. This result was true of both deterministic and 
non-deterministic Z forecasting models. A qualitative explanation and 
discussion of this and the previously described behavior in the model 
is offered in a later section. 
5.2.7 Optimization Process for the Georgia Data Base 
Recall that the procedure for obtaining optimal values of Q and 
S was first to determine numerical values for d(Q,S) in each period. 
This done, the values of the coefficients (y) for the objective function 
are obtained, given the necessary assumptions. For example, the values 
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of Y Q , a n < * Y 2> f ° r t n e month of March 1975, would be obtained as 
follows: 
Table 9. i Values for Seven Periods 
Period Deterrent Effect Y 0 Y l Y 2 
March 1975 1.32% -4.129 -.15109 -.2716 
September 1979 1.38% -4.077 -.15127 -.2720 
January 1983 1.42% -4.055 -.15129 -.2718 
May 1987 1.43% -4.045 -.1531 -.2749 
July 1990 1.39% -4.070 -.1516 -.2724 
November 1994 1.41% -4.072 -.15120 -.2718 
December 1997 1.38% -4.081 -.1510 -.2713 
Throughout this simulation, the values of Q and S were held at the 
constant levels of .30606 and 1.67 years, respectively. Once values 
for the Y- a r e obtained for every period, the model proceeds to solve 
Y Q = log {[1.2(.0132068)]/[1 - 1.2(.0132068)]} = -4.129 
Y = .25{log e[.0132068/1 - .0132068] - yQ}/.30606 = -.15109 
Y 2 = .75{log e[.0132078/1 - .0132068] - .Y q}/(1.67)(.30606) = -.2716 
where, .0132068 = d(Q,S) for March 1975. 
In simulation studies covering the months from January 1 9 7 4 to 
December 1998, some typical values obtained for YQ» Y-̂  a n c ^ Y 2 (using 
data for the state of Georgia) appear in Table 9. 
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for those values of Q* and S* which will result in the greatest deter­
rent impact. This is done by finding a policy which is feasible in 
terms of the corrections capacity constraint, and minimizes the per­
centage of the population who engage in illegal activities during 
period t (the deterrent effect). The corrections capacity constraint 
can be stated for any period t as: 
Q* S* < Q S 
x t t — x t t 
The optimization problem for Q and S can then be summarized for 
period t as: 
Min: [y + y Q + y QS] 
t t t 
s.t. Q* S* < Q S 
• t t — x t t 
and 0 < Q £ 1 
and 0 < S < S 
— max 
The procedure was performed for each month from January 1974 
to December 1998. The results for the seven periods mentioned in 
Table 9 are presented in Table 10. It is worth noting that since the 
input values of Q and S were constant, their optimal values over time 
remain constant within four decimanl places. The relatively stable 
behavior in the value of the deterrent effect explains why this is so. 
In addition, the optimization procedure (being a discrete version 
pattern search, developed by Hooke and Jeeves) is only as accurate as 
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Table 10. Optimization Results for Georgia 
Period Q S Q* s* AC; AS 
March 1975 .3016 1.67 .4605 1.11 .15 -.56 
September 1979 .3061 1.67 .4605 1.11 .15 -.56 
January 1983 .3061 1.67 .4605 1.11 .15 -.56 
May 1987 .3061 1.67 .4605 1.11 .15 -.56 
July 1990 .3061 1.67 .4605 1.11 .15 -.56 
November 1994 .3061 1.67 .4605 1.11 .15 -.56 
December 1997 .3061 1.67 .4605 1.11 .15 -.56 
the number of step--size reductions performed. For executing the above 
optimization, the initial step-sizes were: 
AQ = Q/3 
AS = S/2 years 
with eight step-size reductions performed in each optimization. 
—8 
Consequently, the search was accurate to within about 10 units for 
each variable. 
5.2.8 Motivation for Using Constant Input Policy Variables 
The rationale in using values of Q and S, which are held 
constant over time, is that the best model for predicting each is the 
mean of the actual series. This would imply a stationary sentencing 
policy from month to month. (In fact, when the actual series of 
imprisonment probabilities was analyzed, it was found to be non-
stationary. This case is discussed in a subsequent section.) 
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When conditions of static judicial administration were 
simulated over a 24 year period, the gain in policy effectiveness 
stemming from optimization was similarly stable over time. For each 
monthly period, the optimal values of Q and S were identical, since 
the constraint set was unchanged throughout the simulation and the 
objective function coefficients (y^) did not vary significantly. With 
the optimization process in each period a repetition of the process 
in every other period, the percentage gain in effectivenss by switch­
ing to optimal levels of Q and S would be expected to be constant. 
To verify that this was in fact the case, the number of crimes saved 
in each period was measured and its percentage of the total was 
computed. 
5.2.9 Evaluation of the Impact of Optimization 
month by going from prevailing to optimal values of Q and S, the basic 
equation was reconstructed using Q* and S*. The deterrent effect in 
period t, under optimal policy, was obtained by the substitution. 
and the expected number of crimes under optimal policy can then be 
stated as: 
In order to determine how many crimes would be prevented in a 
d*(Q,S) = 
exp[ Y ( ) + Y-^Q* + Y 2Q*S*] 
1 + exp[y 0 + Y XQ* + Y 2Q*S*] 
The expected number of crimes saved during t, is: 
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Z - Z* t t 
and the percentage savings through optimization: 
•ioo[(zt - z*)/zt]. 
The numerical results for seven typical periods over the twenty-four 
year horizon are presented in Table 11. 
Problems with this approach of measuring the impact of optimi­
zation can arise if a new policy was such that its effect were to en­
large or reduce the prison population to a significant degree. Such 
a shift would thereby change the value of the [C t/C t+P ] ratio and 
perturb the system. This, however, was not considered a serious 
problem, since earlier analysis by Blumstein and Cohen [1975] and 
Greene [1974] have shown that prison populations account, at most, for 
about 17% of the criminal population. (In fact, the prison populations 
accounted for about 20% of the criminal population at its maximum level 
in our study.) Furthermore, such shifts in state institution popula­
tions tend to be gradual and moderated by the presence of the uniform 
corrections capacity constraint. Analogous results for the case of 
deterministic Z f c were identical with the exception that the saving in 
numbers of crimes did not change over time. 
5.2.10 Discussion of Sample Results 
The results presented in Table 7 suggests that the proportion 
of society which comprise institutionalized offenders should be 
expected to demonstrate remarkable stability over time. This implica­
tion tends to reinforce the fundamental notion underlying the 
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Table 11. Expected Total Offenses in Georgia 
Period Prevailing Policy Optimal Policy Saving Percentage 
March 1975 15823 
September 1979 21721 
January 1983 25905 
May 1987 32652 
July 1990 36216 
November 1994 41228 






















Blumstein, Nagin, Cohen model [1975], namely, "the stability of punish­
ment." Blumstein claimed that the punishment process was a homeostatic 
phenomenon, which remained stable over time, regardless of the level of 
deviance present in society. This notion was originally offered by 
Durkheim [1964] in a manuscript entitled, "The Rules of the Sociologi­
cal Method." Durkheim suggested that the presence of crime in society 
is natural and emanates from the same processes which preserve internal 
social stability. 
Blumstein used Durkheim's ideas as a stepping stone in develop­
ing the concept of a behavior distribution. Blumstein believed that 
the level of deviance present in society at any one time appeared to 
bear no direct relation to the level of punishment meted out by the 
society. In other words, if the level of crime were to suddenly 
experience a sharp rise, society would redefine the limits on accept­
able behavior rather than expand the punishment process. This would 
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be interpreted as a shift to the left. Alternatively, if the level of 
crime were to decrease sharply, the society would respond with more 
vigorous enforcement of existing laws as corrections, judicial and 
law enforcement resources became free to press for greater effective­
ness. This would be represented by a shift to the right in Figure 10. 
A classic example of this phenomenon would be the development of legal 
off-track betting in several states which gave legitimacy to the 
behavior of thousands of individuals previously considered as criminals. 
Severely Deviant Compulsively Moralistic 
£ = the current limit on socially acceptable behavior. 
Figure 10. The Behavior Distribution 
Blumstein, Nagin and Cohen used this concept of equilibrium in the 
social order as the basic theme of their 1975 model. Despite the 
modifications within our own model, which uses math programming 
techniques to determine the markovian driving parameters, the implica-
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tion of the results is astoundingly similar, that is, punishment is 
a basically homeostatic process. 
Even though stability was present to a large extent in correc­
tions activity, throughout the 25 year simulation, criminal activity 
rose sharply. At least, what we now consider criminal activity 
experienced a significant upward trend. We have previously shown that 
the criminal population is expected to rise only slowly in Georgia. 
Also, the proportion of the overall population which in some capacity 
(not necessarily career criminals) engages in illegal activities 
(deterrent effect) is likewise expected to fluctuate very slowly 
upward in the next 25 years. Consequently, we must turn to other 
causes to explain the alarming rise in total offenses which are 
expected over this period. 
The explanation offerred by the model is a growth in A^, the 
average number of offenses committed by the individual criminal in 
period t. One possible explanation for this phenomenon lies in the 
fact that the growth in prison populations lags far behind the growth 
in the crime rate. As a result, criminals may view the risks involved 
in committing an offense as remaining stable, while the benefits for 
doing so are enhanced. That is, a criminal perceives his probability 
of imprisonment given conviction as increasing only marginally with 
each additional offense. The benefits associated with committing that 
additional offense, however, may increase linearly or exponentially, 
given the risk-amenable utilities thought to be characteristic of many 
criminals. At the same time, the criminal population would only 
account for a very small proportion of the total population, thereby, 
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tending to impart only a marginal shift in the deterrent effect. 
5.3 The Effects of Nonstationary and/or Correlated Sentencing 
Practices 
If we were to re-examine our actual data from which the pre­
vailing policy variables, Q and S, are derived, it would be of con­
siderable interest in any evidence of growth or seasonality were 
present. In fact, any pattern recurring in either series could 
illuminate a trend present in current policy which may have serious 
implications for the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, 
today or in the future. For example, falling sentence lengths over 
time with stationary probabilities of imprisonment would necessarily 
be followed by a period of rising sentence lengths, due to the systems 
relentless tendency toward the equilibrium condition. This is 
underscored by the concept of the behavior distribution underlying 
the formulation of the model. If such a phenomenon were in fact 
observed, it could betray the presence of a pendulum of justice effect 
operating within our system, lending itself to explicit modeling in 
further analysis. 
5.3.1 Average Sentence Length 
Recall that the average sentence length was determined by 
dividing the total prison population in some month by the number of 
prison receptions in that same month. This procedure was undertaken 
for the months between January 1974 and December 1976. Table 12 
presents the figures obtained for these months and Figure 11 shows a 
plot of the time series. Units in the table are years. 
Figure 11. Average Sentence Time Series for Georgia 1974 - 1976 
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Table 12. Average Sentence Lengths for Georgia 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 1.58 1.51 1.83 
Feb. ,1.79 1.61 2.00 
Mar. 1.55 1.25 1.59 
Apr. 1.48 1.28 1.74 
May 1.52 1.46 1.76 
June 1.78 1.56 2.09 
July 1.59 1.74 2.02 
Aug. 1.83 1.64 1.76 
Sept. 1.66 1.88 1.83 
Oct. 1.31 1.57 1.61 
Nov. 2.14 2.04 1.63 
Dec. 1.49 1.35 1.75 
Subsequent statistical analysis of the data identified the set as a 
stationary, non-seasonal series. This can be verified qualitatively 
by inspection of Figure 11. Consequently, the mean was used to fore­
cast the series which had a value of 1.67 years. 
5.3.2 Probability of Imprisonment Given Conviction 
The monthly probability of imprisonment given conviction was 
computed by taking the ratio of prison receptions for a given month, 
and the average monthly convictions total. The results calculated for 
the months from January 1974 to December of 1976 are presented in 
Table 13. Also, Figure 12 shows a plot of the time series. 
When the data was analyzed, it was found to be non-seasonal and 
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Table 13. Monthly Probability of Imprisonment for Georgia 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. .221 .295 .260 
Feb. . 361 .263 .246 
Mar. .365 .304 .326 
Apr. .348 .326 .325 
May .366 .326 .290 
June .366 .277 .276 
July .283 .301 .252 
August .343 .269 .269 
Sept. .373 .299 .237 
Oct. .401 .379 .281 
Nov. .341 .229 .217 
Dec. .348 .329 .326 
non-stationary. Inspection of Figure 12 provides a quick verification 
of this analysis. Diagnosis of the time series through a statistical 
identification routine suggested the (011)(0,0,0) Box-Jenkins forecast­
ing model as appropriate. 
The (001) (000) Box-Jenkins model proceeds using the following 
definitions: 
w t - i t ~ V i 1 = 2 3 6 
a = w + $_a t = 2 36 
t t I t 
Q t = V i " V t - i + a t = 2 3 6 
Q = Q - $,a , t = 37 
x t xt-l 1 t-1 
Figure 12. Probability of Imprisonment Time Series for Georgia 
(1974-1976) 
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•t-1 t = 37... 
where a^ = w^ = 0 
and, $^ is the iteratively estimated growth parameter found to equal 
.7706 for the probability of imprisonment given conviction time series. 
Figure 13 shows a plot of how the forecasted series will behave over 
time. 
When the model was simulated with the Box-Jenkins fit of Q 
imbedded in the simulation, the first 36 periods were characterized by 
constantly changing Q, and consequently, a constantly changing capacity 
constraint. The value of S was constant at 1.67 years. For periods 
beyond December 1976, the value of Q (and subsequently Q*) remains 
constant at .2751. Given our previous sensitivity studies of the 
systems, we would expect the optimization process to lean much more 
strongly toward Q, given the capacity constraint was tightened by 
about 10%. This was, in fact, what was observed as an initital policy 
of (.2751, 1.67 years), led to an optimal policy of (.7575, .61 years). 
Under the initial (.2751, 1.67) policy, about 20% of the savings 
in reported offenses due to sanctions was attributable to incapacita­
tion. When the optimal (.7575, .61) policy was in effect, only about 
7% of the impact of sanctions was due to incapacitation on average. 
Despite this, the (.7575,.61) policy was responsible for about a 7.7% 
rise in the overall impact of sanctions. This result suggested the 
possibility that the optimization of imprisonment policy was even more 
critical at the lower values of the capacity constraint. 
0.48 
Figure 13. Behavior of Forecasted Q Values 
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The main idea stemming from this experiment has been one 
stressing the importance of stability in judicial policy. Specifically, 
if the judicial system tends to oscillate over short periods producing 
a pendulum of justice-type effect, it can expect wide variation in the 
per dollar return of corrections allocations over time. In addition, 
the system should develop a dynamic (Q,S) policy synchronized with its 
schedule of expenditures in order to maintain uniform per dollar 
effectiveness over time. As we have demonstrated, this policy would 
tend to emphasize the imprisonment option with shorter sentences in 
lean years and the reverse in prosperous years. The ethics question 
of such a practice would, of course, be a moderating factor present 
in the system, but has not been treated in our analysis. 
5.4 Sensitivity Studies in the Q,S Policy Space 
In their analysis of the implications of alternative sentencing 
policies, Blumstein and Nagin [1976] emphasize the importance of the 
value of trade-offs implicit in formulating a Q,S policy. They view 
the debate over the volume of imprisonment as destined to be a stand­
off, given the clear demonstration of the existence of a stable im­
prisonment rate. This demonstration brought to light the major issue 
of their thesis, which was the problem of allocating a fixed prison 
resource, rather than deciding on absolute allocation level. 
Similar to Blumstein and Nagin, our model explores the implica­
tions of alternative imprisonment policies. In this section, the 
model estimates the crime-control potential of imprisonment deriving 
from a combination of deterrent and incapacitation effects, while 
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incorporating due process and resource constraints explicitly. In 
much the same manner as Blumstein and Nagin, we consider a homogeneous 
criminal population committing a single aggregate crime type. The 
last part of this section is a comparative analysis between the two 
models. 
In the period between 1960 and the first year analyzed by the 
model, the reported index crime rate in the United States rose by 157%. 
The rise of the reported index crime rate in the state of Georgia 
during this time was 173%. Although the trend in reported offenses 
may to some extent reflect a growth in reporting rates, there is no 
doubt that the actual crime rate has risen sharply. This section 
focuses on different strategies aimed at reversing, or at least 
moderating, this trend through the use of prison. Such an approach 
has attracted considerable attention in the last two or three years, 
given the failure of rehabilitative approaches, despite the fact that 
it is overtly punitive. 
The first step in investigating the impact of various forms of 
imprisonment policy is to identify those variables subject to direct 
manipulation. These, of course, are Q, the probability of imprisonment 
given conviction, and S, the average sentence length. The purpose of 
this analysis is then to evaluate the impact of incremental changes in 
Q and S relative to each other, in order to determine which of these 
is the more effective reducer of crime. This knowledge would enable 
the decision maker to design a policy resulting in the optimal utili­
zation of his scarce resource, namely, available man-years of imprison­
ment. In addition, such an analysis could provide insight for the 
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absolute level of allocation question by bringing to light the impli­
cations for incremental tightening or relaxation of the resource 
constraint. Specifically, we would like to determine if the expected 
rate of offenses behaves linearly or non-linearly with respect to Q 
and/or S, and at what level of the policy space will incremental 
changes in either variable be most effective. 
5.4.1 Design of a Factorial Experiment 
Since d t(Q,S) is monotonically decreasing in Q and S, then the 
crime rate, Z^, is also monotonically decreasing in Q and S, which is 
of course, consistent with the incapacitative and deterrent effects of 
the two sanction variables. As we have shown in the previous section, 
without other constraints, the optimum sanction would make Q and S 
large without bound. By imposing an upper limit on the average 
sentence length, we assume that sanctions beyond S^ are precluded. 
Similarly, constraining Q to be less than unity can reflect limitations 
on universal imprisonment of all convicted persons through practices 
like diversion of first offenders. Despite this, it is the resource 
limit on imprisonment which has proven to be the binding constraint 
for all practical calculations. 
Blumstein and Nagin [1976] have shown the imprisonment resource 
constraint to be operative in the form of a limit on the product of 
policy variables, Q and S. The computational results mentioned thus 
far, would suggest that the state of Georgia might better deter 
criminal activity by more frequent prison disposition of criminal 
cases with somewhat shorter sentences than is the current policy. 
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To explore this hypothesis more explicitly, a factorial 
experiment at three levels of Q and S is proposed. The dual purpose 
of this experiment was to determine the effect of the resource 
constraint and initial values of Q and S on the optimal solution. In 
other words, at what point does the effectiveness of Q tail off in 
favor of increasing S? Is the relation between and the policy, 
linear or nonlinear? And at what levels? 
Figure 14 illustrates the nine starting points at which obser­
vations were taken in the Q,S policy space. 
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Figure 14. Starting Points for the Factorial Experiment 
For each of the points appearing in the figure, Table 14 gives the 
initial values, the optimal values, and the changes in Q and S, as 
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Table 14. Optimization Results for the Nine Starting Points 
Solution (Q,S) 
Point Starting Optimal Aq AS % Savings 
A (.306, 1.67) (. 461, 1.11) .155 -.56 2.278% 
B (.306, 3.35) (. 620, 1.65) .314 -1.70 4.579% 
C (.306, 6.69) (. 850, 2.41) .544 -4.28 7.792% 
D (.612, 1.67) (. 620, 1.65) .008 -.02 0.061% 
E (.612, 3.35) (. 850, 2.41) .238 -.94 1.756% 
F (.612, 6.69) (. 997, 4.11) .385 -2.58 2.831% 
G (.918, 1.67) (. 863, 1.78) -.005 .11 0 
H (.918, 3.35) (. 995, 3.09) .077 -.24 0.381% 
I (.918, 6.69) (. 995, 6.17) .077 -.52 0.381% 
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well as the percentage savings due to optimization of sanction levels. 
Although comparison in terms of absolute numbers of crimes is not 
meaningful due to different spending levels, the percentage change 
reflects the benefit from reallocating prison resources given the 
absolute level of resource allocation and political disposition 
implicit in the starting policy. 
5.4.2 Analysis of Experimental Results 
Table 14 would indicate that once a policy provides for a 
probability of imprisonment that equals or exceeds about .918, 
optimization for the given capacity constraint will not result in a 
significant gain unless the average sentence length is below about 
1.67 years. This can be verified if we examine the small percentage 
savings experienced when the initial value of Q is about .918 for 
three levels of S, and the similarly small savings when the starting 
policy is (.612 , 1.67). In addition, when Q is small, about .306, 
the optimization process tends to increase in Q for all three levels 
of S, doing so in a linear fashion in Q and a negative linear fashion 
in S. This suggests that Q is clearly dominating at the lower levels 
of the capacity constraint. Finally, Table 14 suggests an analogous 
result for Q in the range of about .612, although both the increase 
in Q and the decrease in S are found to be less dramatic. Figures 15 
and 16 are plots of the percentage increases in Q and S, suggested by 
the optimization procedure against the capacity constraint for the 
three levels of Q and S. Tables 15 and 16 illustrate the procedure 
from which the plots are derived. 
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Table 15. Percentage Changes in Q 
Low Level of Q = .306 




Medium Level of Q = .612 




High Level of Q = .918 





Table 16. Percentage Changes in S 
Low Level of S = 1.67 




Medium Level of S = 3.35 




High Level of S = 6.69 





Figure 16. Percentage Change Plot of S 
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The patterns for Q illustrate a dramatic change in the slope 
for the three different levels as we observed previously. The patterns 
for S indicate a bowl shape whose vertex angle decreases as the levels 
of S increase. The percentage change readings for the low, medium 
and high levels of S have a maximum range of about 45% occuring near 
the prisons capacity constraint of 1.53. The maximum range for 
percentage change readings in Q also occurs near the prisons constraint 
reading of 1.53, but is about 190%. This would indicate that the 
optimization process is far more sensitive to Q up to a capacity 
constraint of about 3.0, after which Q is maintained at its maximum 
level and S is monitonically increased. The degree of "sharpness" in 
the bowl of S reflects the relative proportion of its contribution to 
the capacity constraint, which is diverted to Q in the optimal 
solution. Naturally, as S becomes larger, a smaller proportion of S 
is required to establish Q at its optimum level, and thus, the vertex 
angle of the bowl decreases. 
5.4.3 Analysis for a Linear System 
Intuitively, the apparent sensitivity of the optimization 
process to Q,would suggest to the casual observer that the level of 
Q is probably more of an indication of the potential impact of 
optimization on the crime rate, than the level of S. One way to 
ascertain this, would be to perform a complete analysis of variance 
on our experimental data and compare F-ratio values. 
This, of course, would require the assumption of a linear 
system of the (percentage savings through optimization) response in 
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Q and S. Figures 17 and .18 illustrate a graphical test of the linear 
assumption. Off hand, a linear fit does not appear unreasonable in 
Q or S. We, therefore, assume the linear statistical model: 
where k is some unknown constant. At this point, it should be noted 
that this analysis should be viewed with a high degree of skepticism. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the experiment has only nine 
widely scattered observations. Clearly, any strongly nonlinear 
behavior of the response in the region between our observations would 
invalidate the analysis. 
Table 17 is a convenient summary of the experimental data in 
analysis of variance format. 
single observation per cell, 3x3 factorial experiment. The symbol y 
is used to denote the percentage savings through optimization in the 
table. Using this formulation, we can proceed to calculate the 
appropriate sums of squares as follows. 
Q. + S. + (QS). . + E 
Table 18 illustrates the prelimary analysis of variance for the 
SS = [(14.649) 2 + (5.197) 2 + (0.762) 2]/3 - (20.59)
2 
9 
= (71.531 + 9.003 + .1935) - 47.105 = 33.622 
SS g = [(2.88) 2 + (6.716) 2 + (11.004) 2]/3 - (20.59)
2 
9 
= (2.7648 + 15.035 + 40.363) - 47.105 = 11.057 
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Figure 18. Graphical Test of the Linear Assumption in 
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Table 17. Summary of Responses in ANOVA Format 
for Varying Resource Constraint Values 
Probability of Average Sentence Length (S) 
Imprisonment given 
Conviction (Q) 1.67 3.35 6.69 
0.306 2.278% 4.579% 7.792% 
0.612 0.610% 1.756% 2.831% 
0.918 0.00% 0.381% 0.381% 
Table 18. Preliminary ANOVA 
Source of Variation SS df MS E(MS ) 
(Q) 
3 . 2 
i = i 3 
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S S T = 98.632307 - 47.105 = 51.5273 
In order to test for QS significance, the sum of squares for 
non-additivity is computed as: 
SS, 
3 3 y . A 
£ z y , / y , y , , - y - ( s s n + s s c + 2 _ ) 
= Li=i ,j=i 9(SS Q • SS S) (Tukey, 1961) 
(2040.1158 - 1889.8326) z = 
3345.8261 
Consequently, we can estimate the experimental error sum of squares by: 
SS^ = S S n - SS„ = 6.848307 - 6.7502 = .0981 F Residual N 
Table 19 summarizes the final ANOVA results. 
Table 19. Final ANOVA 
Source of Variation SS df MS F o 
Probability of 
Imprisonment 33.622 2 16.811 514.1 
Average 
Sentence Length 11.057 2 5.5285 169.1 
Non-additivity 
(Prison Capacity) 6.7502 1 6.7502 206.4 
Error .0981 3 .0327 
Total 51.5273 8 
SS D . , n = 51.5273 - 33.622 - 11.057 = 6.848307. 
Residual 
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As expected, the resulting analysis for the linear system 
suggests the level of Q as highly significant in determining the 
potential for optimization. Although the level of S is also signifi­
cant, the F-ratio of S is only one-third as large as that for Q. In 
addition, the level of the capacity constraint was also found to be 
significant in the region analyzed, the F-ratio of which was about 
20% greater than the F-ratio of S. 
The indication most apparent from this experiment Is that any 
marginal increase in the prisons capacity constraint for the state of 
Georgia will be reflected exclusively through a rise in Q, if optimal 
policies are pursued. This is certain for any expansion of the 
corrections resource, up to a constraint corresponding to 1.01. The 
current corrections resource in Georgia corresponds a constraint value 
of .511. (This result is apparent from Table 15.) Since it is not 
likely that this state (or any other) is willing to expand its 
corrections resources almost: two-fold in the near future, changes in 
policy should focus exclusively on Q. Indeed, the interval of Q, in 
which the relative benefit in the expected rate of crime is greatest, 
is between 0 and .612 (see Figure 15). This would indicate that the 
greatest hope for controlling crime in our society today, lies in 
the deterrent impact of using the imprisonment option more frequently 
in the cases of convicted offenders. If this is truly the case, it 
would be intuitive to think that Q is responsible for the majority of 
crime prevention due to sanctions already under current policy. In 
fact, we show this to be the case in a later section. 
The most general conclusion stemming from this analysis, is 
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one that is strikingly consistent with most research in the field from 
recent years. That is, it is the certainty of punishment as opposed 
to its severity that most effectively deters offenders from committing 
crimes. Whether this stems from patterns in the average criminal's 
utility structure or the onerous nature of prison life is not the 
issue in this research. The implications, however, for the control of 
social deviance could hardly be more explicit. 
5.4.4 Experimentation Within Plausible Limits of Current Corrections 
Capacity 
Since the results obtained from the previous sections pertained 
to sanction levels which due to their magnitude are mainly of theoret­
ical interest, a series of experimental runs at "affordable" levels of 
corrections expenditure were performed. In this experiment, 50 simula­
tions of the system, each at a different level of the capacity 
constraint, ranging from 0.1002 to .9185, were performed. The current 
level of the corrections capacity constraint in the state of Georgia 
is about .511. Since previous analysis has been suggestive of the 
system being most highly sensitive to Q, sharp rises in the value of 
this variable were anticipated as the capacity constraint was relaxed. 
The approach of this experiment was to fix S at its current 
level of 1.67 years and vary the starting value of Q, from 106 to 155, 
by increments of .01. Figure 19 is a plot of the 50 values of QS and 
Q*, obtained by the experiment. 
It is equivalent to a reverse image (except for scale) of the 
S vs. S* plot, since the only way possible to increase Q in the final 
solution would be to decrease S. As a result, this plot provides a 
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clear picture of the behavior in the system when corrections expendi-
tues are varied in regions of practical interest. 
We can see from Figure 19 that optimal strategy for corrections 
allocation around the current level of expenditure would indeed focus 
primarily on Q as previous analysis has suggested. In fact, the 
situation would not be likely to change until the system were at a 
corrections capacity level of about .75. This means that all increases 
in corrections allocation, up to a level corresponding to 50% more 
spending than the current tab, should be directed toward increasing 
the certainty of imprisonment for convicted offenders, that is, if 
we are to follow a policy associated with maximum "per dollar" crime 
prevention. Specifically, the system would increase Q from .306 to 
.45, with S held constant at 1.67 before any increase in the average 
sentence length would be considered. 
From Figure 19, we can also observe the behavior of the system 
in regions corresponding to extremely depressed spending. Here the 
slope of the plot is significantly steeper again in favor of increasing 
Q. In addition, four significant "break points" in the line corre­
sponding to capacity constraint values of; .125, .210, .75 and .801, 
can be observed. These points are of particular interest, since they 
represent values where the nature of optimization seems to shift its 
emphasis. For example, if S is held constant at 1.67 years and Q is 
between .000 and .075, the optimization appears almost indifferent 
toward Q or S until the value of Q reaches about .08 (S is still held 
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Figure 19. Q* versus (QS) 
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This situation prevails until Q reaches about .14, where the optimiza­
tion still favors Q at a less extreme rate until it reaches about .45, 
at which time S becomes the dominating variable. The emphasis again 
shifts toward Q at about Q = .49, where the system again appears 
nearly indifferent. Clearly, the system is highly nonlinear through 
most of the observable QS policy space. 
5.4.5 Comparison of Results Between Models 
In order to gain greater insight into the validity of our 
interpretations from the model, it is of interest to compare its 
output with other models designed to perform similar analysis. 
Moreover, we would expect results between analogous models to yield 
like results for like inputs within the same order of magnitude. A 
logical candidate model for this comparison was presented by Blumstein 
and Nagin [1976] in an article entitled, "On the Optimum Use of 
Incarceration for Crime Control." Their formulation provided a 
fundamental building block in the structure of our own model. 
Fortunately, in their thesis, Blumstein and Nagin provide some 
limiting case computational experience, which serves to articulate 
the behavior of their model for stated inputs. The structure of our 
own model is such that the inputs could be identically reproduced and 
outputs compared with minimal modification of their interpretations. 
5.4.5.1 An Illustrative Example. In their modeling of the 
criminal justice system on a national level, Blumstein and Nagin 
estimate X for the year of 1970 to be five crimes per year per 
offender. This estimate corresponds to a X of .4167 crimes per 
month in our own model, which although not available for that year, 
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is reasonably close to X values generated within our model for other 
years. They also estimate the 1970 national (QS) policy at .25, 2.6, 
which is within an order of magnitude of our current estimate of Q,S 
policy for the state of Georgia, which is .306, 1.67. These similari­
ties greatly enhance the possibilities for comparison between the two 
models, at least in terms of input parameters. 
In their subsequent, analysis to determine optimal policy, 
Blumstein and Nagin propose the optimal policies of 1, 2.6 and 1, 1. 
The latter of which was considered feasible and would presumably 
reduce the crime rate by about 25%. The 1, 2.6 policy was anticipated 
to reduce the crime rate by 50%, but was in violation of the prisons 
capacity constraint. 
Our approach to a comparison was then to simulate our own 
model, inputing .25, 2.6 for starting values of Q,S, switching to the 
1, 1 and 1, 2.6 policies, and observing their respective savings in 
percentage of crimes averted. The results are compiled in Table 20. 
Table 20. Model Comparison Summary 
Q.S Policy Percent Savings Via Optimization 
Starting Optimal Blumstein, Nagin Deutsch, Malmborg 
(.25, 2.6) 
(.25, 2.6) (1, 2.6) 




5.4.5.2 Example Discussion. The results provided in Table 20 
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reveal the strong similarities between the two models and emphasizes 
their common formulation of the deterrent mechansim. Whatever differ­
ence is present relates directly to the different approaches for 
estimating X (as described in previous chapters) and our own model's 
more complex development for estimating the criminal population. 
5.4.6 Development of a Q-S Nomogram 
Figure 20 is a chart for determining optimal levels of sanction 
variables Q and S for incremental percentage changes in corrections 
expenditures. The acceptable range for this chart is from -80% to +80%. 
That is, for aggregate changes in corrections expenditure between -80% 
and +80%, Figure 20 can be used to determine the most efficient QS 
policy. To use the figure, determine what the shift in corrections 
allocation will be, then enter the figure on the curve corresponding 
to this percentage. The point at which the curve intersects another 
curve gives the optimal values of Q and S. For example, if it were 
decided that the state of Georgia would boost its corrections 
allocation by 20%, the optimal levels of Q and S from Figure 20 would 
be .35 and 1.54 years, respectively. 
5.5 Separating Incapacitation from General Deterrence 
One question which the Blumstein, Nagin model did not address 
involved the determination of the relative impacts of incapacitation 
and general deterrence for a given imprisonment policy. This distinc­
tion has potentially important implications for the effectiveness of 
a policy. On the one hand, deterrence tries to reduce crime by posing 
a threat of punishment, thereby discouraging criminality, on the other 
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Figure 20. Q* - S* Nomogram for Incremental Changes in 
Corrections Expenditure 
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hand, incapacitation reduces crime by isolating the criminal from the 
rest of society through imprisonment. 
Deterrence operates to reduce criminality,in those not directly 
imprisoned, by posing a threat of punishment for any crimes they might 
commit. It may operate by reducing the number of new entries into 
criminal activity, or by shortening the careers or lowering the crime 
rates of criminals not yet punished. 
We also know that imprisonment can reduce crime through incapa­
citation. This isolates imprisoned individuals from the remainder of 
society, preventing them from committing crimes. In our model, the 
magnitude of the incapacitative effect is directly related to Â _, the 
rate at which offenders commit crimes while free in period t. In the 
following section, we will use this relation to evaluate the incapaci­
tative effect inherent in the imprisonment policy of the state of 
Georgia over a 24 year period. 
5.5.1 Formulation of the Incapacitative Effect 
Since A is a measure of the free criminal's propensity to 
commit offenses in period t, if we knew the number of periods (n) an 
offender was incarcerated, the product, A^n, would estimate the poten­
tial savings realized by imprisonment of that individual for n periods. 
It follows that if we knew the number of individuals who were incarcer­
ated in each period, r̂ _, we. would estimate the number of crimes averted 
in the future through incapacitation from prevailing policy in period 
k as: 
k+n 
I A. r. . , i l . 
i=k 
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Similarly, the number of crimes in period k which could have occured, 
but were avoided through the incapacitative effect stemming from 
prevailing policy in previous periods, can be determined by recursive­
ly accumulating the portion of the incapacitative effect in those 
previous periods, which was operative in period k. This relation is 
derived as follows: 
k-1 
E X. r. {k = n, n+1, n+2 °°} 
j=k-n J 3 
Obviously, this quantity is not estimable for those periods, k, in 
which k < n, where k-n forms the limit on historical data. 
5.5.2 Simulation of the Incapacitative Effect 
Given the proposed formulation of the previous section, the 
only information not previously input or estimated by the model is 
r t- To determine r we consult the annual publication of the Georgia 
State Office of Offender Rehabilitation. This publication provides 
monthly figures of releases and admissions of inmates to and from 
Georgia state institutions, From this, we were able to obtain prison 
receptions figures for the state from January of 1974 to December of 
1976. These figures are presented in Table 21. Subsequent statisti­
cal analysis of the data determined the appropriate modeling mechanism 
to the series mean. The reader can qualitatively verify this hypothe­
sis by examining Figure 21, which is a plot of the time series. The 
mean of the series was 643.03 prisoners per month. 
The results of the 24 year simulation were entirely consistent 
with other results from the model. That is, they seemed to suggest 
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Table 21. Monthly Georgia State Prison Receptions 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 589 651 596 
Feb. 526 614 553 
Mar. 608 814 711 
Apr. 652 811 641 
May 650 726 646 
June 553 689 544 
July 621 631 566 
Aug. 537 672 643 
Sept. 597 593 619 
Oct. 757 703 714 
Nov. 457 543 804 
Dec. 657 814 650 
that the incapacitative effect of the current sanction level was 
significant, yet clearly a subordinate effect to general deterrence 
which comprised the residual 100-S 1 percent. Where S 1 is the percent­
age of crimes averted through overall sanctions, Q and S, specifically, 
due to incapacitation. The results of the simulation for seven 
periods of interest are presented in Table 22. Inspection of the 
table will reveal that the March 1975 period has been replaced in the 
tables by September 1975. This is due to the fact that an average 
sentence length of 1.67 years required a recursion of 21 monthly 
periods before the first incapacitative effect could be accumulated. 
Consequently, the first period for which the percentage of crimes due 
to incapacitation could be estimated was September 1975, 21 months 
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following the start of the simulation. 
The figures which appear in Table 22 suggest incapacitation 
to entail about 20% of the effect of sanctions under current policy. 
This result is roughly consistent with the result of our linear 
analysis of variance, which suggested about 25% of the effect of 
sanctions is attributable to incapacitation. This result is 
encouraging, since these analyses drew from completely independent 
sources within the model and subsequently serves to enhance our 
confidence in the model's formulation of the criminal justice system. 
5.5.3 The Effect of Optimization 
Given that previous analysis for our model implied that optimi­
zation of QS policy within the stated resource constraint would tend 
to emphasize the certainty as opposed to the severity of punishment, 
we would expect the incapacitative effect under optimal policy to 
decrease in favor of the deterrent effect. In fact, when the model 
was simulated over a 24 year period under optimal policy, there was 
an average effect due to operating under the more Q intensive policy 
and about a 2.3% savings realized in total expected offenses. Table 
23 presents the results for seven periods of interest. 
Although the results in Table 23 would seem obvious, given we 
shifted from a (.306, 1.67) to a (.4605, 1.11) policy, they do serve 
to illuminate the incremental effect of a shift in Q and S, within 
the resource constraint. In addition, the results provide another 
intuitive validation of the correctness of our simulation of the 
analytical model. 
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Table 22. Percentage of Overall Effect of Sanctions Q and S Due 
to Incapacitation for Policy: Q = .306, S = 1.67 Years 
Period Incapacitative Effect Deterrent Effect X t 
d 
t 
September 1974 20.93% 79.07% .2814 1.15% 
September 1979 21.01% 78.99% .3717 1.38% 
January 1983 20.81% 79.19% .4361 1.42% 
May 1987 20.34% 79.66% .5330 1.43% 
July 1990 20.23% 79.77% .5954 1.39% 
November 1994 19.83% 80.17% .6724 1.41% 
December 1997 19.60% 80.40% .7326 1.38% 
Table 23. Percentage of Overall Effect of Sanctions Q and S Due 
to Incapacitation for Policy: Q* = .4605, S* = 1.11 Years 
Period Incapacitative Effect Deterrent Effect \ ^t 
September 1975 15.43% 84.57% .2814 1.15% 
September 1979 13.74% 86.26% .3717 1.38% 
January 1983 13.41% 86.59% .4361 1.42% 
May 1987 13.14% 86.86% .5330 1.43% 
July 1990 13.05% 86.95% .5954 1.39% 
November 1994 12.79% 87.21% .6724 1.41% 
December 1997 12.83% 87.17% .7326 1.38% 
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5.5.4 Comparison Between Models 
Attempting to compare the results of this section with analogous 
results from other models is hampered by a lack of analytical research 
in this area. In their analysis of the effect of the (1, 2.6) policy, 
Blumstein and Nagin state that they believe the switch from (.25, 2.6) 
policy resulted in a savings in reported offenses of about 50%. The 
analogous figure from our analysis was about 42%. Of the 50% of crimes 
averted, Blumstein and Nagin speculated in their thesis that about 30% 
of that savings was due to incapacitation and about 70% due to deter­
rence. 
In fact, we performed the precise determination of this 
percentage. This was done by determining the percentage of crimes 
averted due to incapacitation under the (.25, 2.6) policy and the 
(1, 2.6) policy. For the former, incapacitation was responsible for 
about 31% of the entire savings due to sanctions. For the latter, 
the savings attributable to incapacitation, on average, was about 33%, 
an increase of 2%. Consequently, the proportion of the increase in 
total savings was about 5%. This estimate was in sharp contrast to 
the estimate offered by Blumstein and Nagin, who believed this 
figure would be near 30%. Part of the discrepancy, of course, is 
attributable to the fact that their analysis was on a national level 
and we performed the experiment for the state of Georgia only. Table 
24 presents a sample summary of the results for the experiments. The 
first month for which this result was available was August 1976, 32 
months following the start of the simulation. 
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Table 24. Percent of Savings Due to Incapacitation 
Period Policy (Q = .25, S = 2.6) Policy (Q = 1, S = 2.6) 
August 1976 31.98% 37.69% 
September 1979 31.85% 33.44% 
January 1983 30.88% 35.10% 
May 1987 30.00% 31.96% 
July 1990 30.14% 31.31% 
November 1994 30.12% 31.99% 
December 1997 30.06% 31.17% 
5.6 Introduction to the Comparison Procedure 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the application 
of the model to data bases originated in states other than Georgia. 
Specifically, analysis is presented for the states of Missouri and 
Texas, with comparisons offered. Within this section, it is shown 
how judicial policies differ greatly between geographical areas, and 
consequently, the implications for policy improvement may not be the 
same from state to state. The comparison proceeds by first discussing 
the database for each state and ultimately discussing the results 
obtained from the model using each individual data base. 
5.6.1 Input Requirements 
If we recall, the data required to execute the model for any 
individual state consists of 36 monthly estimates of the following 
quantities: 
a. Total reported offenses. 
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b. Total state institution inmate population totals. 
c. Total state institution admissions total. 
d. Average sentence length prevailing in each month. 
e. Probability of imprisonment prevailing in each month. 
Fortunately, we were able to develop complete data bases for Missouri 
and Texas, with the aid of the appropriate law enforcement and correc­
tions agencies of those states. In the following sections, each of 
these data bases is discussed individually and in relation to each 
other. 
5.6.2 Total Offenses for Missouri 
In order to obtain monthly figures of total reported offenses 
in the state of Missouri (for the period from January 1974 until 
December 1976), a procedure analogous to that used in developing 
similar data for the state of Georgia was employed. In this case, 
the monthly behavior of total reported offenses for the city of 
St. Louis was imparted to the state's annual total, in order to 
obtain the monthly state totals. The results of this calculation 
are presented in Table 25. 
From Table 25, it can be seen that the mean value of 19658 for 
the Missouri total offenses time series is significantly larger than 
the mean value of 16449, which is the analogous result in the Georgia 
data. The population totals of Georgia and Missouri are approximately 
4.95 and 4.70 million, respectively, suggesting the per capita rate of 
crime to be greater in Missouri than Georgia. Figure 22 illustrates 








Figure 22. Total Reported Offenses Time Series 1974 - 1976 
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Table 25. Total Reported Offenses in Missouri 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 16079 21038 19658 
Feb, 16952 20155 20285 
Mar. 16689 21396 20403 
Apr. 17026 20145 20370 
May 17293 20228 19987 
June 17997 22171 20356 
July 20697 23881 21557 
Aug, 22336 23575 22951 
Sept. 21330 21883 19675 
Oct. 21973 22467 19697 
Nov. 19444 19185 17735 
Dec. 20908 20972 17940 
offenses series was analyzed as a (0,1,1) ( 0 , 1 , 1 ) ^ empirical stochas­
tic model with iterative estimation of the parameters, resulting in the 
values: 0 ^ = 0.399, Q ^ = 0.694. The model was then run with the 
preceding imbedded as the Z forecasting mechanism. 
5.6.3 Total Reported Offenses in Texas 
In obtaining monthly figures of total reported offenses for 
Texas, the standard procedure was implemented. For the state of Texas, 
monthly crime rates from the city of Dallas, Texas were used to develop 
the total offenses time series for that state. The results of the 
calculations pertaining to the months from January 1974 until December 
1976 appear in Table 26. 
As would be expected, the mean of the above series exceeds the 
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Table 26. Total Reported Offenses in Texas 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 43644 54740 61108 
Feb. 40056 46038 53471 
Mar. 44796 51702 55301 
Apr. 44268 51114 55389 
May- 47233 54674 55395 
June 27730 55037 58820 
July 51929 61979 63585 
Aug. 54453 60302 61586 
Sept. 48296 56189 56102 
Oct. 51992 56332 55543 
Nov. 50626 53272 51889 
Dec. 51809 60309 15150 
analogous values for Missouri and Georgia by an order of magnitude. 
This relates to the fact that the population of Texas is considerably 
larger (about 12.7 million) than that of either Missouri or Georgia. 
The Texas series was identified as a (0,1,1) ( 0 , 1 , 1 ) ^ m°del with 
9 1 = .320, 9 1 2 = .288. Figure 22 shows the behavior of the Texas 
series. 
5.6.4 Missouri Prison Populations 
The second requirement in executing the model for the state of 
Missouri was 36 monthly observations of state inmate population totals 
corresponding to the monthly total reported offenses for that state. 
These observations are presented in Table 26. 
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Interestingly, the mean of the series is slightly over one-third of 
the analogous series for the state of Georgia, despite the fact that 
the populations of the two states differ only slightly. This result 
provides considerable insight into the judicial practices of state 
courts as discussed in a subsequent section. 
Statistical analysis of the Missouri prison populations time 
series suggested the process to be appropriately modeled by the 
non-stationary (0,1,0) Box-Jenkins forecasting model. A graphical 
representation of the series is presented in Figure 23, whose forecasts 
are generated by the form: 
\ - zt-i + V 
5.6.5 Texas Prison Populations 
Monthly observations of Texas state inmate population totals, 
utilized to execute the model for that state, are presented in Table 
28. Once again, these values pertain to the months from January 1974 
until December 1976. The ratio of the mean of the Texas prison popu­
lation time series to the state population was found to be intermediate 
I 
with respect to the analogous ratios for Georgia and Missouri. That 
is, the per capita prison population was found to be highest in Georgia 
followed by Texas and Missouri, respectively. The significance of 
this relationship, in terms of the results from the model, is discussed 
in a later section. 
Statistical analysis of the Texas prison time series identified 
the process to be non-stationary and required a second difference of 
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Table 27. Missouri Prison Populations 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 3514 3867 4513 
Feb. 3531 3948 4553 
Mar. 3547 4126 4565 
Apr. 3535 4141 4627 
May 3598 4193 4702 
June 3640 4201 4732 
July 3690 3985 4753 
Aug. 3698 4120 4744 
Sept. 3709 4138 4784 
Oct. 3720 4242 4795 
Nov. 3735 4300 4759 
Dec. 3754 4368 4809 
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Table 28. Texas Prison Populations 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 171.29 17059 19099 
Feb. 17210 17365 19383 
Mar. 17251 17501 19857 
Apr. 17340 17652 20032 
May 17144 17544 20281 
June 17121 17721 20616 
July 17014 17912 20748 
Aug. 16956 18151 20976 
Sept. 16995 18357 20572 
Oct. 17059 18516 20641 
Nov. 16985 18724 20568 










Figure 23. Prison Populations Time Series 1974 - 1976 
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the form (0,2,1). Consequently, the process can be written as: 
Z = Z n + a = 9 a n . t t-2 t-1 t-2 
Graphical illustration of the series behavior is presented in 
Figure 23. 
5.6.6 Missouri Prison Admissions 
Monthly observations of prison admissions in Missouri state 
prisons during the period from January 1974 until December 1976 were 
consistent with their corresponding prison population observations. 
Consistent in the sense that Missouri had the lowest per capita rate 
of prison receptions and releases of the three states analyzed, and 
the lowest per capita prison population. The 36 month Missouri 
prison admissions time series is presented in Table 29. Analysis of 
the series was suggestive of the non-stationary (0,1,1) Box-Jenkins 
forecasting model to be imbedded into the model which can be written 
in the form: 
Z t " Z t - 1 + a t + 9 a t - l 
where the value of 9 was estimated to be 0.7489. The behavior in the 
time series can be observed in Figure 24. The mean of the series was 
found to be, 181, over the thirty-six historical observations. 
5.6.7 Texas Prison Admissions 
The 36 monthly state prison admission series for the state of 
Texas demonstrated the lowest per capita prison reception rate of the 
three states for which the analysis was performed. The series is 
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Table 29. Missouri Prison Admissions 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 121 173 196 
Feb. 140 171 187 
Mar. 134 251 254 
Apr. 199 214 188 
May 147 172 200 
June 165 201 247 
July 184 192 176 
Aug. 135 160 177 
Sept. 145 146 151 
Oct. 186 195 201 
Nov. 144 221 177 
Dec. 146 246 175 
similar to the analogous series for the state of Missouri, in that 
it represents a non-stationary (0,1,1) process. The 0 parameter for 
the Texas data, however, was estimated to be 0.6889. The data is 
presented in Table 30 with a graphical illustration presented in 
Figure 24. The per capita state prison admission rate in Texas was 
considerably closer to the same figure for the state of Missouri than 
for Georgia. This means that the monthly prison turnover is much 
higher in Georgia than in either Missouri or Texas, indicating that 
Georgia prisons process more individuals (per capita) in a given time 
period than the other two states. The implication of this for judicial 
policy is considered in a subsequent section. 
1000 -
Figure 24. Prison Receptions Time Series 1974 - 1976 
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Table 30. Texas Prison Admissions 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 621 815 751 
Feb. 624 810 761 
Mar. 608 748 945 
Apr. 679 814 842 
May 605 721 720 
June 506 740 850 
July 579 689 748 
Aug. 647 715 848 
Sept. 614 760 773 
Oct. 697 791 823 
Nov. 670 778 782 
Dec. 520 832 816 
5.6.8 Averaj; ie Sentence Lengths in Missouri 
To obtain the 36 month time series of average sentence length 
observations for the state of Missouri, the procedure is to divide 
the prison population time series by the prison admission time series. 
This was done in order to obtain the time series presented in Table 31. 
Clearly, the average sentence length in the state of Missouri is many 
times greater than the corresponding average sentence length figures 
from the state of Georgia, Specifically, the mean of the Missouri 
series is 23.51 years, as opposed to 1.67 years for the state of 
Georgia. 
This result implies that judicial policy in the state of 
Missouri is oriented largely toward the severity of punishment. As 
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Table 31. Average Sentence Lengths for Missouri 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 29.04 22.35 23.03 
Feb. 25.22 23.09 24.35 
Mar. 26.47 16.44 17.97 
Apr. 17.76 19.35 24.61 
May 24.48 24.38 23.51 
June 22.06 20.90 19.16 
July 20.05 20.76 27.01 
Aug. 27.39 25.75 26.80 
Sept. 25.58 28.34 31.68 
Oct. 20.00 21.75 23.86 
Nov. 25.94 19.46 26.89 
Dec. 25.71 17.76 27.48 
a result, we would expect that individuals admitted would remain 
incarcerated for many periods, thus contributing to the extremely 
low turnover which was observed. In fact, later analysis of imprison­
ment probabilities for the state of Missouri will show that judicial 
behavior in that state imposes prison sentences only infrequently, yet 
tends to delegate severe sentences when the imprisonment option is 
exercised. In our analysis for the state of Georgia on the other hand, 
it was found that more frequent prison disposition of criminal cases 
was practiced, yet sentences tended to be of shorter duration. 
The time series appearing in Table 31 was identified as a 
stationary (0,0,0) process, best characterized by its mean values. 
As a result, a constant value of S = 23.51 was used in simulating the 
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model for the Missouri data base. 
5.6.9 Average Sentence Lengths for Texas 
Like Missouri, the time series of average sentence lengths for 
the state of Texas was an order of magnitude larger than the Georgia 
series. The average of the Texas series equalling 25.62 years was 
the largest among the three states considered in the analysis. The 
series was obtained using procedures identical to those used in 
Georgia and Missouri, and is listed in Table 32. In addition, a 
graphical illustration of the 36 historical observations is presented 
in Figure 25. 
As was the case for Missouri, judicial policy in the state of 
Texas is orientated strongly toward the severity of punishment, as 
opposed to its certainty. Indeed we will find this to be the case 
when imprisonment probabilities in the state of Texas are considered. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the low turnover rates observed for 
Texas prisons, suggesting fewer sentences of greater duration. 
Analysis of the Texas average sentence length series suggested 
the stationary (0,0,0) model, leading us to use a constant value of 
S = 25.62 in simulating for the Texas data base. 
5.6.10 Probability of Imprisonment for Missouri 
In determining the second component of judicial policy for the 
state of Missouri, (i.e., Q ) , it was found that the series represented 
a departure from the imprisonment probabilities obtained for Georgia 
in two respects. First, the magnitude of monthly imprisonment 
probabilities for Georgia was nearly ten times the magnitude of those 
40 
time 
Figure 25. Average Sentence Length Time Series 1974 - 1976 
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Table 32. Average Sentence Lengths for Texas 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. 27.58 20.93 25.43 
Feb. 27.58 21.44 25.47 
Mar. 28.43 23.40 21.01 
Apr. 25.54 21.69 23.79 
May 28.34 24.33 28.17 
June 33.84 23.95 24.25 
July 29.39 26.00 27.79 
Aug. 26.21 25.39 24.74 
Sept. 27.68 24.15 26.61 
Oct. 24.47 23.41 25.00 
Nov. 25.35 24.07 26.30 
Dec. 32.27 22.76 25.39 
for Missouri. This result provides convincing evidence that judicial 
behavior can differ greatly from state to state, especially in terms 
of sentencing practices. In fact, these results suggest that the 
character of judicial policy in Missouri has an almost opposite 
emphasis from judicial policy in Georgia. Namely, while the severity 
of punishment is emphasized in Missouri, it is the certainty of pun­
ishment which is predominant in the judicial priorities of Georgia. 
The other respect in which the imprisonment probabilities 
series of Missouri and Georgia differ is the actual generating process 
underlying the time series. While it was shown in section 5.3 that 
the time series for Georgia imprisonment probabilities was a non-
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stationary (0,1,1) process, the analogous series for Missouri was a 
stationary (0,0,0) process, suggesting the mean as a forecasting 
mechanism. Since the mean of the Missouri imprisonment probability 
series presented in Table 33 was .04504, this constant value of Q was 
used in simulating for the Missouri data base. A graphical illustra­
tion of the series is presented in Figure 26. 
One possible interpretation of the stationary imprisonment 
probabilities for the state of Missouri is that judicial policy has 
remained relatively stagnant over the past several years. That is, 
the current policy has remained unchanged from past years, while 
in Georgia a more dynamic judicial process prevails. Alternatively, 
the prisons capacity in that state may be crippled by its obligation 
to fufill numerous sentences of long duration imposed in past years. 
In any case, our analysis could be helpful in evaluating the Missouri 
policies as possibly suggesting ways for improving the situation. 
5.6.11 Probability of Imprisonment in Texas 
The time series of imprisonment probabilities from the state 
of Texas was computed similarly for the months of January 1974 until 
December 1976, and is presented in Table 34. The mean value of these 
36 observations was found to be (0.06855), of the same order of 
magnitude as the series of imprisonment probabilities obtained for the 
state of Missouri. The Texas series was also found to resemble the 
Missouri result, in that the underlying process was a stationary (0,0,0) 
and best forecasted by its mean value. A graphical illustration of 
166 
Table 33. Imprisonment Probabilities in Missouri 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. .03763 .04112 .04985 
Feb. .04129 .04242 .04609 
Mar. .04015 .05866 .06225 
Apr. .05844 .05311 .04615 
May .04250 .04252 .05003 
June .04584 .04533 .06067 
July ' .04445 .04020 .04082 
Aug. .03022 .03393 .03856 
Sept. .03399 .03336 .03837 
Oct. .04232 .04340 .05102 
Nov. .03703 .05760 .04490 
Dec. .03491 .05865 .04877 
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Table 34. Imprisonment Probabilities in Texas 
Month 1974 1975 1976 
Jan. .071.14 .07444 .05145 
Feb. .07789 .08797 .07116 
Mar. .06786 .07234 .08544 
Apr. .07669 .07963 .07601 
May .06404 .06594 .06497 
June .05301 .06723 .07225 
July .05575 .05558 .05882 
Aug. .05941 .05928 .06885 
Sept. .06357 .06763 .06889 
Oct. .06703 .07022 .07409 
Nov. .06617 .07302 .07535 




the series is presented in Figure 26. 
Overall, the imprisonment probability results for Texas were 
very similar to the analogous Missouri results. This suggests that 
judicial practices in these states are quite similar and in sharp 
contrast to the situation existing in Georgia. In the next section, 
the ramifications of these results are explored in greater depth by 
simulating the model for the Texas and Missouri data bases. 
5.6.12 Discussion of Corrections Capacity in Texas and Missouri 
At this point, it is worth discussing one counter-intuitive 
condition which exists within the input data of our model. That is, 
if we examine closely, it is apparent that while Georgia may have the 
highest "per capita prison population," it also has the lowest prisons 
capacity constraint, i.e., QS = 0.511, (while QS = 1.05 for Missouri 
and QS = 1.76 for Texas). This is the lowest capacity of the three 
states considered in the analysis. Although this does not appear to 
make sense immediately, it actually reflects the high cost of long 
term incarceration. This stems from the fact that individuals who 
receive very long sentences tend to be severe deviants, requiring 
expensive high security facilities designed strictly for corrections. 
On the other hand, offenders receiving very short sentences tend to 
impose lower security requirements costing far less per unit time of 
incarceration. As a result, it is possible for one state to expend 
less in detaining a large number of low risk offenders, than it is for 
another state to detain a much smaller number of severe deviants. 
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5.6.13 Results of Model Simulation for the Texas and Missouri Data 
Bases 
To explore for trends in the analysis for Missouri and Texas, 
similar to those which were predicted by the model to evolve in 
Georgia, analogous results for the aforementioned states were calcula­
ted and examined. Specifically, the average monthly number of offenses 
per criminal, the prison populations and the criminal populations were 
explored for Missouri and Texas over the 25 year horizon. 
5.6.13.1 Results for ^t. In this analysis, it was found that 
the behavior of A in Missouri was expected to behave in a manner 
similar to Â_ for Georgia. On the other hand, A for Texas was found 
to grow only slightly. This result can be explained by the slow 
growth behavior of the prison population forecasting model for Missouri, 
and the near stationary behavior of the prison populations in Georgia. 
This behavior of the prison populations is in contrast to the behavior 
of crime rates which were, predicted to rise sharply in both Georgia 
and Missouri. During this same period, Texas prison populations are 
expected to grow considerably along with the crime rate, thereby, 
moderating the growth of Â _. In all three cases, the proportion of 
the criminal population which remains at large, ^^/^t^t' e x P e c t e c * 
to remain nearly stable. Tables 35 and 36 present sample results for 
A t and ^^/C^+F^, respectively, for each of the three states. 
5.6.13.2 Deterrent Effects in Texas and Missouri. In order to 
illustrate the impact on the prevailing judicial policy in Georgia, 
Missouri and Texas, clear of any factors relating to the size and 
population of the individual states, it is appropriate to examine their 
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Table 35. t For Five Sample Periods 
Period Georgia Missouri Texas 
March .2938 .2568 .2813 
January .4361 .3293 .3063 
May .5330 .3238 .3117 
July .5954 .4231 .3340 
November .6724 .5643 .4062 
Table 36 
C 
. ct + P t F o r F l v e Sample Periods 
Period Georgia Missouri Texas 
March .8330 .8231 .8403 
January .8340 .8307 .8486 
May .8340 .8258 .8605 
July .8380 .8283 .8585 
November .8350 .8285 .8486 
deterrent effects. This Is because the deterrent effect represents 
a proportion of the population in each state and as such, is dimension-
less. The deterrent effects for five periods of interest during the 
24 year simulation are presented in Table 37 for each of the three 
states. 
The results in Table 37 suggest that expenditures for corrections 
in Texas, ultimately produces the smallest deterrent effect of the 
three states. The most apparent reason behind this result is that 
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Table 37. Deterrent Effects For Five Sample Periods 
Period Georgia Missouri Texas 
March 1975 1.32% 1.12% 1.09% 
January 1983 1.42% 1.11% 1.07% 
May 1987 1.43% 1.31% 1.16% 
July 1990 1.39% 1.13% 1.19% 
November 1994 1.42% 1.20% 1.13% 
Texas also allocates the largest resource in terms of its corrections 
capacity constraint and therefore, would expect to receive a higher 
return. This reasoning also extends to Missouri, which bankrolls the 
second largest corrections system, followed by Georgia which allocates 
the smallest resource to obtain the smallest deterrent impact. This 
analysis, of course, says nothing about the per dollar efficiency of 
the corrections allocation within each state, which is addressed in a 
subsequent section. 
5.6.13.3 Comparison of the Effect of Optimization. The most 
astounding contrast between the three states existed within the opti­
mization process. Table 38 is a summary of the resulting optimal 
judicial policy for each period for each state. Bear in mind that 
this result is strictly for constant input values of decision variables 
Q and S, and as such, the results apply for every monthly period 
within the 25 year horizon. 
Checking back to section 5.4 will show the results for Texas 
and Missouri to be totally consistent with sensitivity studies 
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Table 38. Summary of the Optimization Process 
for Decision Variables Q and S 
Georgia Texas Missouri 
prevailing Q .30606 .0686 .0450 
prevailing S 1.11 yrs. 25.62 yrs. 23.51 yrs. 
Q* .4605 .6753 .6024 
S* 1.67 yrs. 2.60 yrs. 1.76 yrs. 
AO +.15 +.61 +.56 
AS -.56 yrs. -23.02 yrs. -21.75 yrs. 
performed for the Georgia data base. That is, for relaxation of the 
Georgia capacity constraint corresponding roughly to the existing 
Missouri and Texas capacity constraints, the optimal policy is found 
to be very close to the same form. This would lead us to conclude 
that despite differences in the nature of corrections resource alloca­
tion between states, the social mechanisms underlying the deterrent 
effect are essentially the same. Consequently, the prescription for 
judicial policy should also be roughly consistent. Given the present 
magnitude of this allocation, a more efficient strategy for controlling 
crime within existing corrections capacity is to insure a higher level 
of imprisonment probability with shorter sentences, i.e., increase the 
flow rate of individuals within prison system without increasing 
capacity. 
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5.6.13.4 Comparison of Savings Through Optimization. To 
further illustrate the significance of potential improvement through 
policy adjustment, Table 39 illustrates the number of crimes saved in 
each of the states for five sample periods during the simulation, and 
the corresponding percentage savings. Clearly, the potential improve­
ment in crime control for the state of Georgia is the lowest, due to 
the fact that Georgia maintains the lowest corrections capacity of 
the three states. Also, Georgia's prevailing judicial policy is 
closest to the theoretically correct policy, further narrowing the 
margin for improvement. 
Table 39. Crime Saving Percentages 





March 1975 360...2.28% 4372...43% 11875...33% 
January 1983 590...2.28% 5606...43% 13056...33% 
May 1987 744...2.28% 6152...43% 15123...33% 
July 1990 825...2.28% 7720...43% 16617...33% 
November 1994 939...2.28% 9561...43% 18121...33% 
The most important result from Table 39 is that the states of 
Missouri and Texas stand to realize a substantial improvement in the 
efficiency of their corrections system without allocating additional 
funds. The model suggests that these two states can upgrade their 
crime control effectiveness by redistributing the dollars they are now 
using for long term incarceration and maintenance of high security 
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institutions. Texas and Missouri represent prime examples of the 
predominance of the certainty of punishment as opposed to its severity 
within the feasible region of spending. 
5.6.13.5 Separating Incapacitation from Deterrence. One 
additional result obtained from the model relates to the separation of 
deterrence and incapacitation. Table 40 is a summary of the average 
distribution of the crime control effect stemming from general deter­
rence and incapacitation under current and optimal policies for each 
of the three states involved in the analysis. From the table, it can 
be seen that the redistribution of these measures is far more pro­
nounced in Texas and Missouri than in Georgia. This stems from the 
nature of the shift in policy brought about by the optimization 
process. It is also evidence of the relatively small impact of inca­
pacitation as compared with deterrence under optimal conditions, once 
again emphasizing that it is effectively the threat of punishment, as 
opposed to the actual punishment, which is most correlated with control­
ling crime. As a final note, it should be mentioned that the averages 
appearing in Table 40 represent a much smaller sample under current 
policy for Missouri. This is because the recursive accumulation pro­
cedure for calculating the incapacitative effect in that state required 
a much larger start-up period than for Georgia, due to high average 
sentence lengths under prevailing policy. Consequently, this quantity 
could be determined for only a small number of periods. 
The incapacitative effect in the state of Texas under prevailing 
policy could not be obtained, due to the fact that the average sentence 
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Table 40. Distribution of Crime Control Effect 
Georgia Missouri Texas 
optimal prevailing opt. prev. opt. prev. 
policy policy pol. pol. pol. pol. 
Incapacitation: 13% 24% 8% 93% 6% 98% (est.] 
Gen. Deterrence: 87% 76% 92% 7% 94% 2% (est.] 
length under prevailing policy 26.52 years exceeded the duration of 
the simulation. As a result, the value in Table 40 was estimated by 
assuming the unit percentage relation between incapacitative effect 
and sentence length in Texas was the same for Missouri. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions reached from this research can be divided into 
three categories; (1) those relating to policy implications within a 
constrained resource situation, (2) those relating to policy variation 
amongst geographical areas, and (3) those relating to sensitivity 
studies investigating assumptions underlying the models execution. 
The following sections treat each category of conclusions individually 
and describes their relationship. 
Section 6.2 presents recommendations for furthering the 
research in this thesis and other related areas of potential interest. 
Recommendations for furthering the resarch embody the areas of 
transient analysis, higher resolution of crime type, forecast revision 
with changing sentencing levels and the potential of integrative model­
ing techniques extended to other areas. 
6.1 Conclusions 
The results in section 5.6 indicate a similarity of results 
that is common to each data base for which analysis was provided. In 
all cases it was the certainty of punishment, as opposed to its 
severity, which exhibited the greatest crime control potential relative 
to the prevailing policy. 
In section 5.4, it was shown that this characteristic endures 
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until the system capacity constraint is relaxed to three times its 
presently feasible limit. Since it is not realistic to expect that 
society's allocation for criminal justice will triple anytime soon, 
we can conclude that the evidence stemming from this analysis strongly 
supports the current popular notion favoring the dominance in the 
certainty of punishment. The implication of this for judicial policy 
is that court authorities exercise the imprisonment option for criminal 
offenses with greater frequency and milder sentences. The impact of 
such a generalized policy change will be to increase turnover rates in 
corrections facilities x^ithout affecting population sizes at any given 
instant. Although this would inevitably incur some increase in admini­
strative costs, the results of section 5.4 suggest the resulting 
increases in per dollar crime control effectiveness to be more than 
offsetting. 
In addition to determining the relative importance of the 
certainty of punishment, the model is able to estimate the effective­
ness of a judicial policy in terms of general deterrence and incapaci­
tation. The results stemming from these experiments served to illus­
trate the decreased incapacitative effect and increased general 
deterrent effect characteristic of optimal policies. This notion is 
consistent with the remainder of results, again reinforcing the 
importance of the certainty of punishment as opposed to its severity. 
The results in section 5.6 indicate extreme variation in 
judicial practice between states. Specifically, judicial policies in 
Missouri and Texas were an order of magnitude different from judicial 
policy in Georgia. In addition, it was determined that the state of 
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Georgia spends less money per capita than either Texas or Missouri 
for corrections which have comparable per capita crime control 
potential. 
Further evidence of this is present in state prison turnover 
levels presented for each state in Chapter V. Essentially, these 
results serve to support the conclusions of the preceding section 
and illuminate the inconsistent pattern existing in sentencing 
practices between states. Finally, in states where prevailing 
judicial policy is highly sub-optimal, the potential returns for 
optimization of the current policy are the greatest in terms of 
crime control effectiveness. 
Two assumptions,for which no previous investigation is offered 
in the literature, were involved in specifying the values of beta and 
epsilon. In the analysis offered in section 5.1, the sensitivity of 
our model to the values of beta and epsilon was explored. In choosing 
a value of beta, it was found that the form of the optimal solution 
was not affected. Overstating the value of beta, however, would tend 
to understate the importance of the optimzation. Specifying a value 
of epsilon did tend to alter the form of the optimal solution, as well 
as having an affect on the impact of optimization. In Chapter V, it 
was shown that the impact of epsilon could be explained in terms of 
the prevailing Q and S values. Specifically, it was shown that for 
states characterized by large average sentence lengths, the optimiza­
tion process would tend to favor the value of S more than otherwise. 
The magnitude of this affect was shown to be insufficient to discount 
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the overall dominance of Q when analysis was performed for the states 
of Texas and Missouri. 
6.2 Recommendations 
In developing descriptions of transient behavior for the model, 
closed form results were obtained only within the populations submodel. 
A significant extension of this research would embody the derivation 
of a closed form transient expression for the basic equation. This 
undertaking would involve the development of a time oriented formula­
tion of lambda. This extension would enable the analyst to derive 
results for the model without the aid and expense of computer simula­
tion. 
Besides providing only partial transient analysis, the research 
offers no computational experience for investigating the validity of 
the six month iterative cycle for determining flow variables. A worth­
while effort would be to explore the impact of alternative iterative 
cycle lengths and provide a comparison. In addition, a different 
approach to the determination of flow variables may be suggested. For 
example, a time series description approach for determining flow vari­
able values within Blumstein's Markov Chain description might prove 
more effective than the pattern search approach employed in our 
research. 
Aside from the Criminal Justice System, the integrative 
modeling technique presented in this thesis may be appropriate to 
model building efforts in many unrelated areas. In most situations 
where a system can be separated into distinct subdivisions, the 
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potential for integrative modeling exists. Usually, integrative 
modeling requires only the specification of the logical interrelation 
between each subsystem and the development of the appropriate mathemat­
ical characterization of that relationship. For this reason, the 
technique has considerable potential for extensions in many disciplines. 
One approach frequently taken in other criminal justice modeling 
is to resolve crime rates into specific categories. This has been 
used largely in time series modeling of crime rates. A meaningful 
extension to our analysis would be to adapt the model to a higher 
resolution of crime type. This would circumvent the limiting assump­
tion of a single criminal type committing a single crime type. For 
example, the model might be utilized in modeling only the occurrence 
of burglary or armed robbery and consider the criminal population as 
consisting of only burglars or armed robbers. 
A final extension to the model, and perhaps the most difficult 
to implement, would involve the rebuilding of the forecasting mechanisms 
within the model with each policy change. By this, we mean that each 
time an optimal policy is formulated, the expected number of crimes 
which result under that optimal policy is used as the estimate of 
total offenses in the next: period. This would lead to an optimization 
which is truly unique for each period and dependent exclusively on 
the events of previous periods. This extension would greatly enhance 




The appendix lists the fortran code of the model used to generate 
the results in chapter V and some example output. The input to the pro­
gram is as follows: 
1st card: 36 monthly observations of prevailing imprisonment 
probabilities 
2nd card: 36 monthly observations of total reported offenses 
3rd card: 36 monthly observation of the population of the area 
of interest 
4th card: 36 monthly observations of the state of prison 
population 
5th card: 36 monthly observations of the prevailing average 
sentence length 
A brief description of the routines is as follows: 
1. MAIN. This program is the main-line routine which calls all 
sub sequent sub rout ines. 
2. FRCST. This subroutine forecasts the values of Q, S and the 
prison population which are used throughout the simulation. 
3. SLIP. This subroutine determines the proportion of the crime 
control effect which is attributable to incapacitation. 
4. PLOTTER. This subroutine is the main-line routine which 
calls the subroutines used for plotting total offenses and 
deterrent effect time series. 
5. RANGE. This subroutine compiles the limits of a data set 
which is to be plotted. 
6. INITIAL. This subroutine laods the data into the appropriate 
array for plotting. 
7. SCALE. This subroutine scales the raw data prior to printing 
the plots. 
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8. GRAF. This subroutine orders the data within the plotting 
array. 
9. OUTPUT. This subroutine actually prints the plot of total 
offenses or deterrent effects. 
10. OPT. This subroutine solves for the coefficient values 
given the deterrent effect, and the necessary assumptions. 
11. PTRN. This subroutine executes the pattern search step 
in determining optimal flow and policy variables. 
12. FOBJ. This subroutine evaluates the sum of squares 
objective function corresponding to the current flow 
variable solution. 
13. LIMS. This subroutine determines the feasibility of 
the current flow variable solution. 
14. OBJ. This subroutine evaluates the current Q, S 
solution. 
15. LIMS1. This subroutine determines the feasibility of the 
current Q, S solution. 
16. CONTOU. This subroutine evaluates deterrent effect solu­
tions for a range of Q and S values and is used to plot 































































DIMENSION X(3) »STEP( 3) .Bl ( 3) «B2(3),B3(3),B%(3) 
DIMENSION CAVG(300),CINT(3CO),TER(30 0> 
DIMENSION AC300),W(300),HP(30O> 
DIMENSION DIFS(300).DIFQ(300).DEP(300) 
DIMENSION DETB(3 00).AXX(62).AXY(62) 
DIMENSION FN(60,60).CLEV(7),IBUF(512) 
DIMENSION Tl (300),T2(300).T3(300),T% (300),T5(300). 
T6(300) 
DIMENSION ZPOPT(300) .YRMINK300) .TERMSK300) 
























DO 108 J=2,12 
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00 35* Z (INUM+J) = Z (INUM-KI-1) *Z t INUM-KI-12) -Z CINUM+J-13) 
• T H 1 2 » A ( I N U M - 1 2 * J ) 
0 0 3 6 * 10 8 CONTINUE 
0 0 3 7 * I F ( N F 0 R , L E . 1 2 ) G 0 TO 109 
0 0 3 8 * Z C X N U N « 1 3 ) = Z ( I N U M + 1 2 ) + Z ( I N U M + 1 ) * Z ( I N U M ) + 
» TH12*TH1»A(INUM) 
00 39* ];C0UNT=INUM>H4 
0040* OO 110 K = I C O U N T , 3 0 0 
0 0 4 1 * 2'. ik) = Z U - 1 ) * Z ( K - 1 2 ) - Z ( K - 1 3 ) 
0 0 4 2 * 110 CONTINUE 
0 0 4 3 * 109 CONTINUE 
0 0 4 6 * IEXAM=1 
0 0 4 6 * I W O N = I N U M + N F O R 
0 0 4 7 * I F ( I E X A M . E Q . l ) G O TO 112 
0 0 4 8 * PRINT 113 
0 0 4 9 * 113 FORMAT(*THE ORIGINAL Z OATA MAS*) 
0 0 5 D * PRINT 1 1 4 . ( Z ( I J ) . I J = 1 V I N U M ) 
0 0 5 1 * 1 1 4 F O R M A T ( / 4 F 1 0 . 1 ) 
0 0 5 2 * LDUMslNUM*l 
0053* PRINT 115 
0 0 5 4 * 115 FORMAT(*THE SUBSEQUENT F O R E C A S T S ARE*) 
0 0 5 5 * PRINT 116T(Z(JI).JI=LOUM,IWON) 
0 0 5 6 * 116 FOR M A T ( / 4 F 1 0 . 1 ) 
0 0 5 7 * 112 CON T I N U E 
0 0 5 8 * L P R I M = I W 0 N / 1 2 
0 0 5 9 * PRINT 1 1 7 , L P R I M 
0 0 6 0 * 117 FORMATC*THE OATA COVERS.»I4*TYEARS*) 
0 0 6 D * NPRIS-36 
0 0 6 0 * R E A 0 ( 2 T * ) . ( P R I S ( K K K ) . K K K = l . N P R I S ) 
0 0 6 0 * CALL FRCST 
0 0 6 1 * HCOUNT-0 
0 0 6 2 * SUMsf 
0 0 6 3 * OO 118 L=1.LPRIM 
0 0 6 3 * SUM=0 
0 0 6 4 * OO 119 L L = 1 . 1 2 
0 0 6 5 * MASS=Z(MCOUNT«-LL) 
00 6 6 * SJM=SUM+MASS 
0 0 6 7 * I F ( L L « E Q , 1 2 ) Y R M E A N = ( S U M / 1 2 ) 
0 0 6 8 * I F ( L L « E G U 1 2 ) FIRST=Z( MCOUNT) 
0 0 6 9 * IF(LL.EGU12)LAST=Z(NC0UNT«-LL) 
00 7 1 * I F ( L L . E Q . 1 2 ) T E R M = ( ( L A S T - F I R S T ) / 1 2 * 
00 7 2 * 119 CONTINUE 
0 0 7 3 * Y R A V G ( L ) S Y R N E A N 
0 0 7 4 * T E R M S ( L ) S T E R M 
0 0 7 4 * M C 0 U N T * M C 0 U N T * 1 2 
0 0 7 5 * 118 CONTINUE 
0 0 7 6 * NCOUNT=0 
00 81* ZP ( 1 ) « Z C 1 ) 
0 0 8 1 * DO 54321 1 = 2 . 2 8 8 








































































155 FORMAT('THE POPULATION ROUTINE IS COMPLETE*! 
LC-0 
OO 156 JLN-1,NTIMS 
DO 157 LIP=1,6 






DO 158 LAM=lfNTIMS 
DO 159 JFK=1»6 




00 160 ,IT-1*NTIMS 








DO 162 IE=1,NTIMS 







OO 165 10=1,NOR 




PRINT*,"THE VECTOR OF MONTHLY DETERRENT EFFECTS" 
PRINT*,"FROM JANUARY,1974 UNTIL DECEMBER,1998" 




49189 FORMATf//////*PLOT OF THE TOTAL OFFENSES TIME 
SERIES*) 
PRINT*,"FROM JANUARY,1974 THROUGH OECEMBER,1976" 
IFILE=1 
00 1133 1=1,36 
1133 OET(I)=DET(I)*1000000. 
INU=36 





41089 FORMAT(//////*PLOT OF DETERRENT EFFECT TIME 
SERIES*) 
PRINT*,"FROM JANUARY,1974 THROUGH OECEMBER,1976" 




DO 1134 1=1,36 
1134 DET(I)=DET(I)/1000000* 
CALL OPT(IWON) 
00 1135 J=1,IH0N 
DIFS(J)=OPTS fJ)-SSS(J) 
OIFQ(J) =OPTQ(J)«*QQQ( J) 
1135 CONTINUE 
PRINT 1136 
1136 FORMAT(IX,*ACCORDING TO OUR MODEL,OPTIMIZATION*, 
•* OF POLICY VARIABLES GIVES THE FOLLOWING RESULTS*) 
PRINT 1137 
1137 FORMAT f////IX,*PERIOD PREVAILING AND 
OPTIMAL*, 








00 11%3 I-ltNRE 
DO 11VI J-1,12 
T1(J*LLLC)=0PTQ(J*LLLC) 





















00 11%% 1=1,IKON 










11*6 FORMAT(1X,*SAVINGS IN REPORTED CRIMES PER 
PERIOD THRU*, 
•* OPTIMIZATION HERE AS FOLLOWS*) 
PRINT 11%7,(ZDIF(J),J=l,IWON) 
11*7 FORMAT(1X,6F10.I) 
DO 8001 1=1*288 
DEP(I)=ZDIF(I)/Z(I) 
8001 CONTINUE 
PRINT*,"THE RATIOS OF THE SAVINGS IN TOTAL OFFENSES 
FORECASTED" 
PRINT*,"t(STEMMING FROM OPTIMISATION),TO THE TOTAL 
OFFENSES" 
PRINT*,"FORECASTED FOR PERIOOS 1/75 ,TO, 12/98 BY 
THE MODEL" 
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D O 1173 J=l,60 
A X Y ( J ) = J * . 3 
1173 CONTINUE 
D O 1174 IJ=1,20 
A X X ( I J ) = I J * « 0 5 
1174 CONTINUE 
D O 1175 1(1=1,20 
O O 1176 JQ=1,60 
FM(IQ,JQ)=GAM0 ( K U ) *GAM1CKU)*AXX ( I Q ) 
F N ( I Q , J Q ) = F N ( I Q , J Q ) * G A M 2 ( K U ) * A X X ( X Q I * A X Y ( J Q ) 
F N ( I Q , J Q ) = ( E X P ( F N ( I Q , J Q ) ) / ( 1 + E X P ( F N ( I Q , J Q ) ) ) ) 
FN ( I Q , J Q ) =FN ( I Q , J Q ) 'RATA ( K U ) *RAT (ICU) * T P Q ( K U ) 
F N ( I Q , J Q ) = Z O I F ( K U ) / F N ( I Q , J Q ) 
1176 CONTINUE 
11L75 C O N T I N U E 
G O T O 1149 
PFcINT 1178 
11L78 FORMAT(*THE REGION NEAR THE OPTIMUM I S A S 
FOLLOWS FOR*) 
N E W = K U / 1 2 
K K Y R = K Y E A R * N E W 
M O N T = K U « ( 1 2 * N E W ) 
B B 1 = G A M 0 ( K U ) * G A M L ( K U ) * O P T Q ( K U ) 
B B 1 = B B 1 * G A N 2 ( K U ) * 0 P T Q ( K U ) * 0 P T S ( K U ) 
B B 1 = ( E X P ( B B 1 ) / ( 1 * E X P ( B B 1 ) ) ) 
B B 1 = B B 1 * R A T A ( K U ) * R A T ( K U ) * T P O ( K U ) 
A A 1 = ( E X P ( G A H 0 ( K U ) ) / ( 1 * E X P ( G A M 0 ( K U ) ) ) ) 
A A 1 = A A 1 * R A T A ( K U ) * R A T ( K U ) * T P O ( K U ) 
C C 1 = G A M 0 ( K U ) • G A M 1 ( K U ) * 7 * G A N 2 ( K U ) 
C C 1 = ( E X P ( C C 1 ) / ( 1 * E X P ( C C D ) ) 





P R I N T 1181,((FN(I,J),I=1,20),J=1,60) 
1161 FORMAT (10F10.6) 
1149 CONTINUE 
CALL PLOTS(IBUF*512,1,0) 




















SU ML =0 •0 
00 190 L S1»LPRIM 
SUM1=0.0 



























PERC1(I)=0E1 (D/DETB (I) 
195 CONTINUE 
00 123*5 1=1,288 
PERC(I)=PERC(I)»100, 
123%5 CONTINUE 












































0 4334 1 















DO 1 1=1.300 
TPO(I)=4900000*2200*(I) 
1 CONTINUE 


















00 3 1=2*12 













GO TO 11 
DO 5 I=2,INUM 
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0*35* TH1 = .7706 
0*36* W(I)=QQQ(I)-QQQ(I-L) 
0*37* A(I)=W(I)«TH1*A(I-1) 
0*38* QQQ(I)*QQ.CHI-1)-TH1*A(I-1)«-A (I) 
0*38* 5 CONTINUE 
0*39* Q4CKINUM+L)=QQQ(INUM)•THL*A(INUM) 
0**0* IJP=INUM*2 
0 ^ 1 * OO 6 I=1JP,3S0 
0 W QQQ(I) =QQQ(I-1) 
0**3* 6 CONTINUE 
0**3* 11 CONTINUE 
0 *%** RETURN 
0**5* END 
0**8* SUBROUTINE SLIP 
0**9* COMMON DGRID(*2.72).IOATA(2,72)*ISCALE(*2)•OET(300)• 
0I.I»9*+ OPTS(300),O»TQ(300)T 
0**9** SSQ(300) *PMAT(9) ,ESTPR(6,50> ,ESTCR(6,5 0) , 
0**9** PRIS(30Q),GAMQ(300)• 
0i*k9** G A M K 3 0 0 ) ,GAM2(300) 
0*50* COMMON/BLOCKB/SSS(30 0) .DETK30 0) ,XAH (30 0) »XAM1 (300) . 
* ZDIFC300) 
0*50* COMMON/8LOCKE/ZC300)TZB(30G) 
0*50* OIMENSION N(300) »SSAVE (300) TSSAVLF30 0) • SSOI (300)« 
• PRS(300) 
0*50* OIMENSION PERCP(300),PER1P(3C0) 
0*50* RECEP=6*3.02778 
0*51* 00 1 1=1.288 
0*52* N«:I)=SSS(I)»12 
0*53* 1 CONTINUE 
0%5%* M=M(1)«-1 
0h55* 00 2 I=M,288 
0*56* AA[)O=0.0 
0*57* NF=N(I) 
0*58* DO 3 J=1,NF 
0*59* AOD=RECEP»XAM(I-J) 
0*60* AA0O=AOO*AAOO 
0*61* 3 CONTINUE 
0*62* SSAVE(I)=AADD 
0*63* 2 CONTINUE 
0*6** DO I» 1-1,288 
0*65* N(I)=0PTS(I)*12 
0*66* * CONTINUE 
0*67* MM=N«1)+1 
0*68* OO 5 I=MM,288 
0*69* AADD=C.0 
0*70* NF=N(I) 
0*71* DO 6 J=1,NF 
0*72* AOD=RECEP*XAML(IRJ) 
0*73* AADO-AOO^AAOO 
0*7** 6 CONTINUE 
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0<T75* S S A V K I ) =AADO 
0476* 5 CONTINUE 
0477* IF(MH*L£*M)KU=M 
0478* IF(M.LT.MM)KU=MM 
0479* DO 7 I=KU,288 
0480* SSDJI (I) =SSAV1(I)-SSAVE(I> 
Ok61* IF(SSOKI) .LE.0.0) GO TO 6 
0482* PRS(I)=SSOI(X)/ZOIF(I) 
0483* GO TO 9 
0484* 8 PRS(I)=0.0 
0485* 9 CONTINUE 
0 486* 7 CONTINUE 
0488* OO 13 I=KU,288 
0489* PERCP(I)=SSAVE(I)/Z(I)*10D. 
0490* PER1P=SSAV1(I)/ZB(I)*100« 
Q<»91* 13 CONTINUE 
0492* PRINT*,"STARTING WITH PERIOO" 
0492* PRINT*,KU 
0492* PRINT*,"AND ENOING WITH PERIOO 268, INCAPACITATION 
* WAS" 
0492* PRINT*,"RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF 
* CRIMES" 
0492* PRINT 14,(PERCP(I),I=KU,288) 
0492* 14 FORMAT(///6F11.3) 
0494* RETURN 
0495* ENID 
0500* SUBROUTINE PLOTTER(INU,IFILEJ 
0501* COMMON OGRIO(42,72),IOATA(2,72),ISCALE<42),OET(300), 
* OPTS(300),OPT 
0 50L* + SSQ(300),PMAT(9),ESTPR<6,50>,ESTCRF6,50), 
* PRIS(300),GAM0(30 
0501*+ GAM1(300),GAM2(300) 
0502* DATA IMIN/99999/,IMAX/-99999/ 
0704* CALL RANGE(IMIN,IMAX,INU,IFILE) 
0705* CALL INITIAL(INU) 
0706* CALL SCALE(IMIN,IMAX,IINCR,ILIM) 
0707* CALL GRAF(IMIN,INU,IFILE,IINCR) 
0706* CALL OUTPUT(INU,ILIM) 
0 70 9* RETURN 
0710* ENO 
9711* SUBROUTINE RANGE(IMIN,IMAX,INU,IFILE) 
0712* COMMON DGRID(42,72),IOATA(2,72),ISCALE(42),OET(300), 
* OPTS(300),OPT 
0 712*+ SSA(300),PMAT(9),ESTPR(6,50),ESTCR(6,50), 
* PRIS(300),GAM0(3O 
0712*+ GAM1(300),GAM2(300) 
0713* DO 180 1=1,IFILE 
0714* DO 180 J=1,INU 
0715* IF(IOATA(I,J)«LT«IMIN) IMIN=IOATA(I,J) 











DO 101 I = L.*F2 
OO LAI j = i , i n u 


























DO 100 I-LTIFILE 




IF(OGRID(IPLOTTJ)*NE«1H ) DGRID(IPLOT,J)=1H» 








0752*+ SSQ<300>.PHAT<9>.ESTPR<6,50> .ESTCR<6.50>, 
• PRIS(30D) ,GAM0 (30 
0752*+ G A M K 3 0 0 ) ,GAM2(300) 
0753* DATA DLINE/1H*/ 
0 754* PAUSE 
0755* ISKIP=(42»ILIM)/ILIM 
0 755* PRINT 090 
0 755* 0 90 FORMAT(1 HI) 
0756* 00 130 I=1,ILIM 
0757* PRINT 100, ISCALE(ILIN-I+I),(DGRID(ILIN-I+I,J)•J=I, 
• INU> 
0758* IOC FORMAT (IH ,16,IX,IH*,IX,72A1) 
0759* IF(ISKIP.EQ.O) GO TO 130 
0760* 00 120 J=1,ISKIP 
0 761* PRINT 110 
0762* 110 FORMAT (IH ,7X,1H») 
0 763* 120 CONTINUE 
0 764* 130 CONTINUE 
0765* PRINT 140, (OLINE,1=1,INU) 
0766* 140 FORMAT (IH ,7X,2H**,72A1) 
0 767* RETURN 
0768* END 
0800* SUBROUTINE OPTCIWON) 
0801* COMMON 0GRID(42,72),I0ATA(2,72),ISCALE(42),DET(300)• 
* OPTS(30C),OPT 









0801* DIMENSION X (3) ,STEP(3) ,B1 (3) ,B2(3) ,B3(3) , B4(3) 
0802* DIMENSION SUBSUM(300) 
0813* DO 1 1=1,208 
0814* GAMO(I)=ALOG((1.2*DET(I))/(L-L.2*0ET(I))) 
0815* SUBSUM(I)=ALOG(DET(I)/(L-DET(I))) 
0 815* SUBSUMD) SSUBSUM(I) »GAMC (I) 
•816* GAM1(I)=(«25*SUBSUH(I))/QQQ(I) 
0817* GAM2(I)=(,75*SUBSUM(X))/(QQQ(I)*SSS(I)) 
0 818* 1 CONTINUE 














OO 10 I=1*IW0N 






SUBROUTINE PTRN(NP,P,STEP*NRD.COST.Bl*B2 tT.S.10) 
COMMON DGRID «.2. 72) . IDATA (2. 72) .ISCALE(<»2>.DET (300 ) . 
OPTSC300)tOPT 
• SSQ(300> .PMAT(9).ESTPR(6.50).ESTCR(6.5Q>, 
PRIS(30D)*GAM0(30 
• GAMK300) .GAM?(300) 
C0MM0N/BL0CK/STAil,STA22,STA33*NN*CtC0UNT*TP0P*LLC0N 
DIMENSION P(3) ,STEP(3) . B K 3 ) ,B2(3) ,T (3) .S(3) 
999 FORMAT("PATTERN SEARCH"//) 
1000 FORMAT(5X"Xl»***tXN*Y=",lP7D15*8/(18X7015.8)) 
1001 FORMAT("ITERATION ",I3.5X*"BASE POINT B AND Y(B) 
ARE") 
1002 FORMAT(" COMMENCE LOCAL EXPLORATION"/) 
100% FORMAT(//2X"Y(MIN)="*1PD15. 8//15f"FUNCTION 
EVALUATIONS RQ 
• ED"//2X"Xl f...tXN=",7015.8/(13X7015*8)) 
1005 FORMAT(35HINITIAL PARAMETERS OUT OF BOUNDS 
) 
1008 F0RMAT(2X"STEP SIZES="*1P7015.3/(15X7015.3)) 
1009 FORMAT(2X"EXTRAPOLATION FAILED* GO BACK TO OLD 
BASE POINT."/ 
li.10 FORMAT (2X"EXTRAP0LATE0 POINT T AND V (T) ARE" / 
5X"X1«***,XN, 
•Y ="*1P7D15*8/(18X7D15«8) ) 
11111 FORMAT (2X"EXTRAP0LATION VIOLATES CONSTRAINTS. 
STAY WITH GIVE 




IF(IOUT.LE.Q>GO TO 7 
HRITE(3«1005) 
6 STOP 
7 ITTER s0 





1037* 8 S(I)=STEP(I>*10. 
10 38* IF(LLCON.EQ.I)CALL FOQJ(P.CL) 
1038* IF(LLCON.EQ.L)CALL OBJ(P.CL> 
10 39* L*L 
1040* ICK=2 
10 41* C1B=9999999999999999999999999.0 
1042* .IF(IO.LE.O) GO TO 11 
1043* WRITE(3,1001) ITTER 
1044* WRITE(3,1000>(P(J),J=1,NP>,C1 
1046* 11 00 99 INRD=1,NRD 
1047* 00 12 1=1,NP 
1048* 12 S D ) = S D > / 1 0 . 
1049* IF(IO.GE.2) HRITE(3,1008)(S(J),J=1,NP) 
1050* 20 IFAIL=0 
1052* IF(IO.EQ.3> WRITE(3,1002) 
10 53* 00 3C 1=1,NP 
10 54* IC=0 
10 55* 21. P(I)=T(I)*S(I> 
10 56* IC=IC*1 
1057* IF(LLCON.EQ.0)CALL LIMS(P,IOUT) 
1057* IFCLLCON.EQ.1)CALL LIHS1(P.IOUT) 
1058* IFDOUT.EQ.O )GO TO 215 
10 59* IFDO.LT.3) GO TO 23 
10 60* 02=999999999999999999999999.0 
1061* WRITEC3,1000)(P(J),J=1,NP),C2 
10 62* GO TO 23 
10 63* 215 CONTINUE 
1063* IF(LLCON.EQ.T)CALL FOBJ(P,C2) 
1063* IF(LLCON.EQ«L)CALL 0BJ(P,C2) 
10 64* L*L*1 
1065* II-(IO.LT.3) GO TO 22 
10 66* WRITE(3,1000)(P(J),J=1,NP),C2 
10 67* 22 IF(C1-C2)23,23,25 
1066* 23 IF(IC.GE.2) GO TO 24 
1069* SAI--'S(I) 
1070* GO TO 21 
1071* 24 IFAIL=IFAIL*1 
1072* P(X)=T(I) 
10 73* GO TO 30 
1074* 25 T D ) =P(I) 
10 75* C1=C2 
10 76* 30 CONTINUE 
1077* IF(IFALLOEQ.NP) GO TO 50 
1078* IF(CL.LTOCLB) GO TO 32 
10 79* C1=C1B 
1060* GO TO 60 
1081* 32 DO 351=1,NP 
1062* 35 B2(I)=T(I) 

















DO kk 1=1,NP 
kk T(I)=B2(I) 





'•6 00 k7 1=1,NP 
P(I)=T(I) 
kl B1(I)=B2(I) 
J T F ( I 0 , G E . 2 . AND.ICK.EQ.l) WRITE (3*1010) (T(J) , J = 1 , N P ) , 
CI 
GO TO 20 










GO TO 20 
70 C1*C2 
DO 75 1=1,NP 
75 B2(I)=T(I) 




GO TO tO 












COMMON DGRID(42.72)*IDATA(2*72),ISCALE(42)•OET(300) , 
OPTS(300).OPT 
• SSQ(300>,PMAT(9),ESTPR(6,50),ESTCR(6,50) , 
PRIS(300),GAMD(30 
























00 143 M0N=1,6 












• CAMK300) ,6AM2(300) 
201 
1201* C0NM0N/BL0CK/STAll«STA22 f STA331 NN» QCOUNT*TPOP*LLCON 
1201* DIMENSION X(3) 
120 2* IOUT=B 
1203* IFCX(1>.LT.0.010)IOUT=l 
120i>* :tF(X (D.GT.0.10) IOUT = l 
1205* :tF(X (2) .LT.0.001)IOUT = 1 
1206* IF(X (2).GT.0.011)IOUT = l 
1207* ;[F(X (3) .LT.0.200 ) IOUT = l 
1208* :CF(X (3) .GT.1.000 )IOUT = l 
120 9* RETURN 
1210* END 
1250* SUBROUTINE OBJ(X.Y) 
1251* COMMON DGRIO(%2*72)*IDATA(2,72),ISCALE(%2)fDET(300), 
* OPTS(300),OPT 
12 51*+ SSQ(300)*PMAT(9)*ESTPR(6*50)*ESTCR(6*50)* 
* PRISC300).GAM0C30 
1251*4- GAMK300) *GAM2(300) 
12 51* COMMON/BLOCK/STAlltSTA22f STA33f NNtQCOUNTtTPOPf LLCON 
1251* COMMON/BLOCKD/LO 
1251* DIMENSION X(3) 
1252* V=GAM0(L0)*GAN1(L0)*X(1)*GAM2(L0)»X(1)*X(2) 
12 53* RETURN 
125%* END 
1270* SUBROUTINE LIMS1(X,IOUT) 





1271* C0MM0N/BL0CK/STA11 VSTA22 VSTA33 VNNtQCOUNTtTPOPfLLCON 
1271* COMMON/BLOCKA/TPO(30D).QQQ(3C0>,C 
1271* COMMON/BLOCKB/SSS(300) .OETK300) ,XAM (300) «XAM1 (300) « 
* ZDIF(300) 
1271* COMMON/BLOCKD/LO 
1271* DIMENSION X(3) 
1272* IOUT=0 
1273* IF(X(2).GT.5B)I0UT=1 
127** ]F(X (2).LE.0)IOUT=l 





1500* SUBROUTINE CONTOU(NUMB*NCON*CLEV*FN* NXt NY*AXX*AXYt 
* XLABELvYLABEL*H 
1501* DIMENSION FN(60 * 60)*CLEV(1)*AXX(11 *AXY(1) 
1502* DIMENSION HP(62)»VP(62)*NSYM(52)»HC(1000)*VC(1000)* 
* NSC(IIOO) 
1503* DIMENSION LST(7) 
150%* INTEGER XLABELvYLABEL 
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D A T A n c h a r s / 6 / 
DATA ( l s t ( i o o o o o ) , 1 0 0 0 0 0 = 1 . 7 ) / I , 0 , 4 , 1 1 , 5 , 2 , 3 / 
n s = n y 
e p s = . 0 0 0 1 
x o r 0 0 0 = 0 . 0 
y o r = q . D 
i m = 1 
i h v s w = 2 
m t r a n s = 1 
z a p * L . o d o o o o o d e + o o 
I L L = 0 
j m = n s 
j x = n x 
i x = n y 
i f u 8 - n c o n ) * n c o n > 7 0 * 7 0 * 1 0 
1 0 i f < ( 6 1 - n y ) » c n v - 3 ) ) 7 0 * 7 0 , 2 0 
2 0 i f u 6 1 - n x ) * ( n x - 3 ) . l e . o ) G O T O 7 0 
GO TO 90 
7 0 W R I T E ( 6 , 8 0 ) N U M B 
S B f o r m a t ( " o e r r o r I N C A L L T O C O N T O U R F O R G R I D " , a 6 ) 
G O T O 1 1 6 0 
9 0 C O N T I N U E 
m r i t e ( 6 , 4 2 2 ) 
4 2 2 F O R M A T ( " 1 " , / / / , " E X A M I N I N G C O L U M N B Y C O L U M N 
P R O D U C E D " , 
• " t h e s e E S T I M A T E O c o n t o u r s " , / / / , " i " , 4 x , " x ( i ) " , 6 x , " j -
1 - * 
• 4 x » " y ( j - 1 ) " , 4 x , " f u , J - L ) j " , 5 x , " Y < j ) " . 7 x , " f ( i , j > " , 
7 x , 
• " y h a t " , 1 0 x , " c l " , / / ) 
i h v s w = 1 
DO 1 5 0 1 = 1 , N X 
Z A P S - z a p 
K P T * c 
DO 1 7 0 N C = L , N C O N 
C I L = c l e v ( n c ) 
a 3 = f n ( i , 1 ) 
y y = - 1 . 
J F < a 3 . g t . c l > Y Y = 1 , 
D O 1 6 0 j = 2 , n y 
a 4 = f n ( i , j > 
XFCCAL » * c l>*YY « g t.T) G O T O 1 8 0 
I F < a 4 . e q . c l > G O T O 1 8 5 
j j = j - 1 
X F ( a b s ( c l - a 3 > . g t . a b s ( c l - a 4 > > j j = j 
I S H = 0 
: [ F ( j j . e q . d i s w = i 
; [ f ( j j . e q . n y ) i s w = - 1 
B 1 = f n ( I , J J - L + i s w ) 
r 2 = f n ( i , j j * 1 s m > 
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b 3 = f n ( i , j j - h - u s h ) 
c 1 = a x y ( j j - 1 * i s w ) 
c 2 = a x y ( j j + i s w ) 
c 3 = a x y ( j j * 1 * i s w ) 
c a l l a p p r ( c l , b 1 , b 2 . b 3 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , x 1 * x 2 ) 
X X = x 2 
I F ( X l * G E * A X Y ( J - i > - E P S * A N D * X l * l e * a x y ( j ) * e p s ) x x = x 1 
W R I T E ( 6 0 1 1 1 ) I , A X X ( I ) , J - l , A X Y ( J - i ) , f n ( i , j - l ) . j . a x y ( j ) 
t f n ( i . j ) . x x , 
1 1 1 F O R M A T ( I X , 1 3 , I X , e 1 0 . 3 , I X , 1 3 , 1 X , E 1 0 * 3 , 1 X , E 1 Q . 3 , I X , 
1 3 , I X , 
• e 1 0 . 3 * 1 x * e 1 2 » 4 * 1 x * e 1 2 * 4 * 1 x , e 1 2 . 4 ) 
k p t = k p t « - 1 
h p ( k p t ) = a x x ( i ) 
w p ( k p t ) « x x 
n s y m ( k p t ) = l s t ( n c ) 
a 3 = a 4 
Y Y = i . 
i f ( a 3 * l t * c d y y = - 1 * 
g o t o 1 6 0 
1 8 5 k p t = k p t * 1 
H P ( K P T ) * A X X ( I ) 
V P ( K P T ) = A X Y ( J ) 
N 8 Y M ( K P T ) = L S T ( N C ) 
W R I T E ( 6 , 1 1 2 ) I . A X X ( I ) . J . A X Y ( J ) , F N ( I , J ) , X X , C L 
1 1 L 2 f o r m a t ( / , 1 x , i 3 , 1 x , e 1 0 . 3 , 1 x , 2 6 x » i 3 , 2 x * e 1 0 * 4 * 2 x , 
e i o * 4 * i x » 
+ e 1 2 . 4 * 1 x * e 1 2 * 4 ) 
y y = - y y 
a 2 i = a 4 
g o t o 1 6 0 
1 8 0 a 3 = a 4 
1 6 0 c o n t i n u e 
1 7 0 c o n t i n u e 
i f ( k p t . l e . 4 0 ) g o t o 5 7 0 
p r i n t 5 2 0 . n u m s 
5 2 0 f o r m a t ( " o t o o m a n y p o i n t s i n a r o w o r c o l u m n f o r 
g r i d m * a 6 ) 
d o 5 4 0 i x x x = 1 , k p t 
5 4 0 W R I T E ( 6 * 5 6 B ) K P T • I X X X . H P ( I X X X ) , V P ( I X X X ) , 
N S Y M ( I X X X ) 
5 6 1 9 f o r m a t ( " k p t , i x x x , h p , v r , n s y m ? * 2 i 1 i , 2 e 2 0 * 1 0 , 1 1 0 ) 
5 7 0 c o n t i n u e 
c a l l r e a r ( k p t , h p , v p , n s y m , i h v s w , z a p ) 
c a l l s t o r p ( k p t , x l l , h p , v p , h c * v c , n s c , n s y m ) 
1 5 0 c o n t i n u e 
w r i t e ( 6 , 4 2 3 ) 
4 2 3 F O R M A T ( " 1 " , / / / , " E X A M I N I N G B Y R O W S P R O D U C E S 
T H E S E " , 
e s t i m a t e d c o n t o u r s " , / / , " j " * 4 x , " y ( j ) " , 6 x , " 1 - 1 " , 4 x , 
" x d - l l " , 
204 
1608**%X»"F(I-l,J)",2X*"I"*5X,-X(I)",7Xt ,*F(I,J)",9X, , ,XHAT", 
1609**9X »"CL".//) 
1610* IHVSW=2 
1611* 00 950 J=1*NY 
1612* zap=-zap 
1613* KPT=C 
161** 00 970 NC-l.NCON 
1615* CL=CLEV(NC) 
1616* A3=FN(1,J) 
1617* YY=- 1, 
1618* IFfA3.GT.CL) YY = 1. 
1619* DO 960 1=2.NX 
1620* A*=FN(I,J) 
1621* IF((A%-CL)*YY.GT.O.) GO TO 980 
1622* JJsX-1 
1623* IF(ABS(CL*A3)*GT«ABS(CL»a*)) JJ=1 
162** IF(A*»EQ«CL) GO TO 985 
1625* ISW=0 
1626* IF(JJ.EQ.l) ISH=1 
1627* IF(JJ.EQ.NY) ISWs-l 






163** CALL APPR(CL,B1,B2,83,C1,C2,C3,X1,X2> 
1635* XX=X2 
1636* IF(X1*GE*AXX(I-1)»EPS«AND.X1»LE*AXX(I)*EPS) XX-X1 
1637* HRZTE(6«111) J,AXY<J>,Ifl,AXX<I-1),FN<I-1,J),I,AXX<I> 
* * 







16*5* IF(A3#LT»CL) YY=*1. 
16*6* GO TO 960 




1651* WRITEC6.112) J,AXY(J),I VAXX(I)*FNCI*J)«XX*CL 
1652* YV=-YY 
1653* A3*A* 
165** GO TO 960 
1655* 980 A3= At. 
1656* 960 CONTINUE 
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970 CONTINUE 
IFCKPT.LE.M)) GO TO 30*0 
PRINT 3020.NUMB 
3020 FORMAT("OTOO MANY POINTS IN A ROM OR COLUMN FOR 
GRID ".A6» 
DO 3070 IXXX=1.KPT 






IF(ILL.GT.O) GO TO S10 
PRINT 780tNUMB 
780 FORMATC"ONO CONTOURS FOUND OF SPECIFIEO LEVELS 
FOR GRID ".A6> 










127 FORMAT(//," SCALE FACTORS FOR FOR X AND Y ARE ", 
2E20.10.//) 
WRITE(6*815) 
815 FORMATC"l",///," SUMMARY OF POINTS PLOTTED".//• 
•liXt"X"tl2X»"Y".9X."PL0T COORDINATES IN INCHES "*2X* 
•"SYM #",//) 
00 1070 I=1.ILL 
XC=(HC(I)-AXX(1))/DELTAX 
IF (XCGT.36) MRITE(6.103> XC.I. HC (I) .OELTAX 
1113 FORMAT(F1D.3.I7.2F10.3." XC. I. HC (I) . OELTAX ") 
YC=(VC(I)-AXVC1)l/OELTAY 
HRITE(6v861) I.HC(I)»VC(I> .XC.YC.NSC(I) 
861 FORMAT(IX . 13 .2X. E12. %. IX . E12 .<•. 3X.E 12. %. IX . E12. %. 
3X.I3) 




1181 PRINT*. - NEGATIVE XC VALUE " 




IF( KPT «LE«1) RETURN 
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KPTM1=KPM1 




00 20 K=KK*KPT 
QQ=VP(K) 
IF(IHVSW.GE.2) QQ=HP(K) 















SUBROUTINE STORP(KPT,ILL,HP, VP,HCt V C N S C N S Y M ) 
DIMENSION HP(1),VP(1),HCC1),VC(1),NSC(1),NSYM(1) 
IF(KPT.LT.l) GO TO ID 
DO 20 11=1,KPT 
IF(ILL.GE.IOOO) GO TO 30 
ILL=ILL*1 
HC(ILL)=HP(I1) 





100 FORMAT(/,"1000 POINTS - LIMITED TO THESE ",/) 
ENO 
SUBROUTINE APPR(CL,B1,B2,B3,Cl»C2»C3»X1,X2> 












911 WRITE (6, 100) 




1 8 1 3 3 
1 8 . 4 4 * 
1 7 9 5 5 
1 7 3 6 6 ¥ 
1 7 7 7 7 ¥ 
1 7 6 8 8 
1 7 5 9 9 
1 7 5 1 0 * 1 7 ^ 2 1 
1 7 3 3 2 ¥ 
1 7 2 4 3 * 
1 7 1 5 h * 
1 7 ; 6 5 
1 6 9 7 6 
1 6 8 8 7 
1 6 7 9 8 * 
1 6 7 0 9 * 
1 6 6 2 1 
1 6 5 3 1 
1 6 4 4 2 • 
1 6 3 5 3 
1 6 2 6 4 
1 6 1 7 5 • 1 6 1 8 6 
1 5 9 9 7 ¥ 
1 5 9 0 8 ¥ 
1 5 8 1 9 ¥ 
1 5 7 3 0 ¥ 
1 5 6 4 1 ¥ 
1 5 5 5 2 ¥ 
1 5 * * 6 3 ¥ 
1 5 3 7 4 ¥ 
1 5 2 8 5 ¥ 
1 5 1 9 6 '¥ 
1 5 1 G 7 ¥ 
1 5 ; L D * 1 4 9 2 9 ¥ 
1 4 8 4H ¥ 
1 4 7 5 1 ¥ 
1 4 6 6 2 ¥ 
1 4 5 7 3 ¥ 
1 4 4 8 4 ¥ 
D D 
• 
C O D 
0 D 
D 




0 O D D 0 
1 0 
0 
W¥¥¥¥ ¥¥¥¥¥¥ ¥¥¥¥¥•¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥¥ 
P L O T O F T H E T O T A L O F F E N S E S T I M E S E R I E S 
F R O M J A N U A R Y * , 1 9 7 4 T H R O U G H D E C E M B E R , 1 9 7 6 
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. 0 1 8 1 4 5 
. 0 1 7 8 9 5 
.01777L 
. 0 1 7 6 4 5 
. 0 1 7 5 2 U 
. 0 1 7 3 9 5 
. O I 7 2 7 _ > 
. 0 1 7 1 4 5 
O 1 7 0 2 C 
J O L 6 9 9 5 
.01677G 
C 1 6 & 4 5 
.01652C 
. 0 1 6 3 9 5 
.016270 
.016145 
. C L 6 U 2 C 
.©15995 
. 0 1 5 7 7 R . 
. 0 1 5 6 4 5 
. 0 1 5 5 2 0 
. 0 1 5 3 9 5 
. 0 1 5 2 7 0 
. 0 1 5 1 4 5 
.C?15u 2f 
. © 1 4 8 9 5 
X > 1 4 7 7 C 
. 0 1 4 6 4 5 
• O 1 4 5 2 0 
. 0 1 4 3 9 5 
. 0 1 4 2 7 L 
, 0 1 ^ 1 ^ 5 
. O 1 4 G 2 0 
. 0 1 3 3 9 5 
,013770 
. 0 1 3 6 4 5 
. O I 3 5 2 T 
. 0 1 3 3 9 5 
. 0 1 3 2 7 0 
. 6 1 3 1 4 5 
.0132 20 
O O O O O D 
D O D C D O 
O D O O D O O D O D O O 
ooooco 
D O D O O D 
P L O T O F D E T E R R E N T E F F E C T T I M E S F R I E S 
F R O M J A N U A R Y , 1 9 7 4 T H R O U G H D E C E M B E R , 1 9 7 6 
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AUUJKOING TO OUR MOOEL.OPTIMISATION OF © O U C Y V ARIA 6i_ 
GIVES THE FOLLOWING RESULTS 
PERIOD 












• 3L 61 
. 3C61 
















































STARTING WITH «>ERIGD21 
AND ENDING WITH PERIOD 2?9. 
INCAPACITATION WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING PE RCE NTAGFS OF CRIMES 
SAVED 
REAO ACROSS FROM ..EFT TC RIGHT 
22.159 21.541 22.35- 22.4C1 21.772 21.532 
21.869 21.535 21.657 21.402 21.671 21.7<;u 
19.544 19.477 19.595 19.1.96 19.602 19. b5<. 
19.692 19.496 19.567 19.575 
TMF VECTOR OF MONTHLY DETERRENT EFFECTS FROM JANUARY,1974 UNTIL DECEMBER,1998 IS REAO FROM LEFT TO RIGHT 
•013020328152 
,013020 32 6211 
.013020328183 










THE RATIOS OF THE SAVINGS IN TOTAL OFFENSES FORECASTED tfSTEHMING FROM OPTIMISATION),TC THE TOTAL OFFENSES 
T ? R S 9 S S T I J ? 0 E 2 ? PERIODS 1/75 ,TO, 12/98 BY THE MODEL IS REAO ACROSS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT 
.02271 .02271 .02271 .02271 
.02271 .02271 .02271 .02271 
.02271 .02271 .02271 .02271 
•02271 •C2271 •C2271 •02271 
•02271 •02271 •02271 .02271 
.02271 • 02271 •02271 .02271 
•C2271 •0 2271 .02271 
•02271 •02271 .62271 
.02271 •C2271 .02271 
.C2271 •C2271 •C2271 
•02271 .02271 •02271 
.02271 .02271 .02271 
SAVINGS IN REPORTED CRIMES PEF PERIOD 
THRU OPTIMISATION 
WERE AS FOLLOWS 
360. 351. 351. 371. 385. 396. 423. 430. 455. 1.62. 4 86. 
329. 352. 352. 37J. 391. 395. 427. 430. 459. 1.61. (.91. 
332. 35<.. 359. 375. 387. 395. 423. 430. 455. 462. 486. 
336. 352. 353. 366. 394. 411. 429. 443. 461. 475. 492. 
J41. 352. 365. 374. 389. 408. 425. 440. 457. 4 72. 468. 
346. 352. 367. 37*. 399. 411. 433. 443. 465. 47*.. 496. 
929. 936. 961. 968. 993. 10CO. 1024. 1031. 1056. 10 63. 
93*.. 936. 965. 966, 997. 999. 1328. 1031. 1060. 1062. 
929. 936* 961. 968. 992. 999. 1024. 10 31. 1056. 10 63. 
935. 949. 967. 981. 999. 1013. 1030. 1044. 10 62. 1076. 
931. 946. 963. 978. 995. 1009. 10 26. 1041. 1058. 10 73. 
939. 949. 971. 981. 1003. 1012. 10 34. 1044. 1066. 1076. 
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